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For some, the creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) constitutes a watershed 
event for fixed income markets. For others, it is the mere culmination of a long-established trend of 
increasingly liberalized and globalized financial markets. If forced to choose, I find myself more comfortable 
in the revolutionary rather than the evolutionary camp. Perhaps the root cause of this point of view is that I 
witnessed the momentous impact of the irrevocable locking of national currencies to the Euro on bond 
markets and its participants from my desk on one of many fixed income dealing rooms in London. As a Euro 
bond strategist, my task had been to advise market practitioners on the changeover to the single currency 
since roughly the middle of the 1990s. As Chairman of the ECU/Euro Bond Committee of the European 
Federation of Analysts’ Societies (EFFAS), I worried together with my fellow strategists over the technical 
aspects of this changeover. Many hours were spent on the detail of the harmonization of bond conventions 
and the redenomination of bond contracts, alongside ongoing work on the provision of benchmark bond 
indexes. The bond investor community, though initially skeptical, started to turn their attention to the 
arrangement of their investment portfolios when the political momentum got serious. It was this more 
forward-looking debate on strategies for portfolio allocations best suited for a bond market with certain 
assumed hypothetical properties that I enjoyed most of all. For several years following the immediate 
transformation of national bond markets to the single currency, I remained a practitioner in the Euro bond 
markets, now as an advisor to sovereigns on the positioning of their debt in the newly created market. As 
such I continued to gather first-hand experience of the ongoing changes EMU brought about, to the fixed 
income markets at large and the behavior of investors therein. My privilege has been to assume the part of 
academic researcher and study the impact of EMU on the bond markets. I do so with the benefit of 
hindsight and market data, and out of an ongoing desire to learn more about the operations of our financial 
markets. This research remains true to my background and interests, for it is a fusion of market practice 
and theory.  
It has been an exciting journey which has taken me nearly five years from start to finish. I would not 
have been able to complete it without the support from various corners. I am especially indebted to 
Prof.dr. Sylvester Eijffinger and Prof.dr. Dick van Wensveen for their initial faith in my ability to succeed and 
their ongoing enthusiasm for my research as it was progressing. Their comments and guidance have proven 
invaluable throughout. I am grateful to Prof.dr. Pjotr Hesseling and dr. Norman Schreiner from the Faculty 
Club of the Erasmus University in Rotterdam for pointing me in their direction as possible promotores. The 
Faculty Club remained supportive even as my virtual desk transferred from Erasmus University to Tilburg 




 One of my most beneficial and lasting learning experience I obtained from my cooperation with 
Prof.dr. Ronald Mahieu on the empirical study. I thank him for his patience and encouragement as I 
brushed up my rusty econometric modeling skills. His input in this stage of my research proved its worth 
many times. I would also like to thank the other members of my committee for their comments on the 
manuscript and their support: Prof.dr. Frans de Roon, Prof.dr. Lex Hoogduin and Prof.dr. Harry Huizinga.  
During the theoretical stage, several institutions opened their doors to me in and gave me an 
opportunity to stay in touch with market practice. Sociéte Generale granted me an internship and I had the 
pleasure of working on my thesis in their fixed income dealing room in London for several months. This 
internship happened to be at the most turbulent time for financial markets that certainly I have seen in my 
short career. It was exciting for me to be there among the action and to experience the tremors in the bond 
markets. I am grateful to Ciaran O’Hagan and Vincent Chaigneau of the fixed income research group at 
Societe Generale for arranging my internship. I also spent a month at the Financial Research division of the 
ECB in Frankfurt which was as enjoyable as it was motivating. I thank dr. Philipp Hartmann for extending 
the invitation and Simone Manganelli of the ECB and visiting researcher Marta Gómez-Puig from the 
University of Barcelona for our interesting sessions on the Euro bond markets. I thank Age Bakker at the 
IMF for arranging a week’s schedule of meetings for me with his colleagues in Washington at the time the 
IMF had itself just published a report on the integration of Europe’s financial markets. Equally, I thank 
Istvan Szekely and John Berrigan at the European Commission, whom I visited in Brussels, to receive their 
comments on a first draft of my review on the economic literature on international financial integration. 
Every researcher knows that good data is half the job done. Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley, EFFAS and 
Dealogic all need special thanks for allowing me to work with their data. The technological assistance from 
IT Couple Emil and Katie Glownia was pure magic and transformed my copious amount of eurobond data 
into a format that could be fed into MatLab.  
I mention my precious family last, but they come of course first in all this. They deserve special 
thanks. The truth is that this thesis would never have seen the light of day without the initiative of my 
husband Folker. He has been a beacon of encouragement and support from start to finish, allowing me to 
overcome what seemed to me insurmountable obstructions. Our wonderful children, one of whom was just 
born when I started work in earnest on this thesis and the other right in the middle of it, have been 
incredibly patient with me. I dedicate this thesis to my precious family and to my parents.      
 
              Mary Margaretha Anna PIETERSE-BLOEM 
 
Tilburg, The Netherlands 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
 
1.  Motivation 
 
The integration of financial markets and optimal portfolio allocations and diversification strategies remain 
subjects of theoretical debate among economists. Given the potential implications for market practice, the 
debate is followed with sincere interest and occasionally contributed to by its various quarters. Among 
those are monetary authorities, economic policymakers, financial regulators and of course fund managers. 
All stand to benefit from new findings.  
The subjects of international financial integration and portfolio diversification are strongly 
interrelated. Integrated financial markets are a prerequisite for diversified international investment 
portfolios. In turn, the extent in which portfolios are diversified is indicative for the degree of financial 
integration that has been achieved. The desire to increase financial benefits from better portfolio 
allocations is often a leading force in the further breakdown of any remaining barriers between national 
financial markets. In this sense, there is an ongoing dynamic interaction between financial integration and 
international diversification. Despite this strong interrelation, the two subjects are contended with in near 
dichotomy within economics. International financial integration has been analyzed mainly within the realm 
of macroeconomics and international portfolio diversification within the realm of financial economics. It is 
only recent that a number of studies have crossed over into each other’s territory to much effect in the 
dual study of international financial integration and benefits of international portfolio diversification. This 
thesis is positioned in this new and fertile common ground. It concentrates on the bond markets, a part of 
the financial markets where I gained my market experience and the area where more academic research is 
required.  
   This thesis studies investor behavior with respect to their portfolio allocations and diversification 
opportunities in the bond markets and in the context of the increased integration of these markets in 
Europe. It takes the position that the formation of the economic and monetary union (EMU) marks a 
momentous event with significant immediate and ongoing implications for the constitution and operation 
of European bond markets and the scope of investment opportunities therein. In the immediate aftermath 
of the event, financial studies provide mostly a descriptive analysis of the impact of EMU on financial 
markets and portfolio allocations. The focus hereby often includes fixed income markets where the direct 
changes are most visible. Theoretically driven empirical analysis is mostly reserved for equity markets 
though.     2 
 
 
   My overall research question is as follows: How have investor portfolio allocations and 
diversification opportunities in the European bond markets evolved in the transition to the single currency, 
and what does this in turn offer in terms of evidence of the process and state of the financial integration of 
these markets?  A wealth of economic literature provides a multiple of different methodologies in which 
this subject can be approached. I arrive at my chosen methodology in three stages. In the first stage, an 
extensive review of the measure-based literature on international financial integration results in an analysis 
of the course of the integration of fixed income markets in Europe. The initial conditions offered by 
macroeconomic theories that are most effective in quantifying financial integration have been mostly 
applied to the short end of fixed income markets, i.e. the money markets. Here, the barriers to full capital 
mobility for assets that are highly substitutable can be relatively easily identified. When attention shifts to 
the long end of fixed income markets that are the bond markets, as this thesis does, additional factors 
come into play and the analysis becomes richer. The second stage descends from this more theoretical 
analysis to a market-based analysis of the fundamental way in which these markets have changed and an 
account of vanishing and emerging investment opportunities for bond investors due to EMU. The logic in 
this sequencing of stages is that both render important insights into the ability and opportunity of bond 
investors to make uninhibited allocation choices. This ability and opportunity is chiefly in reference to 
prevailing market barriers and the fusion of fixed income markets under the Euro. Once this is established, I 
turn to an analysis in the third stage which incorporates beyond the ability the willingness of investors to 
seize the opportunity to benefit from changing diversification opportunities in European bond markets.
1  
This willingness is chiefly in reference to the actual behavior of investors. The chosen methodology is to 
analyze this investor behavior with the use of European bond returns in the assumption that investment 
decisions are led by risk-reward benefits in returns. I do this first by determining which factors (country and 
industry) best describe European bond returns. I then use spanning and efficiency tests to analyze what the 
effect of this is on portfolio diversification strategies for fund managers with a mean-variance performance 
objective.  
At the third stage, the thesis could have taken different turns. The study could have adopted a 
qualitative approach. This could have been fulfilled through a survey of institutional investors to uncover 
patterns of changing investment flows, bond portfolio compositions and diversification strategies in 
Europe. This was indeed my original idea. However, in the course of stage one (Chapter 2) and as I gain a 
much better understanding of the vast set of methodologies that have been developed in the field, I 
become drawn to a more quantitative approach. By means of a quantitative approach, this thesis could 
have taken the direction of a study into the home bias in European bond portfolios. Home bias is well 
                                                
1 Note that the terms ability and willingness are used in a broader sense than in Chapter 2 where they are used to describe 
international financial integration from the perspective of the theory and conditions on interest parity deviations only. 3 
 
 
known to stand between the ability and the willingness of fund managers to optimally diversify their 
portfolios. A variety of methodologies have been developed to analyze this phenomenon in asset portfolios 
which in adopted form could have been applied here. However, specifically as regards the prevalence of 
home bias in European bond markets, the second stage (Chapter 3) compounds evidence, albeit 
incomplete, that EMU has elevated national home bias to a Euro home bias in bond portfolios. A 
quantitative study of home bias seems therefore more appropriate for the study of the integration of the 
Euro-denominated bond market with that of the rest of the world.  
As such my thesis has culminated neither into a qualitative survey into bond fund management 
practices nor into a quantitative study into home bias. Instead, I resolve to utilize methods from a new 
niche that emerges from my review of the literature on international financial integration (Chapter 2). This 
niche is where the traditional macroeconomic methods of measuring market integration cross over and 
draw on financial economic methods for determining the importance of country and industry effects in 
return variation and as a base for portfolio diversification. The general proposition is that with better 
integrated markets under EMU country effects decline. If financial markets in the Euro zone are completely 
integrated, then country effects are merely the result of differences in the creditworthiness of EMU 
sovereigns. These differences exist because each sovereign remains in control of its own political-economic 
and above all fiscal policy, though the latter supposedly within the bounds of the Growth and Stability Pact. 
Even so, since the single market incorporates the free flow of capital, goods and labor, it can be expected 
that the national economies of EMU countries will integrate further. Hence, the determination of the 
course of the importance of country effects is a measure of financial ánd economic integration. 
Furthermore, if the ex ante predicted industry specialization in countries takes place under EMU, the 
importance of industry effects should rise.  
The standard decomposition model first introduced by Heston and Rouwenhorst in 1994 allows for 
a direct specification of the importance of country and industry effects in return variation for a preselected 
time period. This is the first methodology I wish to use. If indeed the importance of country effects 
diminishes in bond returns and the importance of industry effects rises from the period before EMU to the 
period thereafter, then a shift in portfolio allocation from country to industry may result in a better mean-
variance performance. Econometric tests developed by Huberman and Kandel (1987) and De Roon and 
Nijman (2001) allow for a direct comparison of the mean-variance performance of country and industry 
portfolio return indexes. This is the second methodology I wish to use. Both methodologies combined will 
effectively determine the importance of country and industry effects in bond return variation, thereby 
implicitly indicate the financial and economic integration achieved under EMU and validate either as a bond 
portfolio diversification strategy.  4 
 
 
Financial markets lend themselves well to empirically verify whether ex ante integration 
assumptions have become real. Unfortunately, return index series dissected by geography and industry 
sector typically required for this type of research are not readily available for European bond markets. I 
suspect that this has deterred other authors from going down this path. My own experience as a bond 
market practitioner allows me to overcome this hurdle and to gather a wide-ranging database. The 
empirical analysis starts from individual eurobond price series; 6,440 in total are sourced from Bloomberg 
and Morgan Stanley. These are calculated to (outright) returns and converted into USD through exchange 
rates obtained from Datastream. They cover the period from May 1990 to March 2008 and are by design 
adequately long either side of the inception of EMU in 1999 to justifiably determine its effect. By means of 
each eurobond issuer’s information on country origin and industry base, obtained from the same sources, 
each USD return series can be classified accordingly. The information contained within the data set allows 
for further classification into liquidity and life-to-maturity brackets. While the industry groups include 
government institutions and thereby incorporate eurobonds from (quasi-) sovereign issuers, they serve as a 
proxy for the real government sector in this stage of the analysis. In a further addition, when the analysis 
moves to the level of portfolio indexes, return index series for domestic government bonds are obtained 
from EFFAS/Bloomberg to allow for the comparison between these two segments of the European bond 
markets. Here, excess returns are also required, calculated from the risk-free interest rate for which an 
appropriate proxy is obtained from Datastream.   
The empirical research that flows from this in the third stage (Chapters 4 and 5) is the heart of this 
thesis and my unique contribution to the research field. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study 
that analyzes both the factor decomposition and portfolio diversification strategies for European bonds 
over such a long period. The results amount to largely consistent conclusions on the evolution of the 
importance of country, industry and other effects such as liquidity and maturity in the risk variation of 
European bond returns and in the design of optimally performing portfolios from before to after EMU. 
These results can be indirectly verified with findings elsewhere in the thesis on the state of financial 
integration of bond markets in Europe under EMU and evidence from market practice on shifting bond 
allocations. Beyond that, they render important insights into the perceived course of economic integration 
at the national-economic and industry level within the Euro zone as observed by the bond markets.          
         
2.  Overview of chapters 
 
The three-stage set up of my research and described in my motivation is emulated in the chapters.  5 
 
 
   Chapter 2 is a review of a large quantity of research that has been produced in the field of 
international financial integration over the past four decades. It is structured around a focus on theories 
that are able to measure the process, degree and state of integration. An eclectic approach is adopted that 
organizes the more than fifty articles judged to have been the most defining into four strands: deviations 
from interest parity, savings-investment correlations, consumption growth correlations and determinants 
of capital controls. It is described how each strand produces its own specific conditions for the 
quantification of international financial integration and it is demonstrated how these conditions are 
theoretically linked. By virtue of a discussion of the empirical evidence each strand has produced, the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various conditions come to light. This discussion initially takes on a global 
perspective, but in the course of the chapter gradually converges on the integration of fixed income 
markets in Europe, the focus of this thesis. It is uncovered that by the time EMU commences and under its 
new reality, the measures of international financial integration discussed in the chapter so far are up for 
renewal. Some recent studies in the field have reached out to the field of financial economics to draw on 
methods for the study of equity return variation for inspiration of new integration measures for the Euro 
zone’s capital markets. This is described as a new direction of research and one that is identified as 
appropriate for the purpose of my own empirical research. 
Chapter 3 is a descriptive account of the evolution, and in some aspects even revolution, fixed 
income markets have undergone as a result of EMU. The account is based on indications from market 
practice including securities volumes and trading statistics and anecdotal evidence from investor surveys. It 
otherwise relies on similar descriptive articles in the finance literature. A detailed picture emerges of how 
EMU has succeeded in creating a large, deep and largely harmonized domestic fixed income market in 
Europe and has encouraged the emergence of hitherto underdeveloped sectors, first and foremost the 
credit bond market. In the context of these transformations in the landscape of fixed income markets in 
Europe, the changing asset allocation and diversification opportunities for bond portfolio managers are 
discussed. There is sufficient empirical evidence on the broader geographical diversification of European 
bond portfolios but only circumstantial empirical evidence as regards their larger credit diversification. The 
latter has, due to the lack of comprehensive data on bond portfolio compositions in Europe, remained 
understated in the finance literature.    
These first two material chapters provide the context for my empirical research; the first one 
(Chapter 2) from a theoretical point of view and the second one (Chapter 3) from a market practice point of 
view. Henceforth, the thesis concentrates on the empirical study of bond returns in Europe. It is again 
divided over two chapters. 
Chapter 4 is my empirical study into the factor decomposition of European eurobond returns in 
primarily country and industry effects and secondarily liquidity and maturity effects. It is based on the 6 
 
 
decomposition methodology of Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994). Within financial economics, theirs is 
adopted as the standard decomposition model. The creation of a data set of individual eurobond returns 
that is used for the purpose of the empirical analysis in this chapter and the next is described in detail. In 
the methodology section, the main decomposition model and its extended version following Varotto (2003) 
are outlined. The empirical results of both models for the entire sample period and the two subperiods 
around EMU are analyzed in detail. This study establishes the importance of country versus industry effects 
in European eurobond returns over the course of my sample period of May 1990 to March 2008, providing 
another perspective on the economic and financial integration achieved in Europe. It allows for first 
indications, based on the risk-contributing properties of factors, of whether eurobond portfolios 
constructed from a country allocation or an industry allocation have better merit and whether this has 
changed following EMU. In the course of this analysis, it is found that the common factor in eurobond 
returns is high. This is analyzed separately.    
Chapter 5 is my empirical study into the risk and reward properties of bond portfolios based on a 
country and industry allocation. Further to Huberman and Kandel (1987) and De Roon and Nijman (2001), 
mean-variance tests of spanning and efficiency are used to compare the performance of the two different 
types of bond portfolios. The methodology employed in this chapter complements that of the previous 
chapter and allows for more indications on whether a diversification strategy based on either country or 
industry yields better results in Europe, this time in a mean-variance framework. Results from the 
decomposition analysis of the previous chapter are utilized in this chapter, as country and industry 
portfolios constructed directly from eurobond returns and after decomposition are compared in their test 
results. As mean-variance tests are typically performed at a portfolio index level, indexes that represent the 
domestic government bond sector in Europe are included in this analysis.  
Chapter 6 provides a summary wherein it binds the analysis from the previous four chapters 
together. It summarizes the main conclusions in light of my overall research question and the concepts of 
ability and willingness introduced in the motivation of this chapter. Chapter 6 ends with a contemplation of 
the main results, drawing out their wider economic implications and their relevance for current events in 




International financial integration and EMU: Theory and evidence 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
With the use of some powerful theories, initially developed in macroeconomics, this chapter gives an 
overview of the evolution of thought on international financial integration.  The focus is on theories that 
have come forward with methods for the measurement of this integration. In the review of the empirical 
evidence of these theories and measures, initially an international perspective is adopted and financial 
markets in a broad sense are discussed. Gradually, this hones in on the process and degree of integration of 
the fixed income markets in Europe and within that the bond markets. By virtue of knowing of what has 
proceeded in terms of this academic debate, new directions of research are uncovered and also outlined in 
this chapter.  
   The 1980s sees a surge among macroeconomists to measure the degree, the process and the speed 
of international financial integration. Four specific strands of theory emerge from this effort, which 
continues in the 1990s and beyond. Three strands adopt a unique approach to the subject as regards the 
quantification of financial integration: deviations from interest parity, savings-investment correlations and 
consumption growth correlations. This chapter reviews the theoretical foundations of each of these strands 
and the conditions they put forward for the measurement of international financial integration. In this 
more theoretical discussion in the early part of this chapter, these conditions are unraveled to show what 
type of integration they imply and how they are interlinked. This discussion also shows up the strengths 
and weaknesses of the various theoretical conditions and their appropriateness for measuring financial 
integration. Following on from this, the chapter gleans the empirical evidence these theories and their 
related conditions have brought forward on the financial integration of capital markets, both 
internationally and in Europe specifically.  
The debate on capital controls among international macroeconomists, which commences in the 
aftermath of the gold standard and proceeds with vigor alongside, is also reviewed for this purpose as a 
fourth strand. The latter focuses more on “prerequisites for” rather than “consequences of” financial 
integration, which is rather the focus of the three strands that are first discussed. The debate on capital 
controls further differs from the earlier strands in that it is largely a qualitative debate on the desirability of 
free capital movements and financial integration. Nevertheless, the small part of this debate that takes on a 
more quantitative approach and attempts to measure and identify the determinants of capital controls 
provides yet further insights.   8 
 
 
Further to that, the debate on capital controls lends a historical perspective into the movement 
towards more liberalized and more integrated financial markets among industrialized countries post-WWII. 
This is taken on with accelerated effect in the 1980s under the up and coming laissez-faire spirit. In Europe 
specifically, the European Economic Community (EEC) makes a firm pledge by the end of the 1980s to 
create a single market within its territory. As such, capital controls are lifted by 1990. When in 1992 the 
Maastricht Treaty is signed the roadmap to EMU is laid down, culminating of course in the Euro in 1999. 
With that, the measurement of the integration of financial markets takes on a new meaning. Various 
European bodies are keen to establish the state of integration of the capital markets within the Euro zone. 
Capital markets have grown more complex by the start of the new millennium and in recognition of this, 
measures are considered for its various sectors. It is described in this chapter how this effort leads to the 
assembly of a set of new measures on financial integration.  
This chapter demonstrates that the cross-fertilization of the tried and tested measures from the 
macroeconomics field with methods borrowed from the field of financial economics, to date predominantly 
applied to equity markets, provides fertile ground for these new measures. It is shown that the end result is 
two-fold. The integrated set of old and new measures comprehensively attests to largely integrated 
financial markets in Europe under EMU. This high level of integration is shown to exist particularly in the 
fixed income markets, but with some notable differences across its various segments. Besides this 
significant verification, the cross-over territory between macroeconomics and financial economics is 
identified as a new and exciting direction of research. It provides a productive and constructive way 
forward in the empirical phase of my research into investor portfolio allocations and diversification 
opportunities in the European bond markets in the context of the increased integration of these markets.         
   The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses why international 
financial integration matters, in general and specifically for the purpose of this research. Section 3 gives an 
overview of the main strands of macroeconomic theories on international financial integration. It outlines 
the definition of international financial integration each inherently adopts and the type of financial 
integration they refer to. It also discusses in detail the support and the criticism each have drawn and 
presents their empirical evidence on international financial integration. Section 4 then considers the 
application of these theories to Europe, pre and post-EMU. As the constitution of capital markets changes 
dramatically under the Euro, available measures of financial integration are shown to be limiting in scope, 
giving rise to new measures derived from the literature of financial economics on equity return variation. 
Other new directions of research in the field are also discussed in this section. Section 5 concludes this 
analysis on the theory and evidence of international financial integration and EMU and looks forward to the 
next chapters. 9 
 
 
2.  Why the integration of financial markets matters 
 
From a theoretical perspective, open market economics rooted in neoclassical theory proclaims many 
benefits to the free movement of capital between countries, both at the macroeconomic and the 
microeconomic level. At the macroeconomic level these benefits are mainly derived as an extension to the 
benefits of the free trade of goods. The most important one of these benefits is the prediction of a more 
optimal global capital allocation as international financial integration frees capital to seek its most 
profitable use. Gains to capital generated in the capital exporting country will in theory more than 
compensate for any potential losses to labor and vice versa for the capital importing country. This results in 
higher economic growth in both countries. Positive economic growth effects from a more optimal capital 
allocation also arise through the channel of greater financial development. This occurs for example when 
funds for investment opportunities increasingly flow to more productive regions, in turn contributing to the 
efficiency of their financial system. Baele et al. (2004) refer to several studies that provide evidence that 
financial development positively effects economic growth. At the microeconomic level, financial integration 
offers opportunities for economic agents to share risk and to smooth consumption intertemporally. In the 
aggregate, this not only protects the domestic economy from shocks (provided that it is too small to 
influence the world economy), but this also implies that economic growth is not limited by a scarcity of 
domestic savings. Hence, any evidence to the contrary – i.e. that markets are not integrated financially, that 
capital is not perfectly mobile and/or that institutional, legal, tax or other barriers exist - sits very 
uncomfortable with this branch of international economics. Not only because it has produced many 
contributions based on the assumption of free movement of capital, but also because of the wealth 
implications from the inability of capital to move freely.  
   It has to be noted that the debate among economists on capital controls reveals some possible less 
desirable effects too of financial integration, often to do with a reduced ability of governments to control 
the effect of their economic policy. This brings the perspective of the policymaker out to the foreground. In 
the monetary sphere, Obstfeld (1998) labels this the ‘open-economy trilemma’. It means to say that a 
country cannot simultaneously maintain fixed exchange rates and an open capital market while pursuing a 
monetary policy oriented toward domestic goals and governments can effectively only chose two. Applied 
to the world’s developing countries, Montiel (1994) describes among the macroeconomic implications of 
financial integration that under a fixed exchange rate regime neither fiscal nor monetary policy can 
influence the terms for domestic borrowing and lending. Other policy implications are that financial 
integration influences the economy’s steady-state inflation rate, as even under weak financial integration 
domestic agents have means to escape an inflation tax. Staying with the topic of taxes but crossing over to 
the fiscal policy sphere, taxes on capital generally are harder to collect the more financial markets are 10 
 
 
integrated because capital funds can leave the domestic economy more easily. The latter is indeed an often 
heard fiscal price that open economies pay for financial integration, with possible adverse income 
distribution effects (Obstfeld, 1998).   
   Yet from the perspective of monetary authorities and indeed market practitioners, financial 
integration is often positively attributed with an inherent ability to enhance the efficiency of financial 
systems as a whole. Better functioning financial systems reduce uncertainty over asset prices and trading, 
allow for pooling of risks and optimal diversification of investment funds, mobilizes savings and provides 
the opportunity to institutions, firms, consumers and countries alike to borrow cost-efficiently. Greater 
international competition among financial service providers improves the price-quality of financial 
intermediation, aided by advances in financial technology and adopted methods of asset pricing and risk 
assessment. Von Furstenberg (1998) cites studies where this attribute of financial integration globally 
renders capital-saving properties. It also has the ability to improve productivity in the many non-financial 
businesses that are economically linked to the financial services industry. For monetary authorities in 
particular, financial integration is channel facilitating a smooth and effective transmission of monetary 
policy. The ECB has consistently advocated the importance of this channel in the case of monetary policy 
for the Euro area countries (ECB, 2005). But this financial market openness as a result of financial 
integration may also come at a price for financial stability. Faruqee (2007b), for instance, emphasizes risks 
of contagion. Closer financial integration increases the chances that developments in one financial market 
spill over to another and act as a transmission channel for shocks.  
   The debate on the relation between capital mobility and financial stability is one in its own right in 
international economics. It dates from a time in the 1980s and 1990s where often the opposite view is 
propagated, mainly with regard to the effectiveness and desirability of capital controls or to stem excess 
market volatility. Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz (1995) famously contribute to this debate by proposing 
to throw ‘sand in the wheels of international finance’. They suggest a global transactions tax to deter 
speculators and return some national autonomy to monetary and macroeconomic policy. Though this 
contribution, written in the aftermath of the ERM crises in the early 1990s, concedes that monetary 
unification would solve the problem of excess (foreign exchange) market swings for Europe, they propose 
that it will not solve this problem for the world as a whole where the costs of these capital flows lie in its 
diversion from more fundamental macroeconomic policy targets. In the same vein, Obstfeld (1998) asks 
whether the global capital market is indeed ‘benefactor or menace’. And though this second contribution is 
written in the aftermath of the Asian financial crises in the late 1990s, observations such as the following 
seem as relevant and poignant in light of events in financial markets from the sub-prime credit crisis since 
mid-2007: these “episodes again underline the need for more effective monitoring and regulation of the 
asset and liability structures of financial institutions [.., and] also underline the difficulty in discerning the 11 
 
 
true risk characteristics of institutions’ assets and liabilities.” (Obstfeld 1998, p 25). Section 3.3 provides a 
more elaborate discussion on capital controls but it is highlighted here that economists are by no means 
united in the view that integrated capital markets only bring benefits, for financial stability or indeed the 
economy as a whole. New research born out of the research on financial integration is again focusing on 
wealth effects and veers in the direction of financial stability aspects for which I refer to Section 4.3.2.  
   As regards Europe specifically, post-WWII efforts have focused on political, social and economical 
integration, which, as far as the latter is concerned culminates in the Single Market Act of 1990 and in EMU 
in 1999. There is no doubt that financial integration has played, and continues to play, a major role in this 
process. De Grauwe (2007) even goes as far as linking the success of financial integration with that of EMU 
itself. Arguing that the role of risk sharing is crucial in dealing with the unpleasant consequences of 
centrifugal forces in a monetary union, the ideal risk sharing mechanism would be the centralization of 
national budgets. In the absence of that, De Grauwe identifies the full integration of financial markets as 
the other main mechanism. Integrated stock, bond, mortgage markets and banking sectors work as an 
insurance system, as a shock in one country is then shared by all other countries. Though it is conceded that 
mainly the affluent with an ability to hold a diversified asset portfolio are likely to benefit and that 
ultimately some form of centralized budget needs to be put in place to fully safeguard EMU, it does not 
take away from the important role financial markets can play in maintaining or restoring stability. 
   In sum, one way or another and depending on the perspective, much hinges on the openness of 
capital markets and their financial integration.  But however intriguing this debate, it is beyond the scope of 
this research to study the benefits (and risks) of financial integration any further. The objective here is to 
merely point out the importance and relevance attached to its prevalence as a context for the theory and 
evidence in the empirical literature of the extent to which financial integration has advanced in Europe.  
 
3.  Main macroeconomic theories and empirical evidence  
 
The state and process of international integration of the world’s financial markets has been a topic of much 
debate among economists, with policy makers and market practitioners taking a keen interest in its 
practical implications. This section aims to provide an overview of the main macroeconomic theories that 
are developed with the specific aim to quantify international financial integration. I will also elaborate on 
the support and criticism they have drawn to put these theories further in perspective. Finally, some 





3.1. Three major strands of theories 
 
Eijffinger and Lemmen (2003a) bring together two volumes of classic and contemporary articles on financial 
integration. This selection is arguably the most defining in shaping the debate to date on the determination 
and measurement of international financial integration. I follow them in their eclectic approach to present 
three major strands that have been most influential in bringing forward theory-based methodologies to 
measure international financial integration: deviations from interest rate parity; savings-investment 
correlations; and consumption-growth correlations and international risk sharing. The main purpose of this 
section is to demonstrate definitions of financial integration, conditions and underlying assumptions that 
these theories are based on and the empirically testable conditions they produce for its measurement. 
Each strand is discussed in more detail in turn for this purpose. Furthermore, I will show how these theories 
are conceptually linked which will prove to be insightful in the subsequent discussion of their empirical 
evidence.       
3.1.1.  Definition of financial integration 
    
The debate on international financial integration shows that the notion itself is not analytically 
straightforward. What exactly is meant with international financial integration? Unfortunately, there is no 
unambiguous definition in the literature and each is intrinsically linked with the specific strand of theory. 
The most far-reaching definition of (perfect) international financial integration is that there is perfect 
international capital mobility and perfect international asset substitutability, such that investors face no 
barriers to instantaneously change their portfolios. Further clarification arises from the disintegration of 
these two essential building blocks of capital mobility and asset substitutability into six types of barriers 
that need to be absent for this state of perfect international financial integration to exist: 
-  Transaction costs (TC): refers to the differential cost of trading otherwise known as the bid-ask spread. 
Beyond that, it can refer to costs related to information gathering, including the costs associated with 
operating in a different language, time zone, and differences in financial reporting across countries.  
-  Capital controls (CC): refers to any policy designed to limit or redirect capital account transactions that 
may take the form of price controls (e.g. taxes) or quantity controls (e.g. quotas) and can be applied 
either to residents purchasing foreign assets (capital export controls) or foreign residents purchasing 
domestic assets (capital import controls). 
-  Asset-specific risks (AR): refers to differences in characteristics of assets, such as default and liquidity 
risks, tax treatment and eligibility for discounting at the central bank. 
-  Political risks (PR): refers to the risk that capital controls are imposed in future periods. 13 
 
 
-  Exchange rate risks (ER): refers to the risks associated with the currency denomination of transactions. 
These arise if the forward rate is not an unbiased predictor of future spot exchange rates.    
-  Purchasing power risks (PPP): refers to the risk that expected inflation differentials between countries 
are not offset by nominal exchange rate movements. 
Capital mobility, which is the ability of investors to adjust their portfolios, essentially depends on the 
absence of the first two types of barriers of transaction costs and capital controls. Asset substitutability, or 
the willingness of investors to adjust their portfolios, depends on the absence of all six types of barriers. 
While international financial integration defined as a state, referring to the existence of perfect or, in the 
opposite case, zero financial integration, is of theoretical interest to define a benchmark, practical interest 
focuses on measuring the degree of financial integration. International financial integration defined as a 
process refers to the gradual dismantling of the above barriers, affecting the degree of international 
financial integration (Eijffinger and Lemmen, 2003b). I now turn to each strand of theory to further 
determine the definitions of financial integration that are incorporated, the conditions and means of 
measurement they propose in practical sense. 
3.1.2.  Deviations from interest rate parity 
 
 This strand of theory fits into the price approach to financial integration for which the departing point is 
that the law-of-one-price holds. This law dictates that if markets are financially integrated then identical 
securities should be priced identically in them all, leaving no further room for market participants to 
arbitrage for profit. Tests on international financial integration based on interest parity conditions each give 
a different meaning and interpretation to the notion of identical prices. 
   The international money markets provide a setting in which the assumption of identical risk 
instruments is best satisfied and transaction costs are minimized. Prices from these markets are the 
cleanest test of financial integration. Closed interest parity is the relation between nominal interest rates 
on domestic instruments and instruments denominated in the domestic currency traded abroad, in the 
international offshore markets. Its synthetic approximation of covered nominal interest parity (CIP) is 
derived for identical (or otherwise comparable) instruments traded in the domestic market and in a foreign 
onshore market but denominated in a different currency. CIP conditions that any nominal interest rate 
differential thus observed is covered entirely by the forward premium. This measures the degree of 
international financial integration between (domestic and foreign) onshore markets.  CIP, otherwise 
referred to as perfect (international) capital mobility of Type I, implies a zero covered interest differential, 
or a zero country premium. Deviations from CIP reflect transaction costs (TC) and capital controls (CC) 
barriers to the integration of financial markets across national boundaries and is therefore a measure of the 14 
 
 
ability of investors to adjust their portfolios. The second type, Type II, of capital mobility is ex ante 
uncovered nominal interest parity (UIP) and holds if expected nominal interest rate differentials on 
identical domestic and foreign instruments are zero except for the currency denomination. If exchange rate 
expectations are held with certainty or investors are risk-neutral, then the forward premium in CIP may be 
replaced by the expected future spot exchange rate to yield UIP. Perfect capital mobility of Type II implies a 
zero country premium as well as a zero exchange risk premium. The latter reflects the willingness of 
investors to move funds across borders. Finally, capital mobility of Type III is ex ante real interest parity 
(RIP) and holds if expected domestic and foreign real interest rates are equal. RIP assumes that ex ante 
purchasing power parity holds continuously, i.e. PPP = 0, and that the expected change in the exchange rate 
in UIP may be replaced by the expected inflation differential between the domestic and the foreign 
territory. Perfect capital mobility of Type III implies not only a zero country and foreign exchange rate 
premiums, but also a zero expected real exchange rate change or in other words a zero deviation from ex 
ante PPP as well. For this reason it is often seen as measure of both international financial and non-financial 
capital mobility, where the latter is referred to as the mobility of goods and services and the mobility of the 
production factors labor and physical capital or technology (Frankel and MacArthur, 1998). 
   Conditions of deviations from interest parity can be formally written (omitting time and maturity 
subscripts for simplicity). For closed interest parity as: 
 
i = i 
euro ,  i
* = i
* euro                  (1) 
 
where i  is the domestic nominal rate of interest, euro denotes the rate observed in the offshore 
euromarkets and the asteriks 
* denotes foreign. For covered nominal interest parity (CIP) as: 
 
  i = i
* + (f – s)                    (2) 
 
where f is the forward exchange rate and s is the spot exchange rate.  For ex ante uncovered nominal 
interest parity (UIP) as: 
 
  i = i
* + (Es – s)                    (3) 
 
where Es is the expected spot exchange rate. For ex ante real interest parity (RIP) as: 
 
Er = Er




where Er  is the expected real return and Ep – p is the expected inflation rate (Eijffinger and Lemmen, 
2003b). Table 2.1 summarizes these formal conditions, states the assumptions they are based on and what 
they measure.  As expectations are difficult to observe, they are often assumed to be estimated with 
rational expectations, i.e. based on past information, and the ex ante UIP and RIP conditions are converted 
into ex post conditions for statistical measurement. 
3.1.3.  Savings-investment correlations 
 
 In 1980, Feldstein and Horioka publish an influential paper, arguing that with perfect long-term capital 
mobility, there should be no relation between domestic savings and domestic investment: “saving in each 
country responds to the worldwide opportunities for investment while investment in that country is 
financed by the worldwide pool of capital. Conversely, if incremental saving tends to be invested in the 
country of origin, differences among countries in investment rates should correspond closely to differences 
in savings rates.“ (1980, p 317). This condition of no correlation between domestic savings and investment 
has become known in the literature as the Feldstein-Horioka condition (hereafter FH condition). As this 
approach focuses on net transfers of real resources across national borders, it falls within the quantity-
based theories of international financial integration.  
Compared to the deviations from interest rate parity conditions, Feldstein and Horioka offer a 
deliberate distinction between short and long-term capital mobility. While part of the world’s capital stock 
is held in liquid form and mobile to arbitrage short-term interest rate differentials, perfect capital mobility 
should also measure such arbitrage type activity among long-term investments. Their analysis yields a very 




  k = α + β  
 




  k  is the ratio of gross domestic investment to gross domestic product in country k and  
 
  k  the 
same for gross domestic savings. In the extreme case of perfect capital mobility and for a country k that is 
infinitesimally small, the FH condition is that β, or the FH coefficient, would be zero. This is because an 
increase in the savings rate in that country would cause an increase in investment in all other countries in 
the world (including in country k) but the distribution of this extra capital would positively depend on the 
size of the initial capital stock (and the elasticity of the country’s marginal β  should only be in the order of 
magnitude of its share of world capital). Statistical tests of this type of capital mobility result in testing the 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































confidence intervals. Failure to reject the alternative hypothesis can be interpreted as evidence that there 
are substantial imperfections in the international capital market because a very large share of domestic 
savings tends to stay in the home country. Since the basic equation can also be interpreted in terms of 
foreign investment flows, where the excess of gross domestic investment over gross domestic savings  
(I – S)k is equal to the net inflow of foreign investment (except for the statistical discrepancy) and where it 
follows from national income identities that the current account balance (CA)k is equal to that net inflow of 
foreign investment, a regression of  
  
   k  on  
 
  k  should have a coefficient of β – 1.
1 Testing the 
alternative hypothesis H1: β = 1 in such equations tests that international capital flows do not depend on 
domestic savings rates and is an alternative measure of low world-wide capital mobility (Feldstein and 
Horioka, 1980; Feldstein, 1983). 
   To demonstrate the link with interest parity conditions is to show that the FH condition requires 
some additional assumptions to the most strict of interest parity conditions, the RIP condition. Dooley et al. 
(1987) propose that three conditions must hold in their framework before no correlation between savings 
and investment can be expected. First, investment must depend on a representative real rate of return r 
but not on other variables that are correlated with savings. So if there is an assumed linear relation, say  
 
 
   = a – hr + ε, then the error term must be purely random and uncorrelated not only with the national 
rate of return but also with national savings. Secondly, the foreign expected rate of return, r
*, must be 
determined exogenously. In other words, the country cannot be large enough in world financial markets to 
influence the world interest rate. Thirdly, the domestic and the expected real rate of return relevant for 
real investment and savings conditions must be equal, r = r
*. If the capital account balance CA is a function 
of the differential in these returns, CA = q (r -  r*), then the hypothesis is that q is infinite. Using this 





  , 
 
 ) = cov (ε, 
 
 ) – h cov (r
*, 
 
 ) – h cov (r -  r
*, 
 
 )          (6) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side is an expression of the endogeneity of investment and savings, the 
second term can be referred to as the small country assumption and the third as the RIP condition.    
                                                
1 Feldstein (1983) demonstrates that the basic equation can be rewritten as  
   
   k  = - α – (β -1)  
 
  k  - εk. Since the national 
income accounts divide the excess of domestic savings over domestic investment into net foreign investment (NFI) plus the 
statistical discrepancy in the savings-investment account (SDS) and by stating that NFI is conceptually equal to the balance on the 
current account (CA), this equation can be rewritten as  
  
   k  = - α – (β -1)  
 
  k  –  
   
   k  + εk. If  
   
   k  is uncorrelated with 
 
 
  k  then the β in this equation would be the same as the β in the basic equation.   18 
 
 
Dooley et al. further state that if any one of these covariances fails to hold, then there is no reason to 
expect a zero correlation between the savings and investment rate. But this is only true of course insofar as 
any non-positive covariance is not equally offset by the other two covariance terms. It is now no longer 
difficult to see that the FH condition may reflect imperfect integration in goods and/or factor markets 
(imperfect non-financial integration) just as well as imperfect financial integration. In other words, the FH 
condition examines net financial and non-financial capital mobility (Eijffinger & Lemmen, 2003). 
3.1.4.  Consumption smoothing and risk sharing 
 
Born initially out of an attempt to reconcile opposing empirical evidence resulting from the interest parity 
deviations and FH condition tests on the degree of international financial integration and a critique that 
neither is effectively underpinned by a benchmark model of an efficient world economy, Obstfeld (1986, 
1989, 1994) lays the foundations for a third alternative. This strand of macroeconomic theory uses 
intertemporal consumption patterns across countries as a measure of capital mobility. As with the strand 
based on savings-investment correlations, this strand falls within the quantity-based approach to 
international financial integration. Obstfeld utilizes the Euler equation characterization of optimal 
consumption behavior to devise essentially two tests on international financial integration: if markets are 
integrated then residents across countries will have access to the same set of financial instruments leading 
to testable restrictions on intertemporal marginal substitution rates (Test I) and on the comovement of 
consumption growth rates (Test II). I shall elaborate further on each test.  
   First, Test I. Here, Obstfeld’s Euler equation test implies that if residents of two countries have 
access to the same risk-free asset, then their expected marginal rate of substitution between current and 
future units of the home and the foreign currency must be equal.  Typical intertemporal consumer utility 
maximizing behavior subject to budget constraints in the stochastic setting of certainty forces the 
consumer’s plan for future consumption to obey the following expected marginal equality: 
 
Et [Rt+1 mt+1] = 1                   (7) 
 
where Rt+1 denotes the return on any asset between time t and t+1, and mt+1 the marginal rate of 
intertemporal substitution, which in turn is determined by a subjective discount factor β and the utility of 
consumption at time t and t+1. Now consider two countries, a home and a foreign country (denoted with 
an asterisk) and a world of integrated capital markets. A representative consumer in each country has 
access to the same risk-free one-period bond that carries a nominal interest it which is part of the time-t 





Rt+1 = (1 + it) Pt/Pt+1                   (8) 
 
where P is the price level. Let Rt+1 be corrected for exchange rate X if denominated in a foreign currency.  
Obstfeld shows that in such a world the following equation holds for the home country bond:   
 






t+1]           (9) 
 
and similarly for the foreign bond. Assume that consumers in each country are alike in terms of preferences 
and endowments so that consumption in the two countries can be aggregated. Further assume that 
preferences are identical across countries so that the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, α, is the same in both countries and β = β
*. Then Et (ηt+1) = 0 becomes observable ex post for 
different assumed values of α (if ηt+1 is a function of aggregate consumption C, the price level P and the 
exchange rate X, all at times t and t+1 and in both countries). Similarly, for η
*
t+1. The conditions Et (ηt+1) = 0 
and Et (η
*
t+1) = 0 can be falsified if discrepancies in marginal substitution rates at time t-1 can explain future 
discrepancies, leading to bond market segregation.  
   Hence, Obstfeld estimates regression equations for different values of α of the form: 
 
ηt = γ0 + ∑   
 
     ηt-i + υt                  (10) 
 
and equally for η
*
t . Error term υ is orthogonal to information dated t-1 or earlier. The empirical test entails 
to accept the null hypothesis H0: γ0 = γ1 = … = γi = 0 for i=1 ... N periods. This would imply perfect financial 
integration with respect to the risk-free asset in the home country, and acceptance of H0
* equally for the 
risk-free asset in the foreign country.  This Test I is therefore a joint test of perfect financial market 
integration (in the sense that the law-of-one-price holds for risk-free assets) and intertemporal 
consumption-smoothing behavior.  
Before proceeding with the second test, it is informative to establish the link between this Test I 
and the deviations from interest rate parity conditions. In the above model the Euler equation for the 
consumers in the home country of its domestic risk-free bond yields:  
 




where U’ is the marginal utility of individual consumption c. Now equally for the consumer of the home 




t) (Pt/Xt)/(Pt+1/Xt+1) mt+1] = 1              (12)  
 
Obstfeld rewrites the equality of these two conditions to establish the following relation between the 
nominal interest rate differential and the exchange rate as:  
 
(1+it)/(1+i*t) = Et(Xt+1)/Xt  * Qt 
where  Qt = {1 + [covt ((U’(ct+1)/Pt+1), Xt+1)]/Et((U’(ct+1))/Pt+1)Et(Xt+1)]}       (13) 
 
and where covt denotes a covariance conditional on time-t information. This expression shows that the 
nominal interest differential is determined by the expected depreciation of the exchange rate and a 
covariance term which may be interpreted as a consumer risk premium: the greater the covariance 
between the future marginal domestic consumption and the future exchange rate, the better serves the 
foreign currency bond as a hedge against this consumer risk and such a rise in the covariance leads to a fall 
of the foreign nominal interest rate relative to its home domestic counterpart. Clearly, when the consumer 
risk premium is zero, interest rates are linked to the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition, which relates 
interest rate differentials to the expected exchange rate moves.  
   Secondly, Test II.  Here Obstfeld’s Euler equation test develops a general method for analyzing 
international consumption comovements when there is cross-border trade in a complete set of state 
contingent assets. With perfect financial integration, insurance of consumption risks against any state of 
the world is traded on the financial markets where the set of securities that can be purchased freely as 
insurance is complete, then the result is that the marginal rates of substitution of different consumers must 
be perfectly correlated. Assume a world with many countries, a representative infinitely living consumer in 
each and with finitely many states of nature starting at time t with state st which transitions to the next 
state st+1 following a Markov probability law. If individual consumption utility in each country k, k=1…..N, is 
now also a function of the state the world is in, then so are marginal rates of substitution mk. Obstfeld 
derives the Euler equation as: 
 




where v denotes all verifiable events. He then demonstrates that with complete markets where all states 
are verifiable, i.e. can be insured against, the marginal rates of intertemporal substitution must be 
equalized, hence: 
 
 mk (βk, Ck(st), Ck(st+1)) = mj (βj, Cj(st), Cj(st+1))            (15) 
 
Now further assume that there is free international trade in a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities, 
that countries share a common risk aversion factor ρ in their individual iso-elastic utility function, then the 
following model condition emerges:   
 
log Ckt = log Cjt + log (Ck0/Cj0) + log (βk/βj)(t/ρ) + 1/ρ(θkt – θjt)        (16) 
 
A main implication of this condition is that national per capita consumption should move ex post in equal 
proportion, if time-preference rates coincide so that βk = βj and if there are no differential preference 
shocks between countries so that (θkt – θjt) = 0. Similarly, if Cwt denotes the world per capita consumption 
such that Cwt = ∑njt Cjt and nkt is the country k’s share in the world population, then:  
 
log Ckt = log Cwt + log Ck0 + (log βk)(t/ρ) + {θkt/ρ-log [∑jβjt/ρ exp (θjt/ρ)njt Cj0]}     (17) 
 
If there are no preference shocks and no population shocks, this condition implies proportional movement 
between the consumption of each country and world consumption. For reasons of avoiding incorrect 
statistical inferences (resulting, for example, when country and world consumption time series are not 
cointegrated), Obstfeld recommends that the above condition is tested with log-differences. Hence for the 
latter condition, one obtains the following estimate equation:   
 
∆log Ckt = α + β ∆log Cwt + εt                 (18) 
 
The test of perfect financial integration or full risk sharing is a test of whether the coefficient β  is 
statistically close to unity, i.e. H0: β = 1. This Test II is therefore a joint test of perfect financial integration 






3.2. Evidence and critique 
 
Each strand of theory has yielded many contributions with empirical evidence to establish the degree and 
speed of international integration of the capital markets for different subsets of countries in different time 
periods. It is impossible to discuss each and every contribution. I have therefore chosen a broad enough 
selection to allow for general conclusions and a discussion of the criticisms each strand of theory has 
drawn. I will also highlight, where appropriate, further modifications that have been proposed that have led 
to yet more empirical results. 
   The inconvenient truth is that not all evidence on financial integration uniformly points in the same 
direction and in some cases appear even outright incompatible, giving rise to a number of puzzles. In the 
words of Mussa and Goldstein (1993, p 260) who provide their own survey of the literature: “Even though 
there is by now a burgeoning literature that addresses directly the measurement of international capital 
market integration, it has proven difficult to reach firm and clear conclusions about the degree – if not the 
trend – of integration. This ambiguity reflects the fact that no single method of measuring the degree of 
integration is completely free of conceptual and technical difficulties that cloud its interpretation.” It is 
demonstrated below that their view on reaching a firm and clear conclusion on financial integration is 
probably too pessimistic and that results are often more congruent and compatible then they may appear 
at first sight. The key lies indeed with the interpretation of the measure of financial integration and that 
very careful consideration needs to be given to what exactly is being measured. With this in mind, the main 
empirical evidence that has been produced under each strand of theory is discussed in the following 
section. 
3.2.1.  Evidence of deviations from interest parity 
 
The main advantage of measuring financial integration by means of testing interest rate parity conditions is 
that it is the cleanest method of all. It is exactly known what and which market segment is being measured 
so as to leave little room for misinterpretation. It is intuitively easy to understand and based on long-
established economic laws of price competition among rational agents: if markets are open then the prices 
of similar goods (in this case financial instruments) between markets will be the same and if prices are not 
the same then barriers of some sort (e.g. capital controls) must exist. This is why this strand of theory is 
most widely preferred. Eijffinger and Lemmen (2003b, p xiv) for instance state that “the law-of-one-price 
definition of international financial integration is theoretically preferable, [but that] the measurement of 
international financial integration has often relied on broader concepts.” This strand has therefore drawn 
the most numerous empirical tests. But not all interest parity conditions have yielded equally good results 23 
 
 
and positive support from its users. Frankel (1992, p 197) for instance claims that only the covered interest 
parity (CIP) condition is “an unalloyed criterion for capital mobility in the sense of the degree of financial 
market integration across national boundaries”. Referring to earlier studies he conducted in 1989 and 1991, 
he concludes on the basis of CIP calculations for a panel of 25 countries that barriers have been low in eight 
developed countries at least as far back as 1982. Based on estimates of a time trend in the absolute value 
of CIP differentials, ten countries have a rate of decrease in the magnitude of the barriers that is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Frankel (1992) also discovers that calculations based on real interest (RIP) 
differentials for the same data panel yield different and sometimes anomalous results and offers the 
explanation that a substantial currency premium appears to drive real interest rates away from zero. The 
same evidence is brought in Frankel and MacArthur (1988) for a set of 24 countries, including seven less 
developed countries for the period 1982 to 1987. A high degree of capital mobility is found for most G11 
countries and Hong Kong and Singapore when based on CIP but not to the same degree, if at all, when 
based on RIP. The differing results on the basis of CIP and RIP are not inconsistent: financial integration of 
markets can be achieved in the sense that a country premium is eliminated but where a currency premium 
remains.  
   It is important to note that these early studies of interest rate parity differentials use money 
market rates series which are often consistently available for a large number of countries. Therefore, these 
studies measure the integration of international money markets only and are silent on other financial 
market segments. Eijffinger and Lemmen (1995) also present an empirical analysis of money market 
integration in Europe between 1979 and 1992. From mean (absolute) deviations from CIP for ten countries 
vis-à-vis Germany based on 3-month domestic interest rates, they conclude that with regard to the degree 
of financial integration, the size and variability of country premiums decline significantly after 1987. The 
same calculations based on UIP, however, provide dissimilar results for certain countries (e.g. the UK) and 
the failure of PPP and thereby also RIP is evident for an even greater set of countries. As with Frankel’s 
studies, these results are neither inconsistent as UIP violation can be attributed to expectation errors or an 
exchange risk premium, which for RIP are compounded with the violation of ex post PPP.   
   Mussa and Goldstein (1993) generalize these results from interest parity conditions for short-term 
financial integration from a wider range of studies with four main observations. First, CIP holds to close 
approximation for most short-term money markets in industrialized countries. Secondly, CIP differentials 
decline during the 1980s signifying closer integration. Thirdly, UIP does not tend to hold and that assets 
denominated in different currencies are regarded as imperfect substitutes. Fourthly, RIP is even rarer as 
this also implicitly requires close integration of the goods markets. At best, studies based on UIP and RIP 
show in the presence of significant differences a declining trend in size and variability (e.g. Eijffinger and 
Lemmen, 1995). In periods of substantial exchange rate volatility, real interest differentials are more 24 
 
 
accounted for by currency premiums than by country premiums (e.g. Frankel and MacArthur, 1988; 
Frankel, 1992). 
   Whereas this strand of theory starts off with the financial integration of money markets, 
subsequent efforts extend the scope of integration to include different asset classes. Three studies in 
particular are notable. The first one is from Popper (1993), who extends the interest parity strand to the 
longer end of the fixed income markets. Using currency swaps for five developed countries versus the US 
for the period 1985 to 1988, Popper is able to establish that mean absolute CIP deviations are not too 
dissimilar for five and seven year government bond maturities compared to 3-month money market 
maturities. She concludes that short-term integration extends with the wider use of swaps to long term 
integration in the late 1980s.  Another within the realm of fixed income markets is from Montiel (1994), 
who extends it to the domain of less developed countries. Estimating mean absolute deviations from UIP 
for 6-month deposit rates of 48 such countries versus 6-month US Treasury bills, Montiel finds that results 
are very mixed but that at least six countries can be identified as having high capital mobility. Dividing the 
sample period in half reveals that capital mobility increases in eleven countries. Both these studies highlight 
the inherent problem of interest parity studies of finding comparable assets when venturing into the longer 
or the higher yielding end of fixed income markets where assets are less substitutable. Finally, Mussa and 
Goldstein (1993) report that yet another branch extends the scope of integration enquiries to equity 
markets, where one approach is to examine premiums observed in closed-end country mutual funds but 
the more common approach is to consider correlations of stock price indexes and returns across countries. 
Results thus far are mixed, with these first studies showing that a number of country funds have 
significantly decreased premiums over the 1981 – 1989 period but the second studies showing that 
correlations of stock market movements across industrial countries are moderate in size and had not 
increased in the previous twenty years or so. This could again be an indication that in the equity markets, 
stocks in different currencies are regarded as imperfect substitutes. Overall, devations on interest parity 
studies that venture beyond the money markets remain somewhat of a rarity in the literature. 
   Notwithstanding the attractiveness of using interest parity conditions to measure the degree and 
the process of international financial integration, which they are clearly very capable of doing, particularly 
for short-term fixed income markets, this review also reveals a number of implicit shortcomings of this 
strand. These shortcomings can be summarized as follows. First, while CIP is the condition that holds most 
often, the risk with interest parity conditions based on CIP is that one possibly presents a tautology. From 
the practices of market participants it is evident that CIP is closely monitored at all times, because traders 
in the foreign exchange and currency swap market continuously use interest rate differentials to set the 
price of forward rates and vice versa. Secondly, evidence is strictly limited to the integration of specific 
segments of the financial markets only, mostly money markets. These are also markets that tend to be the 25 
 
 
most liquid and widely traded by large, sophisticated financial institutions. If, as suggested by Von 
Furstenberg (1998) international financial integration should also contribute to economic welfare by 
succeeding in integrating the market for a large number of diverse financial services, then interest parity 
conditions applied in this sense are of limited value. Thirdly, interest parity studies are prone to 
measurement error as the quality and reliability of measuring financial market integration with parity 
conditions depends heavily on the comparability and substitutability of assets. Differences in default risk, 
term to maturity and liquidity reduce substitutability and can lead to measurement error. To circumvent 
other sources of measurement error, it is important that the timing of interest rate data corresponds with 
the timing of exchange rate and other data necessary for the calculations. Fourthly, interest rate parity 
studies based on UIP and RIP are a joint test of financial integration and rational expectations, where their 
failure can be attributed to either or both. If realized exchange rate changes are a bad proxy for future 
exchange rate changes then UIP will not hold, and the same for expected price changes in the case of RIP.   
3.2.2.  Evidence of the FH condition, puzzle or misinterpretation? 
 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) controversially provide evidence of weak or low capital mobility among 
industrialized countries based on their FH condition of no correlation between domestic savings and 
investment. They conduct cross-country estimates of the regression of their basic equation (Eq. (5) in 
Section 3.1.3.) for a sample of 16 OECD countries for the period 1960 – 1974. This gives an estimate of β of 
0.89 for the entire sample period.
2  The coefficient proves statistically significantly different from one but is 
also incompatible with the hypothesis that the true value of β is zero. In their interpretation: “the evidence 
strongly contradicts the hypothesis of perfect world capital mobility and indicates that most of any 
incremental savings tends to remain in the [domestic] country”. (1980, p 321). Feldstein (1993) repeats the 
same finding for an extended sample to the late 1970s, with an estimate for β of 0.865 for this latter period 
and 0.80 for the entire sample period. Though lower than for the initial sample, indicating a higher degree 
of capital flows among industrialized countries in the second half of the 1970s, their earlier finding seems 
to be confirmed. Given the importance of Feldstein and Horioka’s findings of savings-investment 
correlations, they are listed in Table 2.2.  
These results from Feldstein and Horioka fly in the face of findings from interest parity deviations 
and the general convention that financial markets in the 1980s are more open and integrated following 
widespread deregulation. This is known in the literature as the FH puzzle. To add to the puzzle, 
 
                                                
2 This is in case where gross savings and investment are used. Feldstein and Horioka also provide results in case net savings and 
investment are used. In general, values of β tend to be even higher but also less reliable as net values are derived using an estimate 
of depreciation which tends to bias β upwards. I therefore only report values of β based on gross savings and investment. 26 
 
 
  Table 2.2 
The relation between gross domestic savings and investment ratios 
 
  Sample period  Constant  FH coefficient (β β β β)  R
2   
  1960 – 1974 
*  0.035  (0.018)  0.887  (0.074)  0.91   
  1975 – 1979 
**  0.046  (0.042)  0.865  (0.185)  0.57   
  1960 – 1979 
**  0.057  (0.028)  0.796  (0.112)  0.75   
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* From Feldstein & Horioka 1980, Table 2, p 321 
** From Feldstein 1993, Table 2, p 135 
 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) report that the finding of a high value for β remains valid when incorporating 
the rate of population as an exogenous variable in the basic equation to deal with the possible impact of a 
third variable when β is permitted to vary with a measure of the openness of the economy, or if indeed the 
basic equation is re-estimated using 2SLS to deal with the endogeneity of the savings ratio. Feldstein (1993) 
demonstrates that the result is consistent with a portfolio model.  Furthermore, the main FH finding of high 
savings-investment correlations remains remarkably robust in many empirical studies that follow, both in 
cross-section and time-series studies (mainly of OECD countries) and has become one of those stylized facts 
of economics.   
   Feldstein and Horioka’s proposition is that their finding is compatible with international mobility of 
short-term capital, because “a small part of the total world capital stock is held in liquid form and is 
available to eliminate short-term interest rate differentials, [while] most capital is apparently not available 
for such arbitrage-type activity among long-term investments” (1980, p 328). This provides little comfort to 
other scholars in the field. A flood of articles follow in an attempt to resolve the FH puzzle. While it is 
impossible to review them all, I rely on Coakley et al. (1998) for a summary of the various reactions to the 
FH puzzle. They divide the line of enquiry in the FH puzzle into two: ones to do with measurements of the 
savings-investment correlation and others to do with providing alternative interpretations to its result.  
   Indeed the initial response is to target errors of measurement to explain the FH finding. As regards 
data errors, focus is on sample sensitivity. The FH finding proves to be pretty robust in many repeat tests 
that immediately follow, with the exception of three results clouding the FH finding. First, differences 
resulting from the inclusion of less developed countries. Dooley et al. (1987) are one of the first to report 
evidence of a statistically different effect when they examine 62 countries of which 48 are developing 
countries and 14 are OECD countries. They find in OLS regressions that relate the savings and investment 
ratios, that the coefficients are higher for the industrial countries than for the developing countries, 
although they also find that the difference in these coefficients is not statistically significant when the 
entire sample is pooled. Montiel (1994) provides what is widely regarded as the definitive proof of the 
development effect when he calculates estimates of β on the largest sample to that date, for 62 developing 
countries for the period 1970-1990, and finds a surprisingly high degree of capital mobility according to this 27 
 
 
measure. The finding of higher FH capital mobility for many less developed countries than for industrial 
countries with more highly developed capital markets and fewer explicit capital controls, however, only 
adds to its controversy. Secondly, differences resulting from the inclusion of large countries or country 
blocs. This possible effect is alluded to by Feldstein and Horioka. When a country large enough to affect 
world financial market conditions experiences a fall in national savings, it might drive up interest rates and 
crowd out investment everywhere in the world. Dooley et al. (1987) attribute their development effect to a 
large country effect as they notice that their sample of developing countries contain small countries which 
cannot influence world interest rates. Coakley et al. (1998) report that several studies indeed find evidence 
of a country size effect, producing statistically significantly higher β values for large country groups than for 
small country groups. Jansen (1996) also finds such evidence with the estimation of his error correction 
model for 40 OECD countries over 40 years, namely that the large countries in his sample (USA, Japan), the 
EEC and the OECD have estimates of β close to one. Thirdly, differences resulting from regional effects. 
Contrary to the previous two, these have been supportive of the FH finding.  For example, Bayoumi and 
Rose (1993) use data for eleven regions in the UK for the period 1971-1985 and do not find a positive 
correlation between savings and investment in FH style regressions, which they deem consistent with the 
FH hypothesis. Coakley et al. (1998) report that other regional studies find similar results.  
   As regards econometric errors, the focus is on misspecification (common factors that can explain 
movements in savings and investment have been omitted), simultaneity bias (savings and investment are 
endogenous variables), financial and non-financial integration (the explanation is insufficiently integrated 
goods markets or markets of (non-traded) physical capital such that real interest rates are not equalized), 
cointegration (in the long run savings and investment are tied together, for example by the intertemporal 
budget constraint) and related to this, non-stationarity (the null of a unit root in national savings and 
investment rates cannot be rejected). Dooley et al. (1987) are one of the first to confront the endogeneity 
problem with an instrumental variables approach, including military expenditure over GNP and a 
dependency ratio in the basic FH equation, but this does little to clear up the FH puzzle. They ultimately 
attribute the FH finding to the breakdown of real interest parity conditions. Indeed, Coakley et al. (1998) 
report that the employment of various instrumental variables does not seem to alter the thrust of the FH 
finding. Exploring evidence of cointegration is a more useful exercise. Kroll (1986) finds evidence that a 
country’s intertemporal budget constraint biases results against capital mobility when using time-averaged 
data as Feldstein and Horioka do. Using annual data for 1962 – 1990 for 21 OECD countries instead and 
controlling for country size and international business cycle effects, Kroll’s evidence suggests that capital is 
mobile internationally. Jansen (1996) also finds that savings and investment hold together in the long run 
by an intertemporal budget constraint in several countries, the EEC and the OECD as a whole. Correcting for 
this and for the notion that the current account converges to a constant in the long run, he finds a low β 28 
 
 
value for eight countries and an average β value over the whole sample of 0.57, which is significantly below 
Feldstein and Horioka’s finding (see Table 2.2). Furthermore, Coakley et al. (1998) confirm that several 
studies find that time-series of savings and investment are non-stationary and the problem with this is, as 
Ghosh (1995) points out, that the correlation between them then becomes meaningless: “either savings 
and investments are co-integrated, in which case their asymptotic correlation is unity, or they are not co-
integrated in which case their asymptotic correlation is zero.” (1995, p 108). De-trending the data or 
expressing it as fractions of GDP does not resolve this econometric problem.          
   Another major line of enquiry is to provide an alternative interpretation to the FH finding and to 
reconcile it within specific economic models. Here, several authors construct theoretical models that 
simultaneously incorporate savings-investment correlations and perfect or high capital mobility. Coakley et 
al. (1998) state that these include general equilibrium models, real business cycle models and 
intertemporal models of the current account. Obstfeld (1986) is an example of the first, developing a life-
cycle model of consumption and growth in the world economy in which countries’ savings and investment 
are correlated though capital is perfectly mobile. It is demonstrated through simulated regression analysis 
that this theoretical model is capable of producing results similar to those reported by Feldstein and 
Horioka. This particular line of enquiry subsequently produces its very own measure of international 
financial integration based on cross-country consumption growth correlations (see Section 3.1.4.). Ghosh 
(1995) provides an example of the latter when he compares the variance of an optimal consumption 
smoothing current account assuming perfect capital mobility with the consumption smoothing component 
of the actual current account to determine capital mobility. He finds that for five major industrialized 
countries between 1960 and 1988, for all apart from the US this variance is higher, pointing to excess 
capital flows. Coakley et al. (1998) report that the general results of these contributions are actually 
opposing the FH finding with the one exception of Barro-style modified neoclassical growth models in 
which human capital is immobile.  
   Taken together, this barrage of literature forms a pretty damning criticism of the savings-
investment correlation strand as an appropriate measure for international financial integration. Coakley et 
al. (1998, p 171) sum the whole discussion up perfectly when they note that “despite the apparent 
robustness of the FH result of a high savings-investment association, the FH view or interpretation that the 
FH coefficient (β) can be identified as a measure of international capital mobility has been widely 





3.2.3.  Evidence of consumer risk sharing, an accurate test for financial integration? 
 
The previous section notes that one specific type of general equilibrium models rests on intertemporal 
consumption-smoothing and optimizing behaviour and grows out to produce its very own, alternative 
measure of international financial integration, namely consumption correlations. Overall, the results from 
this approach are closer in spirit to the ones from savings-investment correlations than the ones from 
deviations from interest parity conditions, although this strand does not reject full capital integration nearly 
as often as saving-investment correlations do. 
Obstfeld (1989) uses a particular model of intertemporal consumption choice and derives a test for 
perfect capital market integration by comparing marginal rates of substitution between consumption on 
different dates. Recall from Section 3.1.4. that this Test I estimates regression equations for different values 
of α of the form  ηt = γ0 + ∑   
 
     ηt-i + υt and that acceptance of the null hypothesis H0: γ0 = γ1 = … = γi = 0 
for i=1 ... N is seen as evidence of perfect integration. Obstfeld (1989) conducts this test for (only) two 
country pairs, Germany and Japan each with the US, resulting in a rejection of the null hypothesis for the 
sample period 1962 – 1985 as a whole. Splitting the sample period at 1973 produces the result that the null 
hypothesis is still rejected in both sample periods, but at a lower significance level in the first than in the 
second subsample. Obstfeld interprets this result as consistent with increased capital market integration in 
the early 1970s, though he admits that the test result is weak in the Germany-US case and only somewhat 
stronger in case of Japan-US. Further tests of underlying parameter specifications yield mixed support for 
the model and a more detailed specification analysis is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn.  
  Obstfeld (1994) develops a related test to determine cross-country consumption co-movements 
when there is international trade in a complete set of state-contingent assets. Recall from Section 3.1.4. 
that this Test II  estimates a regression like ∆log Ckt = α + β ∆log Cwt + εt where a coefficient β  statistically 
close to one indicates perfect international integration. While this test can indeed be conducted for cross-
country pairs, Obstfeld prefers to perform a regression of a country’s consumption growth to that of the 
(rest of the) world. He does so for seven industrial countries for the periods 1951 – 1972 and 1973 – 1988. 
Results are poor for the first subperiod, but reveal that for all countries other than the US and Canada, the 
β coefficient on world consumption rises, usually sharply, in the second subperiod. Over the period 1973-
1988 the hypothesis that β = 1 is rejected only for the US, but this is attributed to the fact that the US 
makes a sizeable fraction of world consumption. So the regression equation is re-estimated using rest-of-
world consumption levels. This yields similarly poor results. Including a measure enabling to distinguish 
whether domestic consumers benefit more from domestic or world consumption growth confirms a picture 
for 1951-1972 of an industrial world in which financial markets provide no insurance, while post-1973 30 
 
 
markets become more internationally integrated (while still falling short of providing evidence of complete 
integration) for all apart from Canada.  
  Bayoumi and MacDonald (1995) propose a more robust specification of Obstfeld’s (1994) test that 
enables to distinguish market failure from a lack of access to the domestic or the international market. This 
new specification is tested for cross-country consumption growth correlations for 15 countries between 
1971-1992 with an estimate for non-durable consumption per capita. The results indicate that Japan is the 
only industrialized country in the sample for which national consumption appears to be fully integrated 
with the rest of the world. The excess sensitivity of consumption to local income is the main source of 
failure for the remaining countries. For the EEC countries, failure mostly occurs due to the failure of real 
interest rates to equalize with world interest rates. The authors admit that one needs to be careful with 
drawing too strong conclusions from the test as the power of explanation has proven to be quite weak. 
   In general, the results, which are repeated elsewhere, seem to indicate that though markets appear 
to have become more integrated, consumption growth of countries are not completely correlated and that 
consumption risk is not fully insured in the international market. This gives rise to the international 
consumption correlation puzzle or otherwise known as the international risk sharing puzzle. Though this 
puzzle has not nearly drawn the same number of reactions as the FH puzzle in the literature, one 
contribution explains the persistence of this puzzle by separating between tradeable and non-tradeable 
leisure or goods and the effects of capital market restrictions on consumption risk sharing (Lewis, 1996).  
   The weakness of explanation power often found in the empirical results of consumption correlation 
tests already indicates that this strand is fraud with difficulties. These are both related to data issues and 
the underlying model, although much more fundamental in the latter case. Data issues that may yield 
misleading inferences in test results include the fact that published consumer series include expenditure on 
durable goods and non-tradeable goods and services, are seasonally adjusted, incorporates information 
that accrues over time, which are all contrary to the model specification. Also, in the model unconditional 
distributions of economic variables are kept constant while their conditional distributions may change over 
time and this would be incorporated into the consumption data. These data issues can all, to some degree, 
be mended. The more major drawback of this strand, however, is that the general equilibrium model of 
intertemporal consumption smoothing is mainly theoretical in nature, relies on a very strong set of 
assumptions which bear little relation to the real world and generally lacks supporting econometric 
evidence.  Obstfeld (1989, p 144) himself remarks: “A more fundamental question is whether the model 
underlying the tests [..] has any claim to empirical validity. Because the tests are joint tests of certain 
propositions about capital mobility and a particular model of consumer behavior, test results have no 
implications about capital mobility if the model is wrong.” Unfortunately, as Obstfeld also concedes, much 
of the evidence in support of the underlying model is discouraging. Therefore, and as with the FH 31 
 
 
coefficient, one can seriously question what consumption correlations actually measure, leading to serious 
interpretation issues. 
3.3. Capital controls and structural determinants 
 
Before proceeding with a review of what the capital controls debate brings in evidence of their existence, it 
is useful to put it in context with the strands of literature that have been reviewed so far. Von Furstenberg 
(1998) splits definitions of international financial integration into two categories: those relating to 
“prerequisites for” and those based on “consequences of” such integration. So far, only the second class is 
presented, which deals with testable consequences of financial integration deduced from atemporal rate 
arbitrage and intertemporal optimization models. Indeed, the capital controls discussion belongs to the first 
class, for this approaches the subject of integration from the perspective of necessary preconditions. It 
implies that international financial integration would be complete were it not for the existence of capital 
controls and other barriers.  
  The debate on capital controls goes back longer than attempts to measure international financial 
integration. The Tobin tax is for example already proposed in 1978. The desire to measure the degree, 
speed and process of capital mobility in the 1980s and 1990s is born out of the discussion on capital 
controls. All the while though, capital controls continue to be vigorously debated alongside, but where this 
debate takes on a distinctly different character. The capital controls discussion focuses primarily on 
qualitative issues: the desirability and effectiveness of capital controls; the form that these capital controls 
should take; their feasibility and likely effects on the economy; special macroeconomic and political 
circumstances in which capital controls may be justified; and how capital controls are positively reconciled 
in a general-equilibrium framework.
3  For the purpose of this research, to obtain evidence on the extent of 
the integration of financial markets, I leave this qualitative part of the capital controls debate aside and 
rather focus on the evidence this strand has produced on the existence of capital controls and any 
measures of quantifying this.  
  Evidence of the existence of capital controls is generally quantified through the construction of 
indexes for a panel of countries with the help of IMF annual reports on exchange arrangements and 
exchange restrictions. The IMF publishes this report since 1950 and for a great many countries reports 
whether restrictions on capital account transactions are in place, special foreign exchange rates apply for 
some or all capital transactions or invisibles. Epstein and Schor (1992) are among the first to calculate such 
an index for 16 OECD countries over the period 1967–1986. The index represents the number of restrictive 
                                                
3 For a flavor of this qualitative debate on capital controls, see Eichengreen et al. (1995), Garber and Taylor (1995), Edwards (1999) 
and Epstein and Schor (1992), wherein each of these arguments features. 32 
 
 
practices in place in each country in each year with a maximum of two. Epstein and Schor (1992) observe 
that the motivation for capital controls seems to be closely linked to political and institutional factors but 
leave this notion otherwise unexplored. This is instead further elaborated on in Alesina et al. (1994) who 
empirically investigate the relation between the presence and the removal of capital controls with the 
structural economic and political features of countries. This type of research has become known in the 
literature as the structural determinants of capital controls. Alesina et al. (1994) use a sample of 20 OECD 
countries for the years 1950 to 1989 and with the same IMF data construct a capital controls dummy 
(which takes the value of one when capital controls are in place and zero otherwise). They then perform a 
(probit model) regression of this capital controls dummy on a set of possible explanatory variables that 
include dummy variables for when a fixed exchange rate regime is in place and others to indicate 
government strength and central bank independence. The evidence reveals an a priori expected result, 
which is nevertheless interesting: that capital controls are more likely imposed by a strong government and 
when the central bank is less independent. The latter relates to the fact that governments benefit from an 
inflation-tax with higher seigniorage revenues from imposing capital controls. In these circumstances 
capital controls are able to keep real interest rates artificially low. This is linked with the deviations from 
interest parity discussion and this should then show up in such calculations but Alesina et al. (1994) 
unfortunately do not perform this test. They do find instead that capital controls are more likely at times 
when a fixed exchange rate regime is in place and in countries where the agricultural sector is bigger for 
which a variable is also included.    
  Milesi-Ferretti (1998), part of the set of authors of the original article, then extends the Alesina et 
al. (1994) analysis to a broader panel data set of 61 industrial and developing countries for the period 1966 
to 1989. Further extensions of his study are threefold. First, splitting the capital control dummy into two 
dummy variables, one for each type of restriction the IMF provides data for in its annual reports. Secondly, 
including a whole range of novel explanatory variables. Thirdly, using a slightly modified estimation model 
(a logit as well as a probit regression model) and in addition to the annual series also five year non-
overlapping averages to reduce serial correlation and to smooth out temporary shocks. Milesi-Ferretti’s 
results confirm the Alesina et al. results in many ways and particularly that capital controls are more likely 
to be in place when monetary policy is more firmly under the government’s control. Additional findings are 
that poorer countries and countries with larger governments are more likely to adopt capital controls.  
   Given that only the IMF data on the use of capital controls is on offer for a wide range of countries 
and over a relatively long period of time, the indexes are probably the best that can be produced in terms 
of a measure of the extent of capital controls. They are comparable and easy to interpret. But the 
limitations of the IMF data also translate to the limitations of the indexes. Edwards (1999) notes in this 
respect that the indexes are very general, do not measure the intensity of capital restrictions, fail to 33 
 
 
distinguish between the type of flows that is being restricted and ignore the fact that legal restrictions are 
easily circumvented. Epstein and Schor (1992) further note that a drawback of the IMF definition is that it 
does not include some practices of countries which might reasonably be considered capital controls. A 
possible alternative approach is shown by Lemmen and Eijffinger (1996) who measure the intensity of 
capital controls with closed interest parity deviations. Here any positive (negative) deviations are 
associated with capital import (export) restrictions. The drawback of this approach is that it can only make 
the distinction between these two broad types of capital control but cannot be more specific than that. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that all interest deviations are due to capital controls. An alternative route is for 
any researcher of capital controls to compile her own data on capital controls that have been employed in 
countries with a more detailed categorization of capital controls rather than rely on the limited IMF data. 
This is very costly and time-consuming indeed. 
3.4. Other determinants: legislation and information 
 
The previous section identifies certain economic, political and institutional factors as structural 
determinants of capital controls. Beside these structural determinants, the literature on international 
financial integration points to the legislative framework of countries and information asymmetries on 
countries as other significant determinants of financial transactions. Put differently, and in the context of 
the “prerequisites for” definition used at the start of the previous section, legislation and information 
equality are other necessary preconditions for international financial integration. Their asymmetry or 
inequality can severely impair the free flow of capital. 
  The importance of legal determinants is studied by La Porta et al. (1997) who, among 49 countries 
in the mid-1990s, try to assess the ability of firms in different legal environments to raise external finance 
through debt or equity. They pose the frequency and size of equity and debt financings in a specific country 
as a function of the origins of their laws, the quality of legal investor protection and the quality of law 
enforcement. They find strong evidence that the legal environment has large effects on the size and 
breadth of the capital market. Countries with poorer investment protection as measured by the character 
of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. Common law 
countries (UK, US) protect investors the most, French civil-law countries the least, and German and 
Scandinavian civil law countries somewhere in between. A closer look at the micro data also reveals that 
the largest firms appear to get external finance in all countries, even those where smaller firms do not. La 
Porta et al. (1998) are able to confirm these results for the same set of countries with the use of a wider set 
of variables. They offer the additional insight that share ownership in the largest public companies is 34 
 
 
negatively related to investor protection. This result is consistent with their hypothesis that small 
diversified shareholders are unlikely to be much present in countries that fail to protect their rights.  
  Information asymmetries have long been identified as a possible source for the breakdown of 
efficient markets.
4 Portes et al. (2001) find that informational asymmetries are responsible for the strong 
negative relation between asset trade and distance. The gravity model, which explains trade flows of goods 
between two countries by two masses (GDPs) and distance, is one of the best established empirical 
regularities in international economics. It explains international transactions in financial assets at least as 
well. Distance comes up strongly negative, i.e. the further two countries are geographically removed from 
one another, the less they trade each others’ financial assets. Portes et al. hypothesize that in the case of 
financial assets, distance is really a proxy for asymmetric information. They test if other variables for 
bilateral information flows are significant and if distance is less significant for asset classes where the 
information requirement is less, such as government bonds. Results from regressions of foreign residents’ 
transactions in US equities, corporate bonds and Treasury bonds over the period 1988-1998 and vice versa, 
on distance variables confirm their hypothesis. 
      Studies on determinants such as these serve as an important reminder that not just capital controls 
per se, but also the economic-political, institutional and the legal framework in which capital markets 
operate influence how much flows in and out of markets and influences their integration. Moreover, their 
transparency and the availability and equality of information determines to what extent investors from 
home and abroad operate as equals among each other in various country’s home markets. 
 
4.  The theory applied to Europe 
 
This section explores evidence from the various macroeconomic theories and applied research on the 
extent, degree and the process of international financial integration in Europe. Since the introduction of the 
Euro marks such a substantial change for the integration of capital markets, I divide the discussion in the 
period before EMU, in Section 4.1, and the period thereafter, in Section 4.2. Before EMU was even on the 
agenda, this is largely a discussion of capital controls and the limitations currency fluctuations pose to 
financial integration.  Though this may seem ancient history now, but it is only with an understanding of 
this history that the much better situation financial markets in Europe are in now can be appreciated. With 
the new reality of largely liberalized and much better integrated financial markets, particularly in Europe, 
academic research also adapts and branches out in new directions. This is discussed in Section 4.3.  
                                                
4 Akerlof G., (1970. The market for lemons: quality, uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 
(3), 488-500) is among the first to demonstrate the role of information asymmetries in markets, in this case in the second-hand car 
sales market where agents do not know a priori whether they are sold a lemon. 35 
 
 
4.1. Financial integration before EMU 
 
With the volume and the range of international financial transactions traded freely every day nowadays in 
the liberalized capital markets of industrialized countries that with the support of IT technology and 
integrated trading platforms and payment and settlement systems are executed relatively swiftly, it is 
perhaps hard to imagine that not so long ago capital controls in various forms and disguises ruled the day. 
By means of a summary, it will be seen that EEC ministers agree to a complete removal of capital controls 
by 1990. Various measures of financial integration observe an EEC effect, i.e. that within this economic area 
markets become noticeably better financially integrated in the 1980s and especially the early 1990s. By 
then efforts to create a single market (based on the Single Market Act) are well underway. The Maastricht 
Treaty comes into effect in 1993 which sets Europe on course for monetary unification. In the meantime 
though, it remains a collage of markets with their own national currencies whose internal volatility is tried 
to be contained through the European Monetary System (EMS) and the ERM. Studies based on interest 
parity deviations in particular detect that currency premiums remain the principal source of interest rate 
differentials in Europe at this time.  
4.1.1.  Capital controls until EMU 
 
 From Epstein and Schor’s (1992) historical account of capital controls in the OECD up to the 1990s, the 
distinct impression is obtained that capital controls have come and gone in waves over the past decades, 
coinciding with the prevailing economic intellectual climate.
5  A bird’s eye review based on their analysis of 
the ebbs and flows of capital controls over six decades up to the 1990s renders the following: 
1930s &   
 1940s: 
Exchange and other controls are introduced in most of the countries which later become 
part of the OECD, with the exception of the US and Canada, and remain in place in the early 
post-war period.  An early victory for (predominantly US) free movement of capital 
visionaries is when the IMF’s Articles of Agreement (entered into force on 27 December 
1945) adopt the view that controls should be removed as soon as possible, though there is 
no mechanism of enforcement.                      
1950s:  After 1952, restrictions on the current account and the use of foreign exchange are reduced 
substantially and rapidly and by the end of 1958 convertibility in Europe is established. There 
is less progress on the easing of controls on capital. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome commits the 
EEC to a liberalized environment for capital as well as goods and services.  
                                                
5 Epstein and Schor (1992) describe for example the influence of Keynes on the UK and indeed the European stance in favor of 
capital controls necessary for national policy and political autonomy, as opposed to the US stance which was more firmly rooted in 
neoclassical free market thinking. 36 
 
 
1960s:   In the early 1960s, the EEC passes two directives to liberalize capital movements which are 
followed by a marked reduction in restrictions. Nearly all countries ease restrictions on non-
residents accounts and curbs on repatriation of income are reduced. Capital markets are 
virtually totally freed in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium. Italy, France, 
Austria and Japan liberalize to varying degrees. The main exception is the UK, which raises 
restrictions on capital outflows in 1961. By 1965 progress to liberalize markets is halted when 
the US faces large capital outflows and adds restrictions on overseas borrowing and lending. 
This prompts measures by various European countries to limit inflows. A third EEC directive 
on free capital movement is introduced in 1967, but not implemented for another ten years. 
1970s:   The breakdown of Bretton Woods’ parities leads many countries to enact capital controls to 
avert foreign exchange crises. Most are removed once calm has restored to foreign exchange 
markets following the Smithsonian Agreement. However, the oil shock early on in this 
decade, labor unrest and worldwide recession lead to a sharpening of controls in many 
countries. By 1979, the tide moves against capital controls again. Japan and the UK lift all 
restrictions in 1979. 
1980s:  A general move towards deregulation and laissez-faire prevails in the 1980s, which leads to a 
sustained period of progressive dismantling of capital controls. In 1988, this culminates in an 
agreement by EEC ministers to a complete removal of capital controls by 1990.  This action is 
taken in conjunction with the more general trade liberalization proposed for 1992. 
Broadly speaking, the progressive (but sometimes slow) dismantling of capital and exchange controls has 
been virtually uninterrupted now among the major industrial countries since the 1980s. Mussa and 
Goldstein (1993) note that this has been accompanied by a broader based liberalization and reform of 
countries’ financial sectors. In their observation, the offshore markets and the banks lead the way prior to 
the second half of the 1980s, but since then the reformed domestic markets and securities markets have 
provided much of the momentum. They give a detailed overview of the various and numerous financial 
liberalization measures taken in the US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK from 1964 to 
1992 that attests to this observation. 
In Europe specifically, the winds of deregulation are also felt in the 1980s, but controls do not 
completely disappear from the landscape. Epstein and Schor’s (1992) capital control index gives a score of 
ten for all 16 countries examined (out of a maximum score of 32) in 1980-1983. Half of this score is 
accounted for by the four countries in his sample that would be among the first EMU entrants (Austria, 
Belgium, France and Italy). Only Germany and the Netherlands show the best possible performance in this 
respect. Beyond this limited measure of capital controls, Kenen (1995) also notes that in the early years of 
the EMS, established in 1979, a number of countries control capital transactions by their residents. Banks 37 
 
 
and financial institutions cannot lend freely to foreigners, not even to their affiliates in the international 
currency markets. Residents are not allowed to hold foreign currency assets freely, not even bank accounts 
in other European countries. These controls are deemed essential to the successful functioning of the EMS 
until 1992. It is believed that they reduce the amount of intervention needed from central banks to keep 
their exchange rates within the narrow EMS band defined by the ERM. When the German Bundesbank 
negotiates a devaluation of the Italian Lira in 1992, this is followed by severe pressure on more currencies 
and the exit of the English pound from the system famously on black Wednesday (16 March 1992). This is 
widely regarded as the collapse of the ERM as it had functioned until then. The wider fluctuation bands of 
the ERM officially adopted in August 1993 remove the need for capital controls. With the Maastricht Treaty 
entering into force in that same year (1 November 1993), Europe’s quest for a monetary union to start 
before the turn of the millennium is accompanied by a drive to create a single financial market in Europe in 
conjunction with the Single European Act (signed in February 1986 and entering into force on 1 July 1987) 
which sets a deadline for the creation of a single market by 1992.  
4.1.2.  Evidence of financial integration in a Europe with national currencies 
 
 Beyond the more descriptive account of capital controls in European countries prior to EMU, the evidence 
from measures of financial integration of each strand of theory discussed in Section 3 is now discussed. 
Eijffinger and Lemmen apply all strands of theory to the European Union in separate contributions. Their 
work is gleaned to surmise evidence on the state of the integration of financial markets in Europe prior to 
the Euro’s introduction. 
First and to continue where the previous section left off, consider evidence from the measurement 
of capital controls and its determinants in Europe. Here, Lemmen and Eijffinger (1996) extend the analysis 
of Epstein and Schor (1992) and Alesina et al. (1994). Instead of relying on a capital controls index which 
provides limited information, they compute deviations from (3-month) closed nominal interest parity to 
measure the intensity of capital controls. Unfortunately, their study does not provide details of the extent 
of financial integration under this measure or how it evolves over the period under investigation. The focus 
is rather on the identification of the fundamental determinants of capital controls.  They apply a pooled 
cross-section time-series approach with additional explanatory variables for this purpose. This analysis is 
carried out for 11 EU countries for the period 1974-1993 (averaging the country time-series for five-year 
periods). The regressions show that the realized inflation rate explains the intensity of capital controls most 
significantly, in line with results from Alesina et al. (1994) that inflation is a strong motivator for capital 
export controls. Government stability is the next most significant influence for the intensity of capital 
controls depends negatively on the frequency of significant government changes. Gross fixed capital 38 
 
 
formation gives some moderate explanation. The other variables, on the state of the economy and 
political-institutional indicators, are not found to be significant in the explanation of this measure of the 
intensity capital controls.    
Secondly, consider results from the application of interest parity deviations in Europe. Here 
Eijffinger and Lemmen (1995) assess the degree of money market integration in Europe by estimating the 
size and variability of mean (absolute) deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP of ten countries vis-
à-vis Germany. The sample period of March 1979 to August 1992 is split in September 1987 when the 
Basle-Nyborg agreement promotes better exchange rate stability in the EMS. Empirical results indicate that 
the size and variability of CIP declines after this date and that increased capital mobility of Type I is 
therefore evident. Eight countries in Europe have average country premiums of 32 basispoints or less per 
year in the October 1987 – March 1992 period and only Portugal and Greece have country premiums of 55 
basispoints or more. Ex post exchange risk premiums remain rather persistent, even after 1897, and the 
Netherlands is the only country with a relatively small exchange risk premium (19 basispoints) vis-à-vis 
Germany. On this measure, non-core EMS countries do show higher exchange risk premiums than core EMS 
countries. Eijffinger and Lemmen conclude as a result that “exchange rate volatility is the principal source 
limiting money market integration in Europe.” (1995, p 17). As regards ex post deviations from UIP, the 
Dutch money market is again the most integrated with that of Germany in both periods. The money market 
of the UK is not very well integrated according to the UIP condition, which is in contrast with results from 
the CIP condition for the UK. This, and the fact that no further conclusions can be drawn from the UIP 
condition highlights that the interpretation of this more stringent interest parity condition is more 
complicated. The failure of ex post PPP in the short run is evident for most European countries, though the 
size and variability decline from 1987. Ex post currency premiums remain rather persistent in Europe and 
are the main source of real interest rate differentials. There is a marked decline in deviations from RIP after 
the Basle-Nyborg agreement. From regressions of absolute interest deviations against a constant and a 
time trend to determine the speed of money market integration in Europe, Eijffinger and Lemmen detect a 
significant negative trend coefficient for all European countries for the absolute deviation from CIP and a 
catching up effect: those countries starting from a higher geographical segmentation from Germany in the 
beginning of the sample most rapidly integrated financially during the 1980s.  
   Thirdly, consider findings from the Feldstein-Horioka condition for Europe. Here Lemmen and 
Eijffinger (1995) perform both a cross-section and a time-series analysis of savings-investment correlations 
for all EEC countries (excluding Luxembourg) within the OECD for the period 1967-1990. For the cross-
section analysis the sample period is split at 1979 to take account of the establishment of the EMS and the 
EEC into an EC6 representing the core countries and an EC9 including Ireland, Italy and Spain. On the whole, 
lower values for the FH coefficient (β) are found than is usually the case in these types of studies, though 39 
 
 
none of the β-values are significantly different from zero. The result for the EC9 countries indicate an 
increasing degree of capital mobility of this type over time and that EC6 countries are more financially 
integrated than the EC9 countries. Contrary to expectations, the results for EC6 countries show a rise in the 
value for β over time, but Lemmen and Eijffinger explain that this may be due to the fact that these 
markets became so integrated that capital flows with the rest of the world diminishes. Results from time-
series using cointegration techniques are mixed and allow for one firm conclusion only and that an 
increasing degree of capital mobility in the 1980s in the EEC. It is also interesting to note the results from 
Jansen (1996) in this respect, who uses a specific error correction model to estimate the FH coefficient over 
time for 23 OECD countries over the period 1951-1991, because he also detects a similar and notable EEC 
effect. His results show that the OECD and the EEC as a whole have correlations close to one which suggests 
that the liberalization of capital movements has concentrated on financial flows among EEC countries. This 
is indeed the same conclusion that Lemmen and Eijffinger (1995) reach on the EEC.   
Fourth and finally, consider what Euler equations tests have produced for Europe. Here Lemmen 
and Eijffinger (1998) explore the relationship between returns on financial assets and consumption growth 
rates across countries for the EU. They perform three Euler equation tests, the two standard tests discussed 
in Section 3.1.4. and a new test (Test III) which predicts that real interest deviations are linearly related to 
expected consumptions growth rates in countries were perfect financial integration is achieved. All three 
tests are performed on 14 European countries for the period 1963 – 1992. The sample is again split at 1979 
to reflect the start of the EMS. Test I gives spurious results because financial integration seems to be 
stronger in the earlier period but the explanatory power of this test is also low. The main finding from  
Test II, which is performed for all country pairs, is that cross-country consumption correlations are typically 
higher during the latter period. Lemmen and Eijffinger take this as an indication of closer financial 
integration in 1979 – 1992 in the EU. All coefficients are substantially below one. Test III is performed for all 
countries with Germany as the reference and with respect to short and long-term bonds and stocks. Perfect 
financial integration is rejected in a number of cases. This result is somewhat confusing and is attributed to 
the low explanatory power of the test and to deviations from ex ante PPP, which possibly influence the 
results. At best, Lemmen and Eijffinger are able to conclude that the Euler equations tests may indicate 
closer financial integration in the EU after 1979, but they are clearly not taken with this as a substantive 
measure of financial integration. Bayoumi and MacDonald (1995) fare a little bit better. Notwithstanding 
the low explanatory power of their adaptation of Test II (with the inclusion of domestic income in cross-
country consumption correlations), they are able to detect an EEC effect in their results. They find for 15 
industrial countries over the period 1971-1992 that all the countries that produce evidence of a lack of real 
interest rate equalization are European and are continental members of the EEC. They conclude that the 
world appears to be divided into two zones: the UK and countries outside the EEC appear well financially 40 
 
 
integrated with the rest of the world but their consumption is often excessively sensitive to income, and 
within the EEC excess sensitivity to income is also important but their financial markets appear not so well 
integrated with the rest of world. Note the similarity of this finding with the conclusions from the Feldstein-
Horioka condition.  Sørensen and Yosha (1998) attempt to identify evidence of international consumer risk 
sharing in the OECD and specifically among EEC countries during 1966-1990. Their results contain three 
interesting findings. First, income smoothing via capital markets is lower in the EEC than in the US, which 
suggests that (private) capital markets are less integrated in the EEC than in the US in this period. Secondly, 
for the period 1981 – 1990, the fraction of shocks to GDP smoothed via international transfers is much 
lower in the EEC than in the US. Thirdly, for the period 1966 – 1990, about 40% of shocks to GDP in EEC 
countries is smoothed at the one year frequency via savings and half of that through national government 
budget deficits (and the other half though corporate savings). Apart from the overall conclusions on the 
state of financial integration of markets in Europe, another important policy conclusion of these findings 
relate to the financial stability and sustainability of further integration. In the absence of larger structural 
funds or an EU budget and in the presence of constrained budget deficits, capital market integration at the 
private market level needs to be severely enhanced to allow for better risk sharing. 
4.2. Financial integration after EMU 
 
Upon the introduction of the single currency on 1
st January 1999, capital markets change over swiftly from 
legacy currency to Euro. Especially the fixed income markets - comprising of the foreign exchange markets, 
money markets, bond markets and derivatives thereof - are quick to adopt the new currency of the 
monetary union. With only a few exceptions, outstanding securities’ contracts are smoothly redenominated 
to Euro and new securities are issued, quoted, traded and settled in Euro with harmonized conventions, 
business days and more synchronized government auction calendars from the first days of the inception of 
EMU. The impact of the Euro on Europe’s equity markets is more on the economic factors that drive share 
prices than on the structure of the trading of equity securities.   
As will be shown in this section, the distinction between the various segments of the Euro zone’s 
capital markets is relevant, as various degrees of financial integration can be observed in each. By means of 
a summary, several studies and indicators show a cascading of different levels of integration of different 
Euro market segments eight years into the monetary union. These differing degrees of financial integration 
between various markets in the Euro zone is expressed in Figure 2.1 on a spectrum between fully 
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4.2.1.  Measuring financial integration within the Euro zone 
 
The instant changeover of European capital markets to the Euro is a tremendous result and often cited as 
one of the success stories of EMU. Following this initial euphoria, attention turns to what extent market 
participants are utilizing their ability to freely trade capital market securities within the Euro zone and what 
barriers to this free trade remain across the various segments of the capital markets. In other words, to 
what extent are the Euro capital markets truly integrated? The European Commission commissions a study 
to measure the evolution of capital market integration in the Euro area and in the European Union as a 
whole. The resultant report, from Adam et al. (2002), draws on the methodologies and indicators proposed 
in the academic literature and reviewed in this chapter so far. A prime objective of their study is to identify 
suitable indicators for the frequent monitoring of financial integration in the Euro zone.     
In their selection of possible measures, Adam et al. (2002) distinguish price-based measures (that 
make use of the law-of-one-price) from quantity-based measures (that are mainly stock and flow 
measures). They state a preference for price-based measures for reasons of data availability and accuracy. 
However, rather than relying on the deviations from interest parity conditions as price-based measures, 
Adam et al. (2002) propose to rely on concepts derived from the economic growth literature and adapted 
for measuring financial market integration which they label β-convergence and σ-convergence. Specifically, 
they propose to estimate the following equation:   
 
∆    = α  + β       + ∑ γ 
 
    ∆      + ε               (19) 
 
where (∆)  is the (change in) interest rate in country c at time t (and n periods back), α  the country dummy 
and ε    an error term capturing exogenous shocks that force interest rates to differ across countries. The 
theory is that interest rate deviations tend to return to the long run equilibrium value over time and that 42 
 
 
dispersions are small, taking into account that financial prices are non-stationary. A β-value of zero 
indicates no convergence and a non-zero β indicates convergence.  The magnitude of β denotes the speed 
of convergence.  If the cross-sectional distribution of interest rates decreases over time then so-called  
σ-convergence occurs. This is when countries tend to become more similar over time in terms of deviations 
from the long run equilibrium value. Whereas β-convergence offers a measure of the speed of financial 
integration, σ-convergence indicates the degree of financial integration.   
   Adam et al. (2002) do not explicitly motivate their decision to ignore interest parity deviations 
measures, which had dominated the academic literature on international financial integration so far, in 
favor of their measures of β and σ-convergence. A possible motivation could be that these more 
conventional measures have proven their use mostly for a specific subset of the capital markets only; the 
money markets where instruments are short-dated. Measures are sought for the wider set of capital 
markets for which interest parity conditions seem less appropriate. Furthermore, interest parity conditions 
are less suitable in the case of a single currency area if one considers that CIP and UIP collapse back to a 
measure of closed interest parity. This is because the irrevocably fixed exchange rates within the Euro zone 
renders the difference between the forward or the expected future exchange rate and the spot exchange 
rate nil.  Any deviation between the forward or the expected future exchange rate and the spot exchange 
rate would rather indicate that the market anticipates that a Euro zone country were to adopt its own 
legacy currency again and would therefore constitute a measure of EMU break-up risk. Therefore, assuming 
that EMU prevails, under the conventional deviations from interest parity measures one ends up measuring 
either the one extreme of closed interest parity or the other extreme of real interest rate parity (RIP). The 
accuracy of the first as a measure of financial integration is immediately linked with the ability to find 
securities with the same risk characteristics that are traded inside and outside the domestic Euro zone 
country and whose prices are taken at the same time which is challenging, while the second as a measure 
of financial integration has widely been shown not to hold and is more difficult to interpret. Adam et al.’s 
concepts of β and σ-convergence are instead more general measures of economic and financial 
convergence of markets within the Euro zone. It has to be noted that these measures inherently capture 
the convergence of the economies of Euro zone countries, because economic convergence is reflected in 
the risk characteristics of the chosen securities for measurement, the more so the longer the maturities. 
Other factors, such as maturity and liquidity risks also come into play, which are inherently captured by 
such more broad measures of financial ánd economic integration.  
   To determine the degree and the speed of capital market integration, Adam et al. (2002) separate 
credit and bond markets from the equity markets and further propose measures to determine the effect of 
financial integration on household and corporate decisions and the role of legal institutions. They conclude 43 
 
 
that within the credit and bond markets on their measures of β and σ-convergence, there is fastest 
integration in the interbank loan market and government bond markets and slower integration in the 
mortgage loan and corporate loan markets. On quantity-based measures, integration of credit and bond 
markets is largely weak, though a Euro effect in the international portfolio composition of money market 
and bond funds is noticeable. This is also true for equity portfolios, but on all other measures the 
integration of equity markets is less than for credit and bond markets. As regards household decisions, 
there is evidence of increasing savings-investment correlations, but not of correlations of consumption 
growth rates. As regards corporate decisions, there is mixed evidence of increased cross-border M&A 
activity. Finally, the role and influence of legal institutions is largely unchanged. 
   In the spring of 2002, shortly after the Adam et al. (2002) report, the ECB and the Center for 
Financial Studies (CSF) start up a research network on ‘Capital Markets and Financial Integration in Europe’. 
Comprehensive work on the measurement of financial integration of the Euro area by the new network 
culminates in an ECB paper by Baele et al. (2004). Baele et al. group their various measures into price-
based, news-based and quantity-based measures. Within these overall categories, appropriate measures 
are devised for the bank credit markets, fixed income markets and equity markets. Here, the measures 
proposed for the fixed income markets, which are further segregated into the money markets, government 
bond markets and the corporate eurobond markets are of interest. In the definition of Baele et al., price-
based measures capture discrepancies in prices or returns caused by their geographic origin. As such, prices 
of fixed income assets with similar risk characteristics can be directly compared in the case of the money 
markets and their yields be compared relative to a well-chosen benchmark in the case of government 
bonds (such as German Bunds). Adam et al.’s concepts of β and σ-convergence are also adopted as 
adequate price-based measures of integration for which government bond yield are again used. Baele et al. 
borrow from the field of financial economics to introduce a new price-based measure for fixed income 
assets with dissimilar risk characteristics. Specifically for corporate eurobonds, they follow in the tradition 
of Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, 1995, 1999) and propose a novel measure to extract the proportion of 
cross-sectional return variance explained by country effects. Baele et al. argue that the lower the country 
effects in eurobond returns, the higher the integration of this market in the Euro zone. The second category 
contains news-based measures. These isolate the proportion of asset price changes explained by relevant 
news common to assets across all countries as reflected in the price movements of a benchmark asset. For 
government bonds, the following regression is run to separate common from local influences: 
 




where ∆    denotes the change in yield on the asset in county c at time t and ∆    that of the benchmark 
asset, α    is a time-varying intercept, β   a time-dependent beta with respect to the benchmark asset and 
ε   a country specific shock. Indications of increasing integration are if α   converges on zero and if β   
converges on one. The average distance of all country betas to one serves as an integration measure for the 
overall Euro market. Beside price and news-based measures, Baele et al., like Adam et al., propose the use 
of a third category of quantity-based measures, though often different from the ones proposed by Adam et 
al (2002). Baele et al. abandon to measure the indirect effect of financial integration on household and 
corporate decisions (and therefore do not calculate savings-investment and growth consumption 
correlations for instance) and the effect on legal institutions, but instead focus directly on various segments 
of the capital markets.  
   Indeed the merit of the Baele et al.’s effort is in the consistent application of their proposed 
measures to many more different market segments to assess financial integration for each individually, 
reflecting the now growing (complexity of the) Euro capital markets.  Beale et al.’s longer list of price, news 
and quantity-based measures more or less still confirms the earlier findings of Adam et al. on the state of 
financial integration of the various Euro zone markets. A high and almost complete level of integration is 
observed for the Euro money markets, a high but not complete level of integration for the government 
bond markets, a smaller but increasing level of integration of the corporate bond markets and equity 
markets and a low level and slow integration of bank credit markets. 
   Not long after the publication of Baele et al.’s (2004) study, in September 2005, the ECB publishes 
its first report entitled ‘Indicators of financial integration in the Euro area’. It adopts more or less the full 
range of measures of financial integration from Baele et al., some quantity-based measures from Adam et 
al., such as cross-border M&A activity and some new infrastructure measures on securities and settlement 
systems and retail payment systems. The ECB announces that this report is henceforth published annually 
and that the series of measures are to be updated and published bi-annually.  
   Based on the above studies and his own observations, Haas (2007) comes to what is, just before 
the sub-prime credit crises, the widely accepted view on the state of play on the integration of Europe’s 
financial markets in a similarly titled IMF publication. For the various segments of the Euro’s capital markets 
this view is as follows: 
Money markets:  The uncollateralized bank market is basically fully integrated. The repo market 
and the market for short-term securities, especially those issued by corporate 
and financial institutions, remains fragmented along national domestic lines. The 
market for commercial paper is Euro-wide and growing.                      
Government bonds:  The public debt market is largely integrated and liquidity has improved. There is a 
clear convergence of yields to within a very narrow band. The transformation of 45 
 
 
market infrastructures, particularly the widespread use of MTS as the inter-
dealer trading platform and its related primarily dealerships, has facilitated this 
integration.  
Corporate bonds:   The market for corporate debt has expanded rapidly and there is some, though 
inconclusive, evidence that industry factors play a more important role in the 
investment of bond fund assets. 
Securitized bonds:   Securitization is largely absent in the mid-1990s and has expanded rapidly but 
remains underdeveloped compared to the US. Covered bond markets have a 
stronger footing in Europe. 
Interest rate swaps:  Since EMU, interest rate derivatives develop significantly and are all based on a 
common Euro rate. 
Equity markets:  Integration trends in the equity markets remain less clear cut. Equity prices 
across countries are more correlated and there is a convergence of premiums. 
The consolidation of trading infrastructures is proceeding but remains largely 
fragmented. 
Retail finance:  Retail financial services, for individual and small and medium sized enterprises, 
remain highly fragmented. 
4.3. New branches of research on financial integration in Europe    
 
The research field on international financial integration in the 2000s branches out in different directions. 
While it is impossible to encapsulate all, I highlight three important ones: (i) application to specialized 
sectors of the capital markets; (ii) risk sharing and welfare effects of financial integration, and (iii) cross-
fertilization with financial economics studies on equity returns. In the description of each of these new 
directions of research in the sub-sections below, I stay with studies that focus on Europe. This is for reasons 
that EMU provides special empirical testing ground for research due to the uniqueness of its economic and 
monetary integration in the world and for reasons that it complements the evidence of financial integration 
of Section 4.2.  It will be shown that the third branch provides a compelling way forward in the dual study 
of the integration of European bond markets and portfolio diversifications. It is therefore dealt with last, 
but also in more elaborate fashion than the other two branches.    
4.3.1.  Application to specialized capital market sectors 
 
Macroeconomic studies on international financial integration that employ interest parity conditions focus 
to begin with on the money markets as this market sector provides for securities that are most similar in 46 
 
 
terms of their characteristics. Furthermore, prices for money market instruments are readily available in 
high frequency to researchers. Occasionally studies venture into the longer-dated spectrum of the fixed 
income markets, using government bond and currency rate swap data (e.g. Popper, 1993). Lemmen and 
Eijffinger’s (1998) study is notable for the use of short and long-term bonds as well as stocks to compute 
real interest rate parity deviations and to perform their Euler equation test of financial integration from 
consumption growth correlations theories. This remains a rare example at the time when European 
markets are still divided along national currency lines. Jump forward six years and note that Baele et al.’s 
(2004) compilation of measures for financial integration, extensively discussed in Section 4.2, includes 
price-based measures not only for the money markets and for government bonds, but also for various 
other sectors of the capital markets including the market for bank credit, corporate bonds and stocks. 
Therefore, Baele et al.’s study on the overview of financial integration measures already provides an 
important hint that the field of research has in the meantime moved on to different sectors of the wider 
capital markets.  
   Indeed, due to the growing complexity of capital markets, the literature in the field of international 
financial integration increasingly reflects that each sector merits its own approach. Here, I would like to 
highlight two studies that have each focused their attention exclusively on one particular segment to 
demonstrate the individual approach that is adopted: Stephens (2000) on the convergence of mortgage 
systems in Europe and Allan and Song (2005) on the effect of EMU on the integration of the financial 
services industry.          
   Stephens (2000) is intent on assessing the impact of EMU on mortgage system convergence. His 
study demonstrates that in the prevalent situation of very diverse mortgage finance systems in the 
European Union that it is challenging to directly measure price differences. Stephens therefore resorts to a 
more qualitative approach and devises a mortgage typology with three possible states of convergence: 
divergent, fully competitively convergent on a narrow definition of efficiency and fully convergent on a 
wide definition of efficiency. Stephens concludes that the first, divergent, state exists in the European 
Union. European mortgage systems differ in several respects, including the types of intermediary, the cost 
of funds, the mortgage products, the crude price of mortgages and the price of mortgages adjusted for 
contractual differences and risk allocation. The mortgage market in the European Union therefore lacks 
efficiency both in a narrow sense, defined as intermediation efficiency of the mortgage delivery system, 
and in a wide sense, defined as the economic efficiency of the housing finance system. Stephens anticipates 
that the Euro will provide a strong push towards the state of financially competitive convergence, as the 
single currency enhances price transparency of mortgages and creates greater competition in the savings 
market. Note that Baele et al. (2004) find some evidence of this prediction, as their price-based measure of 
mortgage rates shows signs of convergence, albeit slow. 47 
 
 
  Allan and Song (2005) study the effect of EMU on the integration of the financial services industry. 
They use data on announcements of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) within the industry for Europe as well 
as the Americas and Asia to disentangle the EMU effect from a globalization effect. The sample period is 
June 1998 to May 2003 and is subdivided into three periods to mark the different stages of EMU. A more 
focused analysis is also conducted within Europe, to enable a comparison of EMU with non-EMU countries. 
One of the main findings of the study is that EMU enhances the regional integration of the financial services 
industry within Europe. At the regional level, first, EMU has little effect on non-EMU European integration 
but appears to have reversed the trend of declining integration within the Euro zone area. Secondly, 
financial institutions tend to be acquirers rather than targets in cross-EMU M&A activity following the 
introduction of the Euro. Thirdly, there is more M&A activity among commercial banks and investment 
banks rather than insurance companies with the Euro zone. The other major finding is that EMU does not 
seem to facilitate the entry of non-European institutions into the European financial industry. Taken all 
together, there is some evidence that EMU has helped the integration of the financial services industry. 
4.3.2.  Consumer risk sharing and welfare effects of financial integration 
 
The consumer growth correlation model produces weak results for international financial integration and 
draws widespread criticism as an appropriate measure for it, as discussed in Section 3.2.3. As a result, the 
straightforward application of this model peters out relatively quickly after its introduction in the late 
1980s. It does, however, produce two off-shoots: risk sharing and regional industry specialization as related 
measures of financial integration, and the study of consumer welfare consequences of financial integration.  
   As regards the first, the notion of consumption sharing to smooth idiosyncratic risk, and perfect 
capital market integration providing the mechanism thereto, is extended to the notions of income and 
production sharing. I highlight two studies whereby the focus is on regions. Kalemni-Oznan, Sørensen en 
Yosha (2003) concentrate on the smoothing of regional output fluctuations and devise two mechanisms, 
income and consumer risk sharing, which are by extension each a measure of (perfect) financial integration. 
If income is perfectly insured within the risk-sharing group (of regions or countries), the personal income of 
each grows at the same rate as the group’s aggregate personal income and is not affected by idiosyncratic 
fluctuations of GDP, and the same for consumption. Ekinci, Kalemni-Oznan and Sørensen (2007), based on 
the prediction that with fully integrated capital markets capital will flow to regions with the highest 
productivity, produce a measure of ‘diversification’ finance and ‘development’ finance for the degree of 
financial integration within and between European countries.  Diversification finance examines whether the 
change in the ratio of output to income is positive for regions with high growth. Development finance 
examines whether the level of this ratio negatively depends on the level of output, which would be the case 48 
 
 
if formerly poor regions experience catch-up growth. Though again little evidence results on any of these 
measures of capital market integration, both studies bring out other interesting results. From Kalemli-
Oznan et al., that risk sharing among regions within federations is higher than risk sharing among countries, 
particularly so in the EEC, and that regions are more industrially specialized than countries. From Ekinci et 
al., that regions with the EU where confidence and trust is high are more financially integrated.   
As regards the welfare consequences of financial integration, Von Furstenberg (1998) writes that 
“the definition of worldwide financial integration must refer to its welfare-relevant functions or 
consequences.” (1998, p 53). Now welfare is a very broad concept that can be taken to mean a number of 
different things. In the case of Von Furstenberg (1998), the welfare opportunity is in the contribution 
financial integration has to make to the equalization of trading opportunities as represented by the real 
cost of financial services.  Various (highly liquid and frequently traded) market segments may indeed proof 
to be highly integrated (by interest parity deviations studies for example), but if such integration does not 
succeed in integrating the market for a large number of diverse financial services used by consumers and 
non-financial businesses, then its contribution to economic welfare is hampered. This is argued on the basis 
that intertemporal optimization conditions deduced from its real cost will be distorted. Von Furstenberg 
thus pleas for detailed industry studies of the international pricing of financial services in order to better 
understand the limitations of financial integration and how the international integration of ‘high finance’ 
can be brought down to market access for all. The literature has been spared a tidal wave of industry 
studies, but the call for the welfare enhancing properties of international financial integration has remained 
on the notions that capital mobility is underpinned by intertemporal consumer optimizing behaviour and 
international consumer risk sharing.  
This particular off-shoot from consumer growth correlations model produces better results 
compared to the previous one and also points to new research avenues for the future. Van Wincoop (1994) 
is an early and prime example of a study that uses the theory of consumption risk sharing to compute yet 
unexploited welfare gains associated with the reduced variability and better international pricing of 
consumption streams. For 20 OECD countries between 1970 and 1988 it is shown that the average welfare 
gain across countries (given realistic risk free rates and rates of relative risk aversion) is equivalent to a 
permanent increase in consumption by 1.8-5.6%, which amounts to one to three times the size of the 
entire securities services industry in the US. More recently, research on the welfare consequences of 
financial integration concentrates on the role of banks and how they contribute to interregional risk 
sharing. Acknowledging from prior studies that the most integrated market within the European Union is 
the unsecured money market or the interbank market, Fecht and Gruner’s (2005) study show how financial 
integration can nevertheless be welfare improving. They model a complex interbank market game. Allowing 
for constraint efficient risk sharing among banks, their model outcome shows that international integration 49 
 
 
is preferable to a world with non-integrated bank markets if the expected benefits – insurance against 
liquidity shocks – outweigh the expected costs – risk of financial contagion. It is also shown that further 
welfare gains can be obtained if the interbank market, beyond the initially assumed simple arrangements, 
would allow for cross-country mergers, which can improve interregional insurance against liquidity shocks. 
In an extension of this study to a multi-regional setting to include the secured bank market and the retail 
market and relying on direct revelation mechanisms, Fecht et al.’s (2007) study brings three further results. 
One, for a sufficiently small integrated financial area, a system relying on secured interbank lending is 
preferable because it does not entail financial contagion. Two, a financial area of intermediate size benefits 
most from an unsecured lending mechanism. Three, the larger the financial area becomes, the less the 
interbank market (whether secured or unsecured) is capable of providing efficient risk sharing, whereas the 
cross-border penetration of retail banking markets can. For Europe’s monetary union in other words, the 
Fecht et al. study underlines the importance of integrated retail banking markets to consumer welfare and 
financial stability, which can be achieved through cross-border transactions and bank mergers. Indeed, 
through the notion of risk of contagion in the interbank market, this new strand of research veers in the 
direction of the financial stability of EMU.  
4.3.3.  Cross-fertilization from equity returns studies 
 
It is discussed in Section 4.2.1 that the macroeconomic measures that bring out the clearest results and as 
such emerge from the debate on international financial integration relative unscathed are the deviations 
from interest parity conditions. These conditions find best application in financial markets where assets are 
highly substitutable. Studies on their empirical validity therefore test these conditions predominantly on 
money market instruments. Money markets represent the short end of fixed income markets. The 
application of interest parity conditions at the longer end of fixed income markets is rare for reasons that 
asset substitutability is reduced and this then interferes with any observation on the breach of these 
conditions. Whenever such studies do apply to the longer dated segment (e.g. Popper, 1993), it is with 
respect to government bonds where instruments are most alike. Beyond that, the empirical application of 
interest parity conditions grinds to a halt. Corporate eurobonds, marred by risk characteristics that are just 
too dissimilar, tend not to be studied in the framework of interest parity. Section 4.2.1. also describes how 
the field of financial economics provides inspiration for new integration measures to fill this void for the 
bond markets. It highlights methods to determine the importance of country effects in the variation of 
returns of bonds with dissimilar risk characteristics as one such integration measure. Such a measure can 
for once find application with the corporate eurobond markets, as Beale et al (2004) indeed have done.  50 
 
 
   In order to obtain a better understanding around the methodologies that provide inspiration for 
such measures, it is useful to lay out the territory of financial economic research on asset return variation in 
some more detail. From this, it can also be seen where otherwise cross-fertilization with the traditional 
macroeconomic measures of international financial integration has been and where the best scope for 
further research lies for the European bond markets that comprises both the government and corporate 
sector.    
   In the field of financial economics the relevant debate is on patterns of equity market return 
volatility and its sources and less on financial integration per se. Catao and Timmerman (2010) provide a 
highly summarized overview of the distinct literatures that have emerged since Robert F. Engle’s work on 
volatility modeling in the early 1980s. The first strand of literature asks whether and why equity return 
volatility is time-varying. Using a range of econometric models capable of estimating rich asset pricing 
dynamics, these studies typically find that stock returns from broad stock indexes are strongly time-varying. 
A second body of literature decomposes such time-varying equity return volatility into its country, industry 
sector and firm-specific components. Using firm-level data instead, the econometric model assigns the 
importance of the variation in equity returns over a set time period to country and industry characteristics. 
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) are considered the founders of this strand. Theirs and many other studies 
in this vein typically conclude that country effects explain a larger portion of cross-sectional variation in 
stock returns. In Europe, around the introduction of EMU, several studies detect a rise in the importance of 
industry factors in stock returns, but this is not convincingly confirmed as a long-term trend. Underlying the 
early studies of this literature is the assumption that factors have fixed and constant betas over time. More 
recent studies overcome these limitations by relaxing either or both. Time-varying betas are for example 
incorporated on a dynamic arbitrage price theory model or within a GARCH framework. A third strand of 
literature studies, in view of evidence that country effects play a dominant role in equity return variance, 
their correlation and covariance structure is studied over time. These studies also go in search of answers 
to optimal international diversification. Covariances, like is true for correlations, are also found to be time-
varying. Other studies from this branch show that distance, information, common institutions and 
macroeconomic factors play a role in the explanation of equity return comovements between countries. 
Though not explicitly referred to by Catao and Timmerman, I include studies in the third strand that 
otherwise build on the importance of country versus industry effects in equity returns in the comparison of 
mean-variance performance of portfolios diversified either way. Mean-variance tests of spanning and 
efficiency are applied in Moerman (2008) and in Eiling et al. (2006), and style analysis in the latter study and 
in Eiling et al. (2010) to effectively determine whether country or industry diversification strategies have 
more optimal performances. Studies from the third strand tend to use returns data from stock indexes 
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   Cross-fertilization between the macroeconomic debate on international financial integration and 
the financial economics debate on equity returns has been rare, but there are some exceptions. A good 
example is a recent study from Hardouvelis et al. (2006) taking elements from macro and financial 
economics to study the integration of stock markets under EMU. They pose that following the adoption of 
the Euro, money markets and to a high degree the bond markets are fully integrated and ask if similar 
integration took place in the stock markets of individual Euro zone countries in the 1990s. Theirs is a typical 
example of the common factor approach that has conventionally been followed for stocks returns to 
determine financial integration, but use interest rate and currency rate deviations in the explanation of 
time-varying integration. Specifically, Hardouvelis et al. examine the evolution of the influence of EU-wide 
risk factors over country-specific risk factors on required rates of returns during the 1990s. They estimate a 
conditional asset-pricing model where each Euro zone country has its own time-varying degree of stock 
market integration which is conditioned on a broad set of monetary, currency and business cycle variables. 
Among them are forward rate and nominal interest rate differentials with Germany, inflation differentials 
with the EU average and local currency volatilities relative to the Deutschemark. The data sample includes 
all Euro zone countries (except Greece) plus the UK from 1992 to 1998. The estimation results indicate that 
in the second half of the 1990s stock markets already integrate to a point where individual Euro zone stock 
markets appear to be fully integrated into the EU market. The two main drivers of this integration are the 
evolution of the probability of a country joining the single currency and the evolution of inflation 
differentials. These results are reinforced by the observation that the UK does not show any signs of 
increased integration.  
   Note that Hardouvelis et al. (2006) borrow from the macroeconomic literature on international 
financial integration to study Euro stock market integration. Cross-fertilization in the opposite direction also 
occurs, resulting in the study of Euro bond market integration. Examples include Beale et al. (2004) and 
Varotto (2003). Baele et al. borrow from the second strand of literature of equity return decomposition 
models to devise a novel measure for the integration of corporate eurobond markets, as already 
mentioned in Section 4.2.1. They way in which they do this is deserves some attention. Following Heston 
and Rouwenhorst (1994), Beale et al. aim to identify the country component in individual corporate bond 
yield spreads over government bonds with the argument that the smaller these country effects, the higher 
the level of integration. However, rather than decomposing country effects directly, it is defined as a 
residual and estimated in a second-stage after differences in risk characteristics of corporate eurobonds 
(such as maturity and rating) have been accounted for. Beale et al. (2004) thus find for a sample of Euro 
zone corporate eurobond yields for 1998 to 2003 that the country-specific spread is statistically significant 
but relatively small in economic terms.  Varotto’s (2003) study of corporate eurobond returns stays much 
closer to the standard Heston and Rouwenhorst decomposition model. In contrast, he finds that country 52 
 
 
effects dominate in corporate eurobond spread returns, though for a sample period that unfortunately 
does not include EMU.  
   While studies of country versus industry effects in eurobond return variation remain scarce and 
their evidence of their importance inconclusive, they do point in a new direction in the study of the 
integration and diversification opportunities of bond markets that is both compelling and convincing. The 
decomposition methodology that separates the importance of country effects from industry effects in bond 
return variation is straightforward yet powerful and can include the eurobond sector beyond that of 
government bonds. It is above all meaningful in the context of EMU where such effects can be expected to 
have undergone distinct changes. The analysis has the ability to incorporate bond-specific effects, as 
Varotto (2003) shows with the inclusion of credit rating, maturity and seniority of eurobonds. This adds to 
the attractiveness of the analysis. The decomposition analysis can be extended to methods used in mean-
variance portfolio analysis. Particularly the spanning and efficiency tests can further determine whether 
country-based or industry-based portfolios are to be preferred. Again, this is a meaningful analysis in the 
context of Europe. Spanning and efficiency tests are effectively applied to European stock returns, e.g. by 
Eiling et al. (2006), but hitherto not to bonds. Mean-variance testing expands the study of the integration of 
European bond markets based on a decomposition of country and industry effects into a study on the 
benefit of either as a base for allocation for international portfolio diversification.          
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The literature on international financial integration from the past four decades is numerous and wide in 
scope. It is surveyed in this chapter from the viewpoint of its measurement. From the overview of theories 
that have this more quantitative focus and their empirical application, the aim is to resolve the process, 
degree and state of financial integration, particularly in Europe. The eclectic approach adopted in this 
chapter starts off by organizing macroeconomic theory-based methodologies into three strands. The first 
uses deviations from interest parity to test if financial markets are internationally integrated. The second 
uses savings-investment correlations on the basis of Feldstein and Horioka’s condition that with perfect 
capital mobility, no relation between domestic savings and domestic investment should be apparent. The 
third uses consumption correlations derived from intertemporal consumption smoothing behavior and risk 
sharing across countries as measures of perfect financial integration.  
In the review of each of these theories and the conditions they bring forward, it transpires that 
deviations of interest parity are in the category of price-based measures and measure financial integration 
in the narrowest sense. Often applied to specific instruments and to the short end of fixed income markets, 53 
 
 
it measures the financial integration of the markets they are traded in, such as onshore and offshore money 
market securities. Imperfect financial integration is interpreted as evidence that capital controls, 
transaction costs, exchange rate and other such barriers between these markets still exist. The broadest 
among these conditions, real interest parity (RIP), is a measure of both financial and non-financial 
integration. It is shown that the Feldstein-Horioka condition of no correlation between savings and 
investment is yet broader that RIP.  It requires in addition the assumption of endogeneity of savings and 
investment and exogenously determined world interest rates. As such it is a measure of financial and non-
financial integration in a net sense and therefore no longer of the price-based but of the quantity-based 
variety. Tests resulting from the theory on consumption correlations are also very broad and quantity-
based. They rely on even stronger assumptions, namely that of perfect financial market integration and 
prefect intertemporal consumption smoothing behavior according to the model specification or complete 
markets.  
Knowing the theoretical foundations and assumptions underlying the various measures of financial 
integration, it is logical that in the review of the evidence of their empirical study the interest parity 
conditions bring out the clearest results. Covered nominal interest parity (CIP) holds to close approximation 
for most short-term markets in the industrialized world already in the 1980s. Uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) often tends to break down and the interpretation given to this result is that financial assets 
denominated in different currencies are imperfect substitutes. It is even rarer for real interest parity (RIP) 
to hold between countries. Empirical studies based on the Feldstein-Horioka (FH) condition of no 
correlation between domestic savings and investment consistently find evidence of weak financial 
integration among industrialized countries. In the discussion of the various responses to this so-called FH 
puzzle it becomes apparent that savings-investment correlations are widely challenged as an appropriate 
measure for international financial integration. Consumptions correlations also suffer from such 
interpretation issues and produce altogether weak results. Though empirical studies from this strand do 
seem to indicate (weak) evidence that markets are integrating, consumption growth of countries are by far 
not completely correlated and consumption risks not fully insured in financial markets. In light of the weak 
and conflicting empirical evidence the savings-investment correlations and consumption correlations 
provide, they become further discarded in the theoretical debate because of questions around the 
structural parameters they measure.              
  The debate on capital controls, discussed as a fourth macroeconomic strand, proceeds alongside all 
the while. It has insofar as real measures of financial market integration are concerned focused on the 
quantification of the structural determinants of capital controls. From this, it is found that capital controls 
are more likely imposed by strong or large governments with less independent monetary authorities and 
are more likely also in poorer countries. A historical account of capital controls in the OECD confirms a well-54 
 
 
known fact; that industrialized countries have progressively dismantled capital and exchange controls since 
the 1980s to the extent that financial markets are almost completely liberalized in this sense. In Europe, on 
which the analysis is focused henceforth in the chapter, EEC ministers agree to the complete removal of 
capital controls by 1990. While the course to a single market is set, national currencies remain a reality for 
the rest of nearly the whole decade. Evidence from financial integration measures in that period do detect 
a positive EEC-effect.  
   Following EMU and the successful transition of capital markets to the Euro, the assessment of their 
financial integration is reinvigorated. It is shown that the measures of financial integration discussed so far 
in this chapter are not given priority in the selection of tools to be applied to the new constitution of 
markets under the Euro. It is speculated that this is because some measures are clearly redundant (such as 
determinants of capital controls) and others have proven to be too difficult to interpreted in practical sense 
(such as savings-investment and consumption growth correlations). The remaining and most credible of 
measures, the interest parity conditions, have proven their use mostly in short-term money markets but 
rarely beyond that. In the new setting of European markets, with the elimination of intra-market currency 
risk, they either measure the one extreme of closed interest parity, already broadly shown to hold, or the 
other extreme of real interest parity, rarely shown to hold. Thus instead new measures are adopted 
borrowing from the economic growth literature and from financial economics studies on equity returns. 
With this, inherently the scope shifts from measuring financial integration in a narrow sense (if one 
considers the interest parity conditions) to measuring economic ánd financial integration. The 
comprehensive set of measures reveal a cascading of different levels of integration of different segments of 
the Euro capital markets. An almost complete level of integration is observed for the unsecured money 
markets (the repo market remains fragmented), a high level of integration for the government bond 
markets and related derivatives markets, a lower but increasing level of integration for the corporate bond 
markets and equity markets and the lowest level of integration for bank credit markets.  
   The ability of investors to make uninhibited asset allocation choices in fixed income markets in 
Europe is thus shown to have significantly improved pre to post-EMU. Pre-EMU, capital controls are 
abolished and the degree of integration of the money markets, the foundation of fixed income markets, is 
already significant. Currency volatility in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the 1990s is shown to be 
the largest remaining obstacle to further integration. For this reason alone, EMU has by virtue of its 
elimination of intra-market currency risk a severe positive impact on financial integration. Post-EMU, a 
comprehensive set of measures show that this integration within the fixed income markets of the Euro 
further extends itself beyond the unsecured money markets to the bond markets. Within the bond 
markets, the government sector enjoys a higher level of integration than that of corporate eurobonds. 55 
 
 
  Lastly in this chapter three new avenues of research that are emerging from the literature are 
pointed out. In recognition of the growing complexity of capital markets, I note that one branch is 
concerned with the application to specialized sectors of the capital markets, such as mortgages. The second 
branch is an off-shoot from consumer growth correlations models and studies risk sharing and industry 
specialization as measures of financial integration. It also incorporates separately the study of the 
consequences of financial integration for consumer welfare. The third branch combines methods from 
macroeconomics on international financial integration with methods from financial economics on equity 
return variation. Cross-fertilization between these two fields has to date been rare but examples of studies 
that do for the wider set of bond markets that include eurobonds look promising. The decomposition 
methodology enables the determination of country and industry effects in bond returns and offers a new 
perspective on financial and economic integration under EMU. These results can be expanded on in a study 
of the mean-variance performance of bond portfolios allocated on a country and industry basis through the 
methodology of spanning and efficiency tests. The two methodologies put together provide fertile ground 
to further study the scope for the financial integration of bond markets in Europe and best portfolio 
diversification before and after EMU. The empirical analysis described in Chapters 4 and 5 sits in this fertile 
cross-over territory. Before this is embarked upon, Chapter 3 provides indications from market practice on 












Bond markets and bond portfolio allocation before and after EMU: 
Indications from market practice 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a descriptive account of the impact of EMU on fixed income markets in 
Europe, both immediate and over the years to follow. This is done mostly in comparison to the ways in 
which markets had operated before national currencies were irrevocably locked to the Euro. A portrayal of 
evidence from market practice cites the fundamental and lasting changes the monetary union has brought 
about to the financial markets it incorporated. Securities volumes and trading data is put together with 
evidence from the finance literature and anecdotal substantiation to give testimony to the evolution of 
fixed income markets in Europe from the early 1990s to more or less the present day. Once the context of 
the changing landscape of fixed income markets in Europe is adequately described, the chapter turns its 
attention to changing asset allocation and diversification opportunities for bond portfolio managers.   
   Prior to the creation of EMU, bond markets in Europe are segregated along national currency lines. 
This segregation of markets is more than by currency alone as issuance practices, trading conventions, 
settlement arrangements and the like tend to differ between markets even for similar types of securities. 
Not only is the bond market itself, but also the infrastructure underlying this market highly dispersed. In 
addition to these supply-side factors, there are important factors on the demand-side that cause the 
operations of the European bond markets in those days to be a largely national domestic affair. 
Institutional investors are often constrained by national regulations on their investment portfolio 
purchases, through currency matching rules among others, which make them strong natural buyers of 
domestic government debt.                      
   It is described in this chapter that the establishment of EMU implies significant changes to this 
constitution of markets. The various impacts of EMU are categorized into direct and indirect effects. 
Financial markets in Europe directly adopt the single currency with a Big Bang. In the bond markets, 
outstanding issues are redenominated and new issues are for the vast majority issued in Euro. Bond 
conventions are harmonized and EMU sovereigns coordinate and synchronize issuing and trading practices 
of their debt. These direct effects irreversibly transform the patchwork of national European bond markets 
to a more harmonized and large domestic bond market denominated in one and the same currency almost 
immediately. These direct effects are by now well known and in the finance literature universally attributed 
to EMU. What gives more ground for dispute among financial economists is to what extent the subsequent 
changes that can be observed in Europe’s financial markets can be indirectly attributed to EMU.  58 
 
 
In this chapter it is argued with respect to the fixed income markets at large and the bond markets 
therein, that the indirect impact of EMU has also been considerable in many ways.  Through an abundance 
of fixed income securities data, mainly from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and Dealogic, it is 
demonstrated that following the launch of EMU, the Euro markets quickly sum up to more than its parts. 
The new market environment strongly encourages the growth of the credit sector. A more liquid and 
transparent domestic government bond sector where internal prices differences are on a downward trend 
leads to much higher corporate and financial institutions issuance. The elevation of the fixed income 
markets to a pan-European level strongly contributes to this and to other developments, which altogether 
give rise to a new landscape of fixed income markets in Europe and which continues to be shaped by these 
developments. It is a market that, as will be seen, also remains segregated in some ways. With the benefit 
of hindsight of approximately a decade of data, the contours of this new landscape can be accurately 
drawn. This is done in the first part of this chapter.   
The latter part of this chapter then focuses on the way in which the new fixed income market 
environment created directly and indirectly by EMU has caused bond investors to respond with respect to 
their portfolio allocation decisions and strategies. Again, indications from market practice are taken to 
create as accurate an account as possible. As consistent and comprehensive data on portfolio flows and 
compositions are not readily available, evidence on this from the finance literature and investor surveys are 
pieced together. From this, the picture emerges that bond investors indeed have responded along with the 
new ability and opportunities for diversification that the Euro bond market offers compared to the old set 
of markets. It is shown in this chapter that this goes in broadly two directions. The first is a more 
‘international’ composition of bond holdings, as the fading of borders results in a more even spreading of 
portfolios. The second is a broader ‘credit’ composition of bond portfolios, as investors have the intention 
to incorporate more corporate eurobonds. Particularly this latter change, for which the evidence to date 
seems merely circumstantial and incomplete, leads to further questions on whether bond investors in 
Europe have changed their diversification strategy in tow.     
   The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. To start with, in Section 2, the landscape of 
Europe’s fixed income markets pre and post-EMU is compared in detail. This data rich section 
demonstrates the development of various segments of the Euro bond market and also contains market 
data supporting fundamental shifts in the investment opportunity set for bond portfolio managers.  Section 
3 cites anecdotal evidence from market practice on the response from investors with respect to this new 
market environment. Section 4 surveys the finance literature for theoretical guidance on optimal asset 





2.  The changing landscape of Europe’s fixed income markets 
 
The impact of the introduction of the single currency on 1 January 1999 on Europe’s fixed income markets 
was immediate and profound in a number of ways. Overnight, the currency risk of the securities of the 
participating nations vis-à-vis each other vanished and the ECB assumed responsibility for the Euro bloc’s 
monetary policy. One set of key short-term interest rates in Euro anchors the money markets, 3-month 
implied futures contracts and the very short end of government yield and interest rate swap curves. These 
two direct and immediate effects of EMU are undisputed. But there are a number of other transformations 
on or shortly after the launch of the Euro which contribute to the creation of one large domestic fixed 
income market. Though not immediately mechanically the result of EMU, they are strongly encouraged by 
and carefully prepared for the event.  One such transformation is due to the decision by participating 
sovereigns in the course of 1998 to redenominate the vast majority of outstanding bond contracts and to 
harmonize bond conventions on top of an earlier decision in 1995 to issue all new fungible sovereign debt 
in Euro as of 1 January 1999.
1 These actions create instant volume and depth of liquidity in all maturity 
segments of the new domestic government sector. It encourages private sector issuers to also raise debt in 
Euro, even though it is technically still feasible to issue in legacy currency for another two years
2. The 
installation of the TARGET payment system immediately facilitates and speeds up cross-border payments.
3  
With prices of fixed income securities now quoted in one currency, price transparency is greatly improved 
leading to a reduction in transaction costs. Though a lively discussion had taken place in the months leading 
up to EMU over the best benchmark candidates, the market actually decides relatively quickly: EURIBOR 
(instead of Euro LIBOR) for the money market, a combination of French BTANs and OATs (at 5- to 7-year 
maturities) and German Bunds (at 10-year maturities) for government bonds, the more homogenous Euro 
interest rate swap curve for new issuance, and the 10-year Bund contract in the futures market. The 
German exchange DTB had already drawn most of the trading volume in 1998 at the detriment of LIFFE and 
its 10-year Bund futures contract has now decidedly emerged as the benchmark for the Euro area (Cantillon 
and Yin, 2007). DTB merges into Eurex in 1998, signifying a wider trend among the exchanges to become 
increasingly centralized in the years following EMU. This happens often through a series of cross-border 
mergers and takeovers stimulated by the more open and competitive environment of the Euro. Trading of 
                                                
1 See Pieterse-Bloem and Lamedica (1998) for an accurate reflection of the state of the discussion on the redenomination of bond 
contracts and harmonization of bond conventions in the run-up to EMU, and Danthine et al. (2000) on the reality of the 
redenominations after EMU is implemented. With some minor exceptions in Austria and Finland, all sovereigns had redenominated 
their debt by January 1999. 
 
2 On 1
st January 1999 the Euro is introduced for commercial and financial transactions. Euro notes and coins circulate only from 1
st 
January 2002 and until that time it would have been feasible to conduct financial transactions in Euro legacy currencies still.  
 
3 The first-generation TARGET system started operations in January 1999. By May 2008, it was replaced by an enhanced second-
generation system. The main enhancement was from a technically decentralized structure made up of several systems to one 
based on a single technical platform (ECB 2010, p 94).  60 
 
 
fixed income securities migrates to electronic and central platforms, particularly so in the government 
sector where EuroMTS becomes the central B2B trading platform (and later, to a lesser extent, 
EuroCreditMTS for covered bonds). The desire among sovereign issuers to have their bonds quoted and 
traded on MTS by primary dealers induces larger size issuance, as only bonds of certain minimum size  
(€5 billion in the case of EuroMTS) are allowed onto the platform.  
   Though the fixed income market in the Euro zone through these transformations becomes much 
more homogenous, instantly and gradually over the years, it has remained segregated in some ways.  The 
segregation is most visible in the government bond market, where yield curves, though strongly converging 
after the elimination of currency risk, remain distinct. This is in reflection of national inflation and credit risk 
differentials, as Euro zone governments continue to preside over their fiscal policy and intra-EMU fiscal 
transfers remain limited. The introduction of the Euro initiates a process of consolidation of post-trading 
infrastructure of debt securities in the Euro area across borders in case of the exchanges. Euroclear, 
founded in 1968 in response to the eurobond market, through its partnership with Euronext (resulting from 
the merger of the stock exchanges of Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris) is able to acquire their local 
central securities depositaries (CSD) and through further acquisitions gains significant capability in the UK 
and Ireland, Sweden and Finland.  Otherwise, post-trading infrastructure consolidation is mainly taking 
place domestically and only rarely at an EU level. As a consequence, post-trading infrastructures at a cross-
border level remain largely fragmented. From the moment a fixed income security changes hands to the 
moment it is finally settled in Europe, it goes through a complex web of fund managers, brokers, trading 
platforms, central counterparties (CCPs), custodians which may or may not also be central securities 
depositories, of which there are more than 40 in Europe in 2009, which may or may not also be part of an 
international CSD such as Euroclear. This is an altogether costly affair. Table 3.1 reproduces the costs of 
post-trading services provided by European CSDs when acting as custodians and for clearing and settlement 
for a report prepared for the European Commission.  Costs for post-trading services are still high in 2006 
and remain so in the following two years.  The only bright spot for fixed income securities is that clearing  
 
Table 3.1 
Costs of domestic and cross-border post-trading services in Europe, provided by CSDs 
  Equities  Fixed income 
  Domestic  Cross-border  Domestic  Cross-border 






























Source: ‘Monitoring prices, costs and volumes of trading and post-trading services’, report for the European Commission, Oxera, 2009 61 
 
 
and settlement for cross-border trades is lower than for domestic trades. This is largely because the ICSDs 
are able to lower their costs by consolidating all of the processing platforms into one, used by the 
international and national CSDs. 
   National differences in the regulation of fixed income securities also continue to exist. Several 
regulatory initiatives have been initiated in recent years to overcome these infrastructural and regulatory 
barriers to integration, mostly in the form of EU legislation enacted under the auspices of the European 
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and through a fresh industry code of conduct in the field 
of clearing and settlement.
4 The European Commission is currently preparing a Securities Law Directive 
(SLD) with the aim to transpose it into member states’ law by the end of 2013. Work on TARGET2-system 
(TS2), a single technical platform for the settlement of European securities transactions in central bank 
money and which is thought to greatly improve the harmonization of securities settlements, aims to start 
operations in 2013. As of 1
st January 2011, the new European supervisory framework based on two newly 
founded centralized EU bodies, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) has become operational. These initiatives are all in various stages of implementation and 
their full effect on the Euro zone’s fixed income markets, though bound to be positive for further 
integration, will still need to be realized. Even less visible but certainly not less important an obstacle to 
complete financial integration in the Euro area are national differences in tax treatment of fixed income 
securities. These may prove altogether harder to overcome.        
Many studies review the impact of the Euro on Europe’s financial markets, leading up to the event
5, 
in its immediate aftermath
6 and in monitoring the evolution throughout the years thereafter
7.  I refer to 
these studies for the granularity and detail of the events and processes in the Euro fixed income markets 
already described. Here, the focus is on four major changes that emerge out of these studies induced by 
EMU. These are its indirect effects and have severely affected the market environment European fixed 
income portfolio managers operate in:  
i.  the elevation of a set of national markets to a pan-European market from which currency 
risk is eliminated; 
ii.  the size of the Euro market that quickly becomes larger than the sum of its parts; 
                                                
4 The ECB (2007, pp 63-65) cites five such pieces of legislative initiatives – the prospectus directive of 2003, transparency directive 
of 2004, directive on markets in financial instruments of 2004, directive on undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities of 1985 which has recently been amended, and the collateral directive of 2002 – as well as the clearing and settlement 
code of conduct agreed in 2006.  
 
5 Note various articles in Temperton, P. (1998) and in Dermine. J., Hillion, P. (1999). 
 
6 Danthine et al. (Dec 2000), Adjaoute et al. (April 2000, Nov 2000), Galati & Tsatsaronis (2001) and BIS (2004) are good examples of 




iii.  the alteration in the dominance and supply of different types of fixed income securities and 
in particular the surge of the Euro credit bond market; and  
iv.  the change in risk-reward relationships of established and upcoming market segments. 
I detail each major change separately and describe how they have fundamentally altered the opportunity 
set of investments for fixed income fund managers.  
2.1. A pan-European fixed income market 
 
The Euro causes the elevation of the fixed income market to a pan-European level and playing field in many 
(but not all) respects. While the European Commission’s Second Banking Directive and Investment Services 
Directive should have already created a single European market in financial services by the late 1990s, in 
practice obstacles remained. One such obstacle are the so-called currency matching rules, or national 
regulations bearing on the portfolios of pension funds and insurance companies to restrict holdings of 
assets denominated in foreign currency (and other assets that were deemed risky). Table 3.2 lists the 
currency matching rules for the assets under managements of pension funds and life insurance companies 
that prevail in the late 1990s in the eleven first EMU-entrant countries. Together with restrictions on the 
size of equity and property holdings and the prudent man rule oftentimes originating from the same 
regulations, the currency matching rules made these funds, whose asset base is very substantial in many 
countries in Europe, strong natural buyers of domestic government debt.  Much is made of the impact of  
 
Table 3.2 
Currency-matching rule for European pension funds and insurance companies
8 
  Pension Funds  Life Insurance 
Austria  50%  80% 
Belgium  No  80% 
Finland  80%  80% 
France  No  No 
Germany  80%  80% 
Ireland  n.a.  n.a. 
Italy  33.3%  80% 
Luxembourg  n.a.  n.a. 
Netherlands  No  80% 
Portugal  No  80% 
Spain  No  80% 
Source: Danthine et al (2000, Table 3.2) who cite the European Commission (1997), IMF (1997) and the OECD (1998) as sources  
 
                                                
7 Apart from the ECB, who through various reports (2004, 2007, 2010) has continued to describe the changes in the Euro bond 
markets, studies such as Cappiello et al. (2006) and De Santis and Gerard (2006) set up a more analytical framework. 
 
8 The figures provided in Table 3.2 are broadly over various asset classes. Adjaoute et al. (2000, Table 2.4) also outline the national 
restrictions of portfolio investments of life insurance companies and pension funds but for fewer Euro zone countries (Germany, 
Spain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands only) from which it is evident that many countries have a limit on the allowable 




EMU on the currency matching rule, as the adoption of the single currency means that under the same 
rules the government debt and other securities from the Euro zone immediately come within the scope of 
these funds. There is evidence that portfolios holdings of domestic government bonds of these institutional 
investors shifts away from their home currency to a diversified cross-holding of government debt within the 
monetary union, as indeed is the case for other investors operating under fewer restrictions.
9 The flip-side 
of the same coin also causes national debt management agencies to rethink the market position of their 
government debt and loss of privileges that come with being the main supplier of risk-free debt in their 
home currency.  National treasuries become more keenly aware that in a post-EMU environment they need 
to compete more for the same “domestic” investor base. They start to better coordinate issuing calendars 
to avoid being in the market at the same time, but at the same time revise issuing strategies to make their 
debt more attractive. The latter involves in the majority of Euro area countries the offering of better 
liquidity through larger size issues and designated primary dealers, lengthening of the maturity profile and 
in some cases the offering of special products such as inflation-linked bonds.
10  With that, sovereign issuers 
play to the demand of institutional investors whose funds under management face upward pressure from 
an ageing population and desire to match long-term liabilities with assets, in part indexed to inflation. The 
ECB calculates that the outstanding Euro-denominated public debt securities as a percentage of all public 
debt securities actually also increases slightly from 2000 to 2002 for all Euro countries apart from Finland, 
from 74.5% to 77.7% for the Euro area as a whole (ECB 2007, Table 5).  
The Euro-denominated bond market, led by the government bond sector, gains instant 
momentum. The quick redenomination of existing government bonds into the new single currency creates 
a critical mass of Euro securities. This is added to by a larger size and stock of domestic bonds from 
participating sovereigns. These are issued in a more harmonized fashion. Central trading platforms such as 
MTS, the activity of primary dealers and a more seamless link with the derivatives markets all result in more 
liquid trading conditions than before. There is anecdotal report that the Euro bond markets gained as much 
in liquidity as it did in its overall size in the early years under EMU. In the words of the ECB who publishes a 
first comprehensive study on the Euro Bond Market in December 2004, the Euro-denominated bond 
market “has since [its inception] become much larger and more liquid than the national markets of the 
                                                
9 Galati & Tsatsaronis (2001, pp 20-21) state that in the absence of a complete matrix of flow-of-funds statistics on international 
portfolio shifts any evidence can only be partial, but are nevertheless able to detail that German institutional investors and Italian 
mutual funds appeared to have increased their purchases of Euro-denominated foreign securities between 1995 and 2000. For 
German investors, Euro-denominated assets account for more than 70% of the € 175 billion of total gross outward portfolio 
investment for the two year period 1998-99 and 60% for 2000. For Italian mutual funds, the share of Euro area bonds in the overall 
bond portfolio increases from 8% in 1995 to 23% at the end of 2000.    
 
10 The ECB states that in the segment of debt securities with a maturity of over ten years, public sector issuers account for more 
than 50% of these instruments in the years 2003-2006. Some countries like France are already issuing domestic inflation-linked 
bonds prior to EMU, but bonds linked to Euro zone inflation become more popular instruments thereafter, in particular in France 
and Italy and occasionally even in Germany and Austria (ECB 2007, p 14). 64 
 
 
participating member states were in the pre-EMU era” (ECB 2004, p 8). Due to the more esoteric nature of 
the bond markets, where securities rarely trade via a stock exchange, there is unfortunately no single set of 
statistics that capture this better liquidity. The limited data that is available for European bonds is patchy 
and mostly in terms of turnover and trading volumes and bid-ask spreads. Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) cite 
turnover data from Euroclear for selected European government bonds. This data shows that the average 
daily turnover of the most actively traded bonds from the French, German and Dutch governments 
noticeably increases between 1998 and 2000. The establishment of MTS as the B2B trading platform for 
Euro government bonds forces larger size and hence more liquid issues. Also the volume on most of its 
platforms increases, at least in the first half-decade of EMU. This can be seen from Table 3.3, where annual 
trading volumes on the domestic MTS markets and EuroMTS are compared for 2001 and 2005. The MTS 
markets in Belgium, France and Germany have all grown. MTS Italy and EuroMTS appear to have gone 
somewhat in reverse, but both are due to lower volumes in Italian long-dated government bonds (BTPs) 
which distorts the picture somewhat. MTS Germany is small by comparison to MTS Italy and that is because 
the preferred inter-dealer platform is Eurex Bonds. On this platform, which trades mostly German 
government securities but also German covered bonds and other European government and agency bonds, 
the average daily volume is on an upward trend between 2001 and 2007. This is shown in Figure 3.1. The 
existence of successful futures and options contracts, again on Eurex, has provided investors a low cost 
margin based trading mechanism for German government bonds. Trading volumes thereof provide another 
piece of evidence on enhanced market liquidity. Figure 3.2 shows that the annual volume traded in the 
Euro Bund 10-year future contract rose strongly between 1998 and 2007, as did the average annual 
openinterest on Eurex-traded futures and options on Euro-denominated debt securities (reported in Table 
3.4). This highlights another special feature of the European bond markets, which is that the liquidity  
 
Figure 3.1 
Daily average volume, single-counted, traded through 
EUREX Bonds (€ mn) 
Table 3.3  
Annual(ized) trading volume, single-counted,  
on MTS markets and EuroMTS 
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Source: Eurex Bonds (figures read from a chart and reproduced)  Source: Cheung et al (2005, Table 3) for 2001-2002 figures,   















Annual volume in traded contracts in EUREX-traded 
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Table 3.4  
Average annual open interest on EUREX-traded 
derivatives on Euro debt securities 
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Source: Eurex  Source: ECB 2007, Table 11 (Eurex) 
 
of Euro government bonds is not just in the real securities markets but also in its related derivatives 
markets, and increasingly so according to the data shown here. Lastly, a further study on the Euro bonds 
and derivatives markets by the ECB in 2007 claims on the basis of declining bid-ask spreads that liquidity 
conditions have improved significantly. This study calculates that the bid-ask spread of Euro government 
bonds declines from around 0.08% in 2003 to 0.05% in 2006 and quoted spreads of corporate eurobonds 
from 0.38% to 0.24% over the same period (ECB, 2007). Each piece of data needs to be treated with caution 
when looked at in isolation.
11 Taken together though, they are consistent with a broader, deeper and more 
liquid bond market under the Euro, certainly compared to the situation in Europe before the single 
currency. The growing liquidity in the Euro bond market invites others to join in with their issuance. The 
securities data in the next section will show that the market grows quickly as a result. 
Though the majority of Euro government bond supply is placed through auctions, occasionally 
syndications of banks are deployed by sovereigns for two reasons. First, to keep banks incentivized to act as 
good primary dealers and secondly to reach a broader investor distribution. Hence investment banks that 
are not from the home turf are deliberately included in the syndicate to reach investors in the far corners of 
the Euro zone. This marks a sharp diversion from practice under the old legacy currency markets. The same 
trend occurs among non-sovereign issuers who rely exclusively on syndications of underwriters for the 
placement of their international bonds with investors. Overall, while in the years between 1996 and 1998 
40% of the volume of bond underwritings issued by borrowers of a specified nationality in the Euro area 
and denominated in Euro (legacy) currency are won by bookrunners of the same nationality, that 
percentage drops to 18% in 1999-2000 (Galati & Tsatsaronis, 2001, Table 3). 
 
                                                
11 The clearing of bond transactions is highly dispersed in Europe and while there has been consolidation of clearing activity, an 
increased turnover on Euroclear may also partially reflect an increase in its market share.  MTS is an inter-dealer trading platform 
and growing volumes can also be due to reduced voice-broker activity. Eurex Bonds has added securities to its trading platform 














Bookrunners of Euro Liquid Bonds: 2007 versus 1999 
Q1-4 1999  Q1-4 2007 
Rank                         Deal Value (€ mn)  No.  % Share  Rank                       Deal Value (€ mn)  No.  % Share 
1. Deutsche Bank  47,642  245  10.7  1. Deutsche Bank  65,259  196  9.2 
2. Dresdner Kleinwort  30,991  177  7.0  2. Barclays Capital  46,598  151  6.6 
3. BNP Paribas  28,455  104  6.4  3. Societe Generale  39,482  100  5.6 
4. ABN AMRO  28,014  146  6.3  4. Citi Group  38,901  108  5.5 
5. Intesa Sanpaola  27,079  185  6.1  5. JPMorgan  35,949  104  5.1 
6. Unicredit Group  20,618  168  4.6  6. BNP Paribas  35,301  105  5.0 
7. Commerzbank  19,867  136  4.5  7. ABN AMRO  30,855  92  4.6 
8. JPMorgan  17,487  76  3.9  8. HSBC  32,537  99  4.4 
9. Morgan Stanley  17,184  77  3.9  9. UBS  28,867  85  4.1 
10. UBS  17,021  65  3.8  10. Merrill Lynch  26,881  69  3.8 
Source: Dealogic 
 
Attracted by the much larger and more liquid market and lower barriers to entry, it soon becomes 
economically attractive for non-European banks, particularly US banks with a substantial investment 
banking division, to build up capacity and presence in EMU’s fixed income markets.  Table 3.5 shows that 
whereas in 1999 the first seven places in the bookrunner league table for liquid Euro bond issues are 
occupied by large European banks, in 2007 two American banks break through to the top five of the same 
ranking. 
  Thus the advent of the Euro raises the level of fixed income markets that are segregated along 
national currency lines to a Euro-wide level. For investment funds portfolio constraints are relaxed and the 
investment opportunity is broadened. Likewise for borrowers, who had both previously been more 
confined to their national markets, the investor base is widened. This creates a pan-Euro level playing field 
for all and the investment banks who serve them. 
2.2. The Euro bond market: more than the sum of its parts 
 
 The size and the constitution of the fixed income market within the Euro zone changes post-EMU. By this is 
meant that the Euro market as a whole becomes a viable contender to the US dollar market and that at the 
same time the structure of outstanding supply of its varying segments alters.  In the years following EMU, 
its fixed income market has really proven to be more than the sum of its components. International debt 
securities markets worldwide have grown substantially over the last fifteen years and far more than world 
GDP. According to BIS figures
12, international fixed income markets globally grow nearly 18% on average 
per annum between 1993 and 2008. The share of Euro-denominated securities in that period rises from 
24% at the start (compared to 43% for the US dollar) to 48% by the end of that period (compared to 36% 
                                                
12 for the amount of US Dollar outstanding of international bonds and notes and money market instruments, Tables 13A and 13B 
(BIS Quarterly Review, December 2009) 67 
 
 
for the US dollar). The surge in the Euro share is particularly notable from December 1998 when its share is 
still only 27%. Figure 3.3 shows the development in the amount outstanding in international bonds and 
notes and compares the US Dollar and Euro-denominated market between 1993 and 2009. In December 
1998, on the eve of EMU, Euro bonds and notes constitute just below 60% of that outstanding in US Dollars 
($1,137 billion versus $1,955 billion). But by the same measure, in 2003 the Euro has overtaken the US 
Dollar ($4,828 billion versus $4,535 billion) and its international fixed income market would continue to 
grow faster than its US Dollar equivalent. By the end of 2009, the Euro international debt market is 1.3 
times the size of the US Dollar international debt market. The data strongly suggest that the Euro is able to 
attract issuers in volumes that the sum markets of its legacy currencies were not able to do before.  
In the international money markets, not included in Figure 3.3, the picture is the same. According 
to BIS figures, the amount outstanding in international money market instruments in December 1998 in 
Euro is 30% of that outstanding in US Dollar ($135 billion versus $40 billion), but this situation is already 
reversed by the end of 2002 ($178 billion versus $145 billion). In 2009, the Euro international money 
market is 1.4 times larger than its US Dollar counterpart. While money markets were small in each of the 
legacy currencies of the Euro in the 1990s, the Euro quickly establishes itself as an attractive currency for 
short-term funding with international borrowers. 
A further dissection of the international bonds and notes data indicates that the growth in the Euro 
market can be attributed to an increased issuance activity by corporate and financial institutions. Figure 3.4 
depicts the moving average in net issuance of international bonds and notes of the proceeding four 
quarters. The left panel shows that the share of the Euro in the net issuance of international bonds in all 
currencies rises strongly in the period 1999-2003, precisely when there is a strong expansion of its market. 
 
Figure 3.3 
International bonds and notes amount outstanding, in $ billion 
A.  USD  B.  Euro 
   
 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, December 2009 
Notes: 
- International bonds and notes are from tables 13B. Euro before 1.1.1999 is the sum of ECU and Euro legacy currencies. 






















Four quarter-moving average of net issuance in international bonds and notes in $ billion 
A.  Share of Euro in all currencies  B.  All currencies 
 
 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, December 2009 
Notes: 
- International bonds and notes are from tables 13B. Euro before 1.1.1999 is the sum of ECU and Euro legacy currencies. 
- The moving average is over the next fourth quarters. 
In that time, the net issuance of corporate and particularly financial institutions accelerates, as can be seen 
from the right panel. 
  This is first evidence of what is by now a well-know fact, that the Euro spurs the growth of its credit 
market. Being introduced at a time when EU15 government budget positions had consolidated to -2.3% and 
net issuance from Euro zone governments would decline from €112 billion in 1998 to €96 billion in 2000 
(according to ECB numbers), there is ample room for European corporates and financial institutions to 
diversify their borrower base away from bank lending to bond investors. The latter can be more easily 
tapped in size in the Euro market and investors themselves are keen on the spread offered by such issues  
 
Figure 3.5 
International and domestic securities amount outstanding by sector, in percent of annual total 
A.  United States  B.  Euro zone 
   
 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, December 2009 
Notes: 
- International debt securities are from BIS tables 12 and are by sector nationality of issuer. Domestic debt securities are from BIS tables 16 and 
are by sector and residence of issuer.  Euro zone is created from the sum of the first twelve member states but has no data available for 
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over the low yielding government bonds (10-year German Bund yields were at 3.8% on the first trading day 
of EMU). 
   Figure 3.5, which now also takes the domestic alongside the international debt securities market 
into account, shows that the share of corporate and financial institutions rises much faster from a smaller 
base in the Euro zone than in the United States. This is at the detriment of the government sector. The 
constitution of the fixed income market, government versus corporate and financial sector, changes 
markedly in the Euro zone; from a near 50:50 market in 1998 to a 33:67 market by 2008. 
   The statistics shown in Table 3.6 of the various computations on the BIS securities data, neatly sum 
up the points made in this section: 
-  While international fixed income markets globally grow on average nearly 18% between 1993 and 2008, 
the Euro currency roughly doubles its market share. The surge of the Euro fixed income market happens 
almost immediately after EMU, which makes it evident that the Euro-denominated market quickly 
becomes more than the sum of its constituent markets. 
-  The Euro fixed income market with its larger and growing market soon becomes a true contender with 
the US Dollar market for size. Both in international money markets and bond markets, the ratio of the 
Euro to the US Dollar outstandings turns over.  
-  While BIS data does not provide a breakdown of type of issuer by currency, it can be derived that the 
surge of the Euro is driven by corporate and financial institutions. Not only coincides the larger share of 
the Euro currency in net issuance of international bonds and notes with a much higher share of net 
issuance of these private institutions, also within the Euro zone itself, the share of corporate issues 
nearly doubles and that of financial institutions grows from an already high base. 
 
Table 3.6 
Summary statistics of BIS Data on Global Fixed Income Markets 
  Dec. 1993  Dec. 1998  Dec. 2003  Dec. 2008 
A.  International Fixed Income Markets  -  amount outstanding globally 
Size ($bn) 
Growth rate (average last five years)  
Share of the Euro currency  

















B.  International Fixed Income Markets   -  ratio of EUR to USD in two sectors 
Money Markets 









C. Net Issuance of Intl. Bonds & Notes   -  share (average forthcoming four quarters) 
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2.3. The rise and rise of the corporate eurobond market 
 
In the previous section, the course of coporate issuance is derived from BIS securities data. Considering 
corporate issuance alone from the main source consulted by the BIS, Dealogic, it can be directly established 
rather than merely derived how it develops over the years, before and after the Euro. This Euro corporate 
issuance data is compared to that in US Dollar and further dissected by sector (neither of which the BIS 
data provides). Note that the definition of corporate issuance now includes financial institutions.  Annual 
corporate issuance in the sum of currencies that would enter into EMU was low on the whole in the 1990s 
rarely exceeding $100 billion, as can be seen in Panel B of Figure 3.6. In the US Dollar market, corporate 
issuance was approximately three times that amount on average between 1993 and 1997. In 1998, 
corporate issuance in Euro starts to surge as large institutions vie to establish their name with investors in 
the large European market that is to be created by the new currency. Issuance jumps up further in the first 
year of the Euro.  Between 1997 and 1999, Euro corporate annual issuance grows by a factor of 2.5. Though 
annual corporate issuance remains substantially higher in US Dollar, in the years to follow the level of Euro 
corporate issuance catches up, particularly from 2003. The one marked difference between the two 
markets is that in the Euro market corporate issuance is very much driven by the finance sector whose 
share up until 2007 remains high. In the US Dollar market corporate issuance is from a more diverse range 
of industry sectors. Also in terms of credit rating of new corporate issues, the Euro market is much less 
diversified than the US Dollar. The Euro corporate issuance sector has a much higher share in the 
   
   Figure 3.6 
Corporate issuance by currency and parent general industry group, in $ billion 
A.  USD  B.  Euro 




- Corporate issuance is both investment grade and high yield and is the deal value (proceeds) in USD-equivalent at issuance.  
- Euro is the sum of the legacy currencies of the initial eleven member states, the ECU and the EUR.  
- Industry groups  are merged such that finance includes insurance and closed end funds; communications is telecommunications,  computers & 
electronics and publishing and consumer is consumer products; utility & energy includes oil & gas and basic materials is construction/building, 
chemicals, metal & steel and mining; industrial is machinery, transportation, aerospace and defence, retail, auto/truck, real estate/property, leisure 













































































































Effective credit rating at launch of corporate issues, in percent of total 
















































































































































highest rating categories, triple-A in particular, and very few with a single-B rating compared to new US 
Dollar corporate issues, according to the figures from Dealogic presented in Table 3.7. 
   Nevertheless, the much increased debt offerings by institutions other than the sovereigns in the 
new pan-European market significantly adds to the menu of options for European fixed income fund 
managers. Not only is the breadth of the new market in Europe enhanced, also its depth improves 
markedly by at least one measure, the average size of new issuance. Figure 3.7 illustrates the development 
of the average size of the corporate issuance shown earlier between 1990 and 2009. In line with the trend 
of larger issue sizes witnessed among the Euro zone sovereigns in their new domestic market, the average 
size of Euro corporate issuance also strongly rises, from $200 million in 1999 to double that size in 2003.   
 
  Figure 3.7 
Average size of corporate issuance, in $ million 
 
















Calculated from the corporate issuance which is both investment grade and high  
yield and is the deal value (proceeds) in USD-equivalent at issuance, divided by the  
number of issues. Euro is the sum of the legacy currencies of the initial members,  




By that time, it exceeds that of the much larger US Dollar corporate market. The average issue size 
continues to rise in both markets, to reach nearly $1 billion in the Euro market by 2007, and after a short-
lived dip, again in 2009. 
   The credit sector encompasses more than corporate sector issuance alone. By the time of the 
creation of the Euro, Europe already has a very large covered bond sector. In the European context, 
covered bonds incorporate predominantly the (German) Pfandbriefe-type securities backed mostly by 
pools or public sector loans and mortgages according to strict legal requirements. The covered bond sector 
has traditionally been large in Europe, though concentrated in a handful of countries. Table 3.8 and Figure 
3.8 provide main statistics on the European covered bond market, based on data from the European 
Covered Bond Council (ECBC). In 2003, the Euro-denominated covered bond market is a €1.8 trillion 
market, roughly 35% of the total international fixed income market in Euro and 4.3 times larger than the 
Euro corporate (including financial institutions) eurobond market. By 2008, presumably due to the overall 
growth of the Euro market and in particular corporate issuance, covered bonds constitute a smaller but still 
substantial 16% of the international fixed income market in Euro, now 2.4 times bigger than its corporate 
market.  
   However, despite the size of the covered bond market investors have found diversification 
opportunities in the Pfandbriefe sector to be limited. Their low default risk as a result of the (legally 
proetected) collateral structure translates into small additional yields (typically no more than 30 
basispoints) over government bonds and highly correlated price moves. If a yield pick-up of more than the 
normal size can be achieved, it tends to be the result of the illiquidity of the covered bond. In that case, it  
   
Table 3.8 
Size of the European covered bond market 
Figure 3.8 
European covered bonds - outstanding in 2008 by 
country of origin 
Outstanding denominated in €: 
 
2003  2008 
 
 
Outstanding in USD billion 
Compared to  international fixed 
income market  in Euro 
Compared to international corporate 














Source: European Covered Bond Council, BIS & Dealogic 
 
Notes:  
- Statistics before the year 2003 are not available from the ECBC 
- Amount outstanding is provided by the ECBC, in EUR million and ihave 
applied the average USD/EUR rate to convert to USD 
-Figures  for the international fixed income market in Euro are from BIS 
- Figures for the  international corporate bonds in Euro are from Dealogic 















Source: European Covered Bond Council73 
 
 
represents a buy-and-hold opportunity to investors. Besides, the lion’s share of the European covered bond 
market has traditionally originated from Germany, and to a lesser extent from Denmark, offering 
littlegeographic diversification. Germany’s legal framework for Pfandbriefe serves as the leading model for 
other European countries to copy in the latter part of the 1990’s and the early 2000’s. Within the Euro 
zone, covered bonds from France and Spain are now also sizeable. But even in 2008, Germany’s share of all 
Euro-denominated covered bonds outstanding still amounts to around one-third. 
It is also well-documented that under the Euro other segments of the fixed income credit market 
than corporate eurobonds flourish. These other segments include asset-backed securities (ABS), 
collateralised debt obligations (CDO) and tier capital bonds from financial institutions. Their significance 
have rarely been put into perspective though so Figure 3.9A stacks the annual issuance of each of these 
types of credit securities as a percentage of their total in the nine years following the inception of EMU. It 
shows that more than 80% of new issuance in all these credit sectors combined is from the corporate 
eurobond sector in the first two years of EMU. While other sectors expand thereafter, most notably the 
ABS sector, in 2007 corporate eurobond issuance still amounts to more than 60% of the total. Also bonds 
and notes issued in Euro off an MTN-program originate predominantly from corporates and banks, by 
around 90% throughout (see Figure 3.9B). Thus it seems that diversification opportunities in the Euro zone 
for fixed income investors are primarily with corporate eurobonds, even while the market further matures 
and other credit sectors arise.   
    From a survey conducted by the Bond Market Association (currently part of SIFMA) in September 
2006 among the top 20 bookrunners for European bonds a rare glimpse can be obtained of the primary 
investor distribution of government, high-grade and high-yield bond issues. Results of the survey are 
reproduced in Table 3.9. On primary distribution at least it appears that in 2005 and 2006 investors from 
within the Euro zone are the largest purchasers of government and investment-grade bonds. For the latter, 
which presumably incorporate corporate eurobonds of a sufficiently high credit rating, Euro zone investors 
account for a 55% share. This is even more than for government bonds where their share of the uptake is 
also high at 45%. Participation in European high-yield bonds by Euro zone investors is not as large as to 
occupy first place. For these lower rated corporate bonds, their participation is outflanked by 
UK investors who also show a keen interest in European investment-grade bonds. Otherwise remarkable is 
the interest of Asian investors in European government bonds at that time. In large part these are likely to 
be central banks, who see an opportunity to diversify their growing foreign reserves away from US 
Treasuries. Central banks (and other public entities) fund managers have been the main buyers of European 
primary investment-grade bonds followed by insurance companies and pension funds, while fund 





Euro-denominated eurobond annual issuance by sector, in percent of total 







- Corp.-HY and Corp.-IG stands for high yield and investment grade corporate issuance respectively. ABS stands for asset-backed securities. 
MBS stands for mortgage-backed securities. CDOs stands for collateralized debt obligations.  
- MTNs stands for medium-term notes.  
 
Table 3.9 
Percentage investor distribution of primary issues in the European bond market 2005-2006 
  By Investor Region  By Investor Type   
  Gov  IG  HY  Gov  IG  HY   
Euro zone  45%  55%  34%  25%  5%  1%  Central Banks & other public 
entities 
UK  15%  26%  45%  12%  16%  13%  Insurance / Pensions Funds 
Switzerland  5%  5%  4%  26%  32%  15%  Banks 
Europe other  3%  4%  3%  24%  31%  41%  Fund Managers 
North America  6%  3%  10%  10%  11%  27%  Hedge Funds 
Middle East & Africa  4%  2%  0%  1%  2%  0%  Corporate Funds 
Asia  21%  5%  3%  2%  3%  3%  Private clients / Retail 
 
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (BMA Primary Market Distribution Survey, September 2006) 
Notes: 
- Gov stands for the government bond market, IG for the investment grade bond market and HY for the high-yield bond market. 
- The percentages for investor region do not all add up to 100%. The difference is accounted for by “overall other”. 
 
2.4. Converging Euro government bonds crowd in eurobonds 
   
The advent of the monetary union causes bond yields of those sovereigns believed to be among the first 
entrants to converge. Exchange rate risk had traditionally been an important component of intra-European 
market risk, in particular for longer dated bonds. During the multiple ERM crises of 1992-93, some of the 
highest spreads to Germany are recorded, over 580 basispoints for Italy and even 130 basispoints for 
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Daily generic government bond spreads over Germany, in basispoints 
A.  1 Jan 1990 – 31 Dec 1998 
i.  5-year  ii.  10-year 
   
 
B.  1 Jan 1999 – 1 May 2008 
i.  5-year  ii.  10-year 




- Calculated from the difference in yield of the generic government bond of the respective country and the yield of the German generic government 
bond of the same maturity.  
- On 2 Jan 1990, generic yields were only available for 10-year Germany, France and the UK. All other series commence later:  10-year Sweden on 2 
Jul 1990,  10-year Spain on 4 Jan 1993, 10-year Italy on 7 May 1993, 5-year Germany and France on 19 Feb 1991, 5-year UK on 31 Dec 1991, 5-year 
Sweden on 2 Jan 1992, 5-year Spain on 4 Jan 1993 and 5-year Italy on 7 May 1993. 
 - The ‘Open’ and ‘Close’ represent the spread level at the start and the end of the (available data) period and the ‘High’ and the ‘Low’ represent the 
highest and the lowest spread level achieved during the (available) data period.  
 
 
after the ERM bands have widened, spreads diverge periodically in order to contract again in calmer times.  
Overall, as is demonstrated in Figure 3.10, the difference between the highs and the lows in 
European benchmark government bond spreads are considerable in the pre-EMU years. They range from -
35 basispoints for French 5-year spreads to 625 basispoints for Italian 5-year spreads to Germany. By the 
end of the period, just before the irrevocable locking of exchange rates, the government bond spreads of 
France, Italy and Spain all had come in significantly relative to Germany. Spreads of EMU-ins on the eve of 
EMU are well below that of Sweden and the United Kingdom who opt to remain outside of the Euro
13. The 
elimination of intra-Euro currency risk has kept sovereign spreads in a tight range, at least up until 
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Correlations between generic government benchmark yields 
               (5-year are below the diagonal and 10-year above) – (correlations that have decreased are in italics) 
A.  1 Jan 1990 – 31 Dec 1998  B.  1 Jan 1999 – 1 May 2008 
  GE  FR  IT  SP  SW  UK    GE  FR  IT  SP  SW  UK 
GE  1  .9834  .9267  .9334  .9212  .9598  GE  1  .9980  .9919  .9925  .9430  .8200 
FR  .9759  1  .9563  .9675  .9414  .9577  FR  .9978  1  .9955  .9971  .9392  .8096 
IT  .8614  .9437  1  .9945  .9543  .8815  IT  .9934  .9953  1  .9954  .9149  .7970 
SP  .8818  .9601  .9944  1  .9615  .8798  SP  .9924  .9951  .9963  1  .9330  .7891 
SW  .8586  .9228  .9643  .9641  1  .9104  SW  .9064  .9069  .8946  .8942  1  .7263 
UK  .8638  .8578  .7704  .7224  .7722  1  UK  .8219  .8141  .8089  .8173  .7323  1 
Source: Bloomberg (same series as for Figure 3.10) 
 
May 2008.
14 The comparison of sovereign spread divergences in the nine years before and after EMU is 
striking, even for Sweden and the UK.  Sovereign spreads in Europe have moved in a much closer range, of 
no more than 55 basispoints for the EMU-ins and 215 basispoints for the EMU-outs since the Euro began.   
   Even though yield spreads diverge and converge significantly at times in the near decade before 
EMU, the comovement of sovereign bond yields is quite high. Table 3.10 lists the correlation coefficients of 
the benchmark government bonds yields used for the displays in Figure 3.10. Over the entire 1990-1998 
period, these are above 0.90 for the EMU countries, with the exception of the correlation between 5-year 
Italy and German yields and 5-year Spanish and German yields. Correlations of 5-year UK yields with all 
other countries are generally among the lowest, but the same correlations of UK yields are quite a bit 
higher for 10-year maturities. The 1999-2008 period sees the already high correlations among EMU 
sovereigns rise above 0.99 without exception. This implies very strong comovement of 5- and 10-year 
government bond yields within the Euro area indeed. Interestingly, while the bond spreads of Sweden and 
the UK to Germany oscillate in a narrower range in this time, the comovement of their yields with the Euro 
zone generally declines.  
   All in all, the convergence in sovereign spreads in Europe and the very high comovement of bond 
yields within the Euro zone following the creation of the Euro leads to much reduced diversification 
opportunities in the government bond sector. The single currency fundamentally and irreversibly alters the 
risk-reward relationships in this segment of the fixed income markets in Europe. The implications for 
prospective returns on portfolio investment are already visible in the months leading up to the institutional 
change that the monetary union signifies. Figure 3.11, Panel A illustrates that average monthly returns on a 
portfolio of Euro zone government bonds (comprising Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,                           
                                                
14  Sovereign spreads start to widen following the start of the financial crises from the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage sector in 
July 2007 and have widened significantly further in the period after May 2008. I am deliberately not including the months after May 
2008 because the data sample used for empirical research in the next chapters also ends around that time.    77 
 
 
  Figure 3.11 
Evolution of Difference between the highest and lowest monthly returns, in percentage 
A.  6-month moving average of 
average monthly returns 
 
 
B.  Difference between highest and lowest returns 
 
Source: Bloomberg for the EFFAS indices, Datastream for the IBOXX indices 
Notes: 
- Panel A is calculated from the moving average of the previous 6 months of the average monthly returns on EFFAS domestic government bond 
total return indices for the entire market (maturities > 1 year) of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, denoted EFFAS 
EURO GOV, and the UK and Sweden include. 
- Panel B is calculated from the difference between the maximum and minimum monthly returns on EFFAS domestic government bond total 
return indices for the entire market (maturities > 1 year) of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, denoted EFFAS EURO 
GOV, and the UK and Sweden included; and the difference between the maximum and minimum monthly returns on IBOXX Euro corporate 
financials and corporate non-financials AAA, AA, A and BBB total returns indices.  
- Start date for the EFFAS indices is 31 Dec 1991 and for the IBOXX indices 31 Dec 1998. Monthly returns are missing for IBOXX Euro corporate 
financials BBB between Jan 1999 and Feb 2001, for the IBOXX Euro corporate non-financials AAA between Jan – Jul 1999 and April – Nov 2001, 
and the IBOXX Euro corporate non-financials BBB between Jan – Jul 1999.   
- Returns are in percentage in local currency. 
 
and Spain) and another one including Sweden and the UK are on a trend downwards. Furthermore, as can 
be seen in Panel B of the same figure, the difference between the highest and the lowest monthly holding 
period return in the Euro zone government sector is around 3% in the early 1990s, close to 2% in the mid-
1990s and steadily declines further to reach a paltry 0.5% in 1998. The dying out of the variation of returns, 
to around 0.25% only after 1999, is an immediate reflection of the disappearing diversification opportunity 
among Euro zone government bonds. Some higher variation can still be achieved by adding Sweden and the 
UK to the portfolio, but also that strategy appears to have its limitations. 
  The diversification opportunity has to be sought elsewhere and the surging corporate bond sector 
offers it. The return variation between a portfolio of corporate financial and non-financial institutions of 
different credit rating classes between triple-A and triple-B will for the majority of times be considerably 
higher. This is clearly what attracts European fixed income fund managers to participate in the new 
corporate eurobond issues, and what encourages further supply in this sector. 
   With the enlarged segment of corporate eurobonds in European fixed income portfolios there is a 
need for corporate benchmark indexes to measure the performance of such holdings. Prior to EMU, 
corporate indexes for the individual European eurobond markets are virtually non-existent. However, with 


















EFFAS EURO GOV plus UK, Sweden IBOXX EURO CORP, AAA-BBB78 
 
 
investment banks to add credit research, trading and sales capability in their fixed income department. A 
number of them start to calculate and publish Euro corporate benchmark indexes already in the course of 
1999 and shortly thereafter. 
 
3.  Response from portfolio managers in their allocation strategies 
 
Comprehensive data on portfolio compositions of institutional investors is unfortunately lacking, especially 
in Europe where this is further hampered by the dispersion of this investor base and their regulators. Even 
so, from the analysis in the previous section it can be derived that prior to EMU, the composition of 
European bond portfolios is predominantly in the government bond sector. These are in the majority of 
cases allocated according to their country weight in benchmark government bond indexes. This can be 
concluded from the fact that in those days the investment opportunity as well as benchmark portfolio 
measures are largely confined to this sector. The non-sovereign bond sector is small and far less liquid by 
comparison and their credit risk poorly researched and understood by investors. Besides, yield spreads 
between European government bonds offer sufficient diversity, certainly with the overlay of the currency 
volatility incorporated in the investment decision. Thus an allocation of bond portfolios from the most 
liquid sector of government bonds and allocated on a country basis is perfectly sensible in Europe at that 
time.  
Investors are initially rather skeptical on the European monetary unification project, as the 
treacherous ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and volatility of some currencies within the ERM in the 
1992-1993 years is still fresh in their minds. Even the European Council’s decision in December 1995 that 
the third stage of EMU would commence on the 1
st of January 1999, that the name of the European single 
currency would be "Euro", that ECUs would convert 1:1 into Euros and that a three-phase scenario would 
be implemented for its introduction, fails to instantly convince investors. This lack of conviction is evident 
from benchmark spreads of fixed income securities to Germany, which remained high for many countries, 
and the prevalence of the ECU parity diversion.
15  But, as the conception of EMU becomes an increasingly 
accepted reality by the investor community, price behavior in the fixed income markets starts to reflect this 
also. Certainly from around 1997, more and more investors participate in what is then known in the 
markets as “EMU convergence plays”. As a result of these convergence plays, the ECU parity divergence 
                                                
15 The European Currency Unit (ECU), the predecessor of the Euro, was defined as a frozen basket of underlying European 
currencies. The value of the ECU currency traded in the foreign exchange markets was commonly thought of being equal to the 
basket but because there was no means of officially converting one into the other, a difference between the two would sometimes 




narrows and the bond yields spreads of those governments believed to be among the first EMU-ins are 
driven down relative to those of Germany.  
Brookes (1999) demonstrates that the impact of higher return correlations between national 
government bond markets that occurs in tandem with this bond convergence is to reduce the tracking error 
of a duration-neutral portfolio of European government bonds from an estimated 50 basispoints in January 
1994 to 37 basispoints in January 1998. This reduction is accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the 
ability to outperform the benchmark from 30 basispoints to a mere 7 basispoints. Therefore, the focus of 
fixed income fund managers in Europe starts to shift away from this traditional allocation strategy, leaving 
them to consider three possible alternatives (or a combination thereof) to mitigate the loss of 
diversification benefits in the government bond sector: (i) continue to manage a portfolio of European 
government bonds but manage the duration of various holdings more actively and more aggressively, i.e. 
duration diversification; (ii) continue to manage a portfolio of government bonds but include a higher 
allocation to non-Euro zone markets such as the US, Japan, the UK and Eastern Europe, i.e. international 
diversification; and (iii) continue to manage a European portfolio but incorporate investments further down 
the credit risk spectrum, such as corporate eurobonds, alongside government bonds, i.e. credit 
diversification.  
   In the equity fund management industry, alongside the need to reduce home bias in European 
equity portfolios and to which EMU is expected to provide impetus
16, a shift from a country to an industry 
sector allocation of portfolios of European stocks is broadly advocated by analysts, widely discussed in the 
financial literature and mostly accepted by portfolio managers as best-practice. In this respect the results of 
the Goldman Sachs/Watson Wyatt EMU Survey of June 1998 are often quoted. This survey indicates that 
fund managers expect that 64% of European equity portfolios would be managed along a sector basis post-
EMU as opposed to only 9% on a country basis (reported in Brookes, 1999). Many analysts separately 
advocate a shift away from country to a sectoral allocation of equity portfolios.
17  
   Such an impending change in investment allocation strategy is not so outspoken in the case of 
bonds. One of very few concrete pieces of evidence of the intentions of European bond portfolio managers 
can be gathered from a survey conducted by bank Paribas in the first quarter of 1998. In this survey 98 
portfolio managers in the US and 55 in Europe are questioned on the expected impact of EMU on their 
asset allocation process. In terms of international diversification the results are minor and mostly with US 
                                                
16 See Biais (1999, pp 242-247) for a discussion on the prevalence of home bias in European equity portfolios and his prediction that 
a possible short-term effect of EMU might be an increase in foreign equity holdings in countries adopting the Euro. 
 
17 See also Brookes (1999, pp25-29) and Young (1998, p 312) for evidence of analysts’ recommendations of a diminished role for 
country selection in European equity portfolios following the implementation of EMU, which is also noted by Rouwenhorst (1999, 
p58) and by Adjaoute and Danthine (2003, pp 32-34). The latter refer to this phenomenon as the ‘shift in the (equity) asset 
allocation paradigm’.  80 
 
 
portfolio managers increasing their proportion of Euro holdings by January 1999 (from 12% to 19%). 
European portfolio managers’ only notable intended change is to increase their holdings of Eastern 
European countries (from 0% to 3%). The more significant changes are with respect to non-sovereign 
holdings, both in the US and in Europe. Of the two, European bond portfolio managers cite the greatest 
willingness to diversify their credit risk: of the 85% of European funds who anticipate changes in their EMU 
non-sovereign holdings, 70% expect an increase of the share of European corporate and bank bonds by an 
average of 21% (Pieterse-Bloem and Lamedica, 1998, pp 286-288).   
The incorporation of a substantially larger portion of non-sovereign holdings in European bond 
portfolios leads into the possibility that fund managers in fixed income are also intent on a shift from a 
country-based to an industry-based allocation, similar to their counterparts in equity. For a portfolio 
consisting in the main of government bonds is confined to this one sector only and diversification can only 
be achieved through an allocation across countries. But with the incorporation of more industry sectors as 
corporate eurobonds increasingly enter into the portfolio, the opportunity arises to allocate the portfolio 
also on an industry sector basis. The surge of corporate bond issuance in Euro in the immediate aftermath 
of EMU and the introduction of Euro corporate bond indexes by various providers, as discussed in Section 
2, clearly ties in with this shift. Such an allocation shift would be further encouraged if the convergence of 
bond yields witnessed in the government bond sector is interpreted as an indication of inferior 
performance of bond portfolios that are allocated on a country basis. The next section asks what empirical 
evidence there is from the finance literature to the effect of shifts in bond portfolio allocations in Europe.  
 
4.  The finance literature on bond portfolio allocation shifts 
 
The part of the finance literature that addresses the impact of EMU on bond portfolio allocations focuses 
mostly on the potential for international diversification. The possible effect of currency matching rules for 
pension and insurance company funds, discussed in Section 2, are contemplated under the new 
constellation in Europe. It seems that these regulatory constraints are often not tested to their full limits 
even in the old constellation in Europe (Adjaoute and Danthine 2003, pp 5-6). This brings the wider 
question of the persistence of a strong home bias in European bond portfolios in perspective and the 
possible effect of EMU thereon.     
   When the IMF brings out the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)
18 in which countries 
report on the size of foreign currency holdings of their residents of equity, long-term and short-term debt 
securities for end-1997, extends it for end-2001 and again for end-2003, the data is seized on. A number of 
                                                
18 I refer to the “Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Guide, Second Edition” of October 2001 which is available on the IMF 
website for more details on the survey data. 81 
 
 
academics use the CPIS data to study the home bias in equities and, for the first time, also for bonds across 
countries. Given the pre and post-EMU dates of the CPIS surveys, it allows to seek for an EMU effect for the 
Euro area countries. Varying measures of home bias
19 put it in a range of 82% (De Santis & Gerard, 2006) to 
87% (Fidora et al, 2006) for bond portfolios in the EMU countries at the end of 1997. 
20 In both cases this is 
well above that detected for equities at that time (respectively at 77% and 80%). Comparing 2001 with 
1997, a decline is observed in the home bias of equities portfolios of EMU countries in the range of 12-14%, 
but a much sharper decline for bond portfolios of 18-37%, neither of which are matched in any other region 
(Cappiello et al., 2006; Fidora et al., 2006; and De Santis and Gerard, 2006). When compared with the 
results for 2003, it is evident that the largest shift in the Euro zone takes place between 1997 and 2001 and 
the trend continues thereafter but not at the same pace (Fidora et al., 2006; Lane, 2006).  
   At first sight, the scale and the timing of the decline in home bias appears to be driven by the Euro 
area itself, particularly for bonds. This is confirmed in three different ways. First, when it is revealed that 
the decline in home bias for bonds between 1997 and 2001 is much less if the Euro area is treated as one 
bloc (De Santis and Gerard, 2006).
21 Secondly, by Lane (2005, 2006) who finds that in 2001 and 2003 
respectively 62.2% and 63.8% of Euro area aggregate ‘international’ bond holdings are invested in other 
member countries and further empirical evidence to substantiate the claim that EMU countries 
disproportionately invest in each others’ bonds. Thirdly, by De Santis (2006) who finds that the portfolio 
transactions among the Euro area member states in the period 1997-2001 amounts to 51% of the 
‘international’ bond assets held by these member states and further empirical evidence that EMU provides 
a significant positive catalyst effect in the allocation of portfolio capital among Euro area member states, 
which is stronger for bonds than for equities. The important conclusion from this is that the domestic home 
bias in bond portfolios is, to a large degree, superseded by a Euro zone home bias. 
  Whereas the ‘internationalization’ of European bond portfolios can thus be verified through the 
CPIS survey data, any other means of diversification cannot be established. This is of course because CPIS 
reports in effect holdings of residents at an aggregate country level of other countries’ equities and debt 
securities. It only breaks down the debt securities by term but not by sector. Therefore, CPIS data cannot be 
                                                
19 Discrepancies in the calculation of home bias arise for at least three important reasons. First, CPIS only reports on holdings of 
residents of non-residents’ securities, therefore the domestic holdings of residents need to be derived from external market 
capitalization data for which different sources can be used. Secondly, a number of important investment countries are excluded 
from the 1997 CPIS, notably Germany, and different approximate values from external sources may or may not be used to reinsert 
these countries. Finally, CPIS does not capture final holdings properly thereby misrepresenting figures for financial centers such as 
Luxembourg and Ireland and these countries may or may not be excluded from the set of EMU countries.   
 
20 Not precise, measured from Figure 2 on page 45 in the case of De Santis and Gerard (2006) and from Graph 1 for Euro area 
economies in the case of Fidora et al. (2006, p 35). 
 
21 On their measure, the home bias in bonds of 10 EMU countries individually but taken together as a group is approximately 82% 
in 2001 and 43% in 2007 but the home bias of the Euro zone area excluding intra-Euro zone trade is 89% in 2001 and 70% in 1997, 
signifying a much lower decline in home bias when the Euro area is treated as one bloc (De Santis and Gerard, 2006, Figure 2, p 45). 82 
 
 
used in the investigation of changing portfolio compositions across industry sectors of the issuers of the 
respective debt securities for instance. I am not aware of any other source either that publishes this sort of 
data consistently and comprehensively for European bond holdings.  It is understandable that in the 
absence of such data, there is a hiatus in the finance literature of empirical studies on bond portfolio re-
allocations in Europe along the credit spectrum.      
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the market securities data, investor surveys and findings from finance articles presented in 
this chapter on the subject of bond markets and bond portfolio allocations pre and post-EMU results in the 
following conclusions. First of all, the event of EMU irreversibly changes the landscape of fixed income 
markets in Europe in direct and indirect ways. Beyond the immediate technical implications of one currency 
and one monetary policy, direct effects are shown to include several that are immediately induced by EMU. 
These are the decision by participating member states to harmonize bond conventions and issuance 
proceedings and to issue in the new single currency from January 1999. Especially the decision to 
redenominate outstanding bond contracts lends instant critical mass to the Euro bond market. Market 
participants decide in lieu to quote and trade all securities in Euro. Single benchmarks for pricing in the 
primary and secondary markets across various segments of the fixed income markets are also decided on 
quickly.  
EMU has moreover had a number of indirect effects and as such has continued to be an instigator 
of change in the years to follow. Among these indirect effects is the elevation of markets to a pan-European 
level. On the demand-side, currency matching rules for institutional investors are lifted. On the supply-side, 
borrowers now face increased competition to position their debt. Both are important mechanisms to 
change the scope of financial operations from markets previously divided along national currency divides to 
the new Euro market. The instant momentum provided to the Euro bond market encourages other 
participants to enter and the market enjoys a stronger interest from non-European investors and likewise 
from all types of issuers to raise debt in Euro. This indirectly induced effect of EMU causes the Euro bond 
markets to become more than the sum of its part in its first few years. This is evident from an array of fixed 
income securities data from the BIS, Dealogic and other sources. The credit sector in particular enjoys great 
expansion under the Euro and within that eurobonds from corporate and financial institutions.  
   Thus EMU leads to the creation of a larger, deeper and more liquid bond market under the Euro. 
However, this chapter also shows that the Euro bond market remains segregated in a number of ways. This 
is most visible in the government bond segment with the continued existence of separate yield curves 83 
 
 
though in a closer spectrum under the Euro compared to the years before. The continued dispersion of 
post-trading infrastructure, including clearing and settlement arrangements, as consolidation is slow is less 
visible but not less important and impacts on transaction costs. The latter are shown to remain significant 
for Euro-denominated bonds. National differences in the regulation of fixed income securities also 
segregate the Euro zone markets. Initiatives by the European Commission to address these differences start 
late and while currently under implementation, still await their effect. National differences in tax treatment 
also continue to exist and may prove altogether harder to overcome.  
Overall, the changes in the landscape of European bonds markets caused directly and indirectly by 
EMU is such that the ability for bond investors to freely allocate funds is significantly enhanced. Barriers for 
investors are lowered to now seek opportunities across the pan-European market. The new environment in 
Europe, which is already largely anticipated by bond portfolio managers in the months leading up to the 
monetary union, causes them to rethink and to shift their portfolio composition.  Indications from market 
practice in this chapter, though mostly circumstantial, are that bond holdings are predominantly in the 
government sector pre-EMU. Finance studies otherwise provide evidence, albeit not conclusively, that a 
strong home bias prevails in bond portfolios beyond the constraints of currency matching rules certain 
institutional investors have to abide by. CPIS survey data from the EMF, published at regular intervals from 
1997 on cross-national holdings of assets, find that the international diversification of European bond 
portfolios improves post-EMU. These studies also show that this better international diversification remains 
confined to the Euro zone though.  
There is otherwise some evidence from market practice that a further type of diversification of 
European bond portfolios has taken place. This is a diversification away from the traditional government 
bonds into the corporate eurobond sector. Converging yields in the government sector provide ample 
encouragement for investors to benefit from higher spreads and yields of corporate eurobonds. It is argued 
that the eurobond sector could not have emerged with the force seen from the securities data if the new 
supply would not have been keenly emersed into instutional investors’ portfolios. The publication of 
benchmark indexes for the corporate eurobond market from 2000 onwards further attests to this. The 
allocation shift is confirmed by anecdotal evidence from investor surveys. In anticipation just prior to EMU 
a reallocation towards corporate eurobonds is intended. Whereas CPIS survey data is able to highlight 
changes in the non-national diversification, such changes in the credit risk diversification of country 
holdings cannot be detected. Evidence from market practice seems to point in this direction, but remains 
on the whole circumstantial. Data limitations, beyond the CPIS survey data, on bond portfolio compositions 
by sector have so far inhibited the possible portfolio allocation shift along the credit spectrum in Europe 
from being studied extensively. 84 
 
 
  With this account of the evolution of bond markets in Europe and the significant impact of EMU 
thereon, the ability in market practice for European bond investors to allocate their portfolio more freely 
and among a broader set of securities is established, albeit one that ventures rarely beyond the Euro zone. 
The willingness to diversify geographically is empirically confirmed through studies on international 
investment holdings based on CPIS survey data from the IMF. The willingness to diversify along the credit 
spectrum is established merely anecdotally as an intention on the part of investors and can possibly be 
derived from developments directly observed in the European bond markets, particularly the surge of the 
corporate eurobond market under the Euro. To what extend this has become reality and whether the larger 
incorporation of eurobonds in European bond portfolios has led to a shift in diversification strategy from a 
country allocation to an industry allocation is a matter for further research. The empirical research in the 
following two chapters, which is in essence a study into the diversification opportunities and benefits in 
European bond returns along the two main dimensions of country and industry, sets out to provide a part 
of the answers.   




The importance of country and industry factors in European bond markets 
  
1.  Introduction 
 
It is beneficial to recapture what has been established by means of the previous two chapters before the 
empirical analysis in this chapter is introduced. In the course of a detailed review of theory and its empirical 
evidence on international financial integration, it is shown that fixed income markets in Europe have 
increasingly integrated in the run-up to EMU. The degree of integration of the money markets, already 
large before the Euro, is with the removal of intra-market currency risk further improved and extends itself 
to the bond markets, government securities before eurobonds. From the analysis of market practice it is 
seen that following the creation of the monetary union, the European bond markets rapidly integrate 
further to one large, homogenous and liquid market, though one that also remains segregated in certain 
ways. While the Euro-denominated fixed income markets as a whole are considered to be largely 
integrated, measures that are able to focus on its different segments testify to differences in the degree of 
integration. Measures that take inspiration from financial economics and focus on the reaction of prices of 
bonds with similar risk characteristics to common news and of bonds with dissimilar risk characteristics to 
country effects are thus able to establish that the government bond sector is better integrated than the 
corporate eurobond sector. The difference is not very large though and the overall the ability for bond 
portfolios managers to allocate their portfolios more freely across the entire bond markets within the Euro 
zone is established, certainly compared to the pre-EMU era.  
Beyond the immediate effect that EMU has had on the integration of bond markets in Europe, it is 
further established that EMU drives fundamental changes in the investment opportunity set for fund 
managers in these markets. One of the main factors through which the investment opportunity is enhanced 
is precisely through the corporate eurobond sector, an area of the European bond market that experiences 
strong growth under the Euro. Beyond the mere ability to allocate bond portfolios, this enters the territory 
of the willingness of bond portfolio managers to seize such new investment opportunities. Here it is 
established European bond portfolios diversify geographically within the Euro zone. There is also an 
outspoken intention to incorporate a larger portion of corporate eurobonds in portfolios henceforth. While 
there is support that portfolios are heavily skewed towards government bonds with a strong national bias 
prior to EMU, the creation of a pan-European market and the intended reallocation to eurobonds gives rise 
to bond portfolios with an altogether broader geographical and credit diversification. Through the 
incorporation of a more diverse set of industry sectors in European bond portfolios than the government 86 
 
 
sector alone post-EMU, this is accompanied by a better opportunity to choose between a country-based 
and an industry-based diversification strategy.  
 The ability and willingness to change the portfolio composition and diversification strategy in 
European bond markets in the context of their enhanced integration pre to post-EMU can be investigated 
through the expected, or ex ante, benefits such changes would bring to fund managers. This is done ex post 
through the return structure of European bond markets. This chapter is the first of two empirical chapters 
and determines which factors best describe European bond returns. For equities a strand of literature has 
focused on the benefits of country and industry sector diversification strategies for decades. As described 
in Chapter 2 (Section 4.3.3.), Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) is the benchmark study in this field and has 
inspired new methods to measure the integration of Euro zone bond market. This research is appropriate, 
for it provides a powerful econometric method whereby the risk contribution of each factor in returns can 
be separated and ranked in order of importance for certain time periods.  
This chapter follows in the decomposition tradition and aims to determine the importance of 
country and industry effects in European bond markets. Due to the nature of the methodology and 
available data, this analysis is from individual eurobond returns; 6,440 in total. These eurobond returns are 
from ten country origins, mostly European, and seven industry groups including one for government 
institutions. This data covers the period between May 1990 and March 2008 and when split at the time of 
the introduction of the Euro results in two subperiods sufficiently long to study any change in their relative 
ranking EMU may have caused. If indeed it is confirmed that country effects dominate industry effects in 
return variation of European eurobonds prior to EMU, as has been empirically established for European 
equity returns, then one would expect a priori that EMU results in reduced country effects and increased 
industry effects. Diminishing country effects would be an immediate consequence of the enlarged financial 
and econometric integration that can be expected to take place among the Euro zone countries. The 
regional industry specialization that is predicted by the Krugman school of international trade economists 
to occur within the monetary union would result in reduced industry effects. Varotto (2003) has confirmed 
that country effects dominate industry effects in eurobonds from European and other markets but for a 
sample period from before EMU. The aim of this analysis is to separately verify these findings and to extend 
the sample period post-EMU. Varotto’s study also demonstrates factors other than country and industry 
may impact on the analysis in the case of eurobonds. Following this, the standard decomposition model in 
this chapter is extended to include liquidity and life-to-maturity, though only as second order effects. If one 
of the main results from the analysis from market practice of Chapter 3 of a larger and deeper bond market 
under the Euro is reflected in European eurobond returns, then liquidity and maturity effects can be 
expected to diminish pre to post-EMU.        87 
 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a selection from studies 
that the decomposition literature has produced for methods and main empirical results. As will be seen, 
these studies focus their attention predominantly on equity returns and cross-fertilization to eurobonds has 
to date been rare. The empirical analysis conducted in this chapter is positioned in this field. Section 3 
discusses the type of data that is typically used for similar studies on equity returns. The purpose of this 
section is to demonstrate how in the absence of this for bonds, a comprehensive data set of 6,440 
individual eurobond returns is gathered. Details of the sources, cleansing and preparation of this data set 
for the econometric models are described in detail. Section 4 then proceeds to propose the main 
decomposition model and its extension to suit the purposes of eurobonds. Sections 5 and 6 show and 
discuss the results of the decomposition of European eurobond returns over the full sample period of May 
1990 to March 2008 and the two subperiods around EMU’s commencement from the main model and the 
extended model respectively. Section 7 concludes.    
 
2.  Finance literature on country versus industry factors 
 
The history of research on the importance of country and industry effects in return variation and their 
benefits for international diversification is longer and richer for stocks than for bonds. First research papers 
that study the factors driving the covariance and volatility in equity returns across countries can be traced 
back to the late 1960s. Yet, the proper decomposition of pure country and industry effects on equity 
returns is generally seen to start with the influential research paper of Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994).  
They look for an explanation of the low correlation between international equity markets’ returns and 
volatilities, and the influence of industry factors on country index returns as previously documented. They 
ask themselves whether the benefits of international equity portfolio diversification stems predominantly 
from a pure country or industry selection of stocks.  
Heston and Rouwenhorst’s procedure is novel in that they entirely separate country from industry 
effects as sources of return variation and in their applied methodology decompose equity returns into 
industry and country components. The employed econometric apparatus consists of cross-sectional 
regressions of individual companies’ equity returns on a set of country and industry dummy variables for 
each time interval. As these dummies are orthogonal in each cross-section, their estimated coefficients 
represent the return associated with the country and the industry sector they belong to in excess to the 
average of the entire market. The contribution of each factor is then computed by the time series’ variance 
of the coefficients estimated in the successive cross-sectional regressions over fixed or rolling time 
windows of arbitrarily specified lengths.  88 
 
 
2.1. On equity returns 
 
 Not only is Heston and Rouwenhorst’s model straightforward to estimate on equity returns more or less 
readily available from easy to access databases (such as Datastream), it also yields strong results which are 
intuitively appealing. In their case, that in Europe in the period before the Maastricht Treaty is signed 
(1978-1992), country effects explain most of the cross-sectional variation in equity returns. Over the whole 
sample period, they find that the ratio of the average variance of twelve country effects to the average 
variance of seven industry effects is roughly 4:1. Consequently, Heston and Rouwenhorst conclude that 
country diversification is a more effective tool than industry diversification for achieving risk reduction in 
stock portfolios in Europe. This is a powerful result for fund managers of European equity.   
   Heston and Rouwenhorst’s model and results initiate a lively debate in the finance literature which 
is still unwavering. Their work forms the basis of many studies that replicate their model, either in its 
entirety or in adapted form, over data samples varying in geographic scope and time span. The literature is 
too wide to survey here in its entirety. I restrict myself to a review of the main studies that follow Heston 
and Rouwenhorst to discern a pattern from their results, specifically in Europe and with respect to the 
impact of the Euro.  
   Griffin and Karolyi (1998) apply the Heston and Rouwenhorst methodology to a data set that allows 
a much finer division of industry sectors. Neither is it restricted to Europe, but covers many more countries 
and for the subsequent period of 1992-1995. The Heston and Rouwenhorst result that country effects 
dominate industry effects in equity returns by a ratio of around 4:1 is largely replicated, but with two 
embellishments. First, it is with the finer industry classification of 66 categories that this result is obtained. 
The ratio of country effects to industry effects increases to 12:1 when firms are re-arranged into nine broad 
industry groups. Griffin and Karolyi find that country effects explain a larger proportion of the variation in 
their index returns with industries that produce goods that are traded internationally, which they are able 
to separate from industries that do not. Secondly, this much higher ratio of 12:1 than Heston and 
Rouwenhorst (1994) find on a comparable industry grouping is due to the fact that Karolyi and Griffin’s 25 
countries include emerging countries. Both add-ons of Griffin and Karolyi to Heston and Rouwenhorst’s 
main result are early discoveries of sample bias influencing the outcome of the importance of country 
effects versus industry effects. This sample bias is confirmed in other studies from more causes than 
industry grouping and country selection alone and is reverted to below.      
   The result from Griffin and Karolyi of consequence for my purpose is that the more homogeneous 
the set of countries, the lower the country effects. This result serves as a prelude of what can be expected 
for European stock markets under EMU. Indeed as Europe’s monetary union draws closer, and the 
economies of prospective member states converge and become more integrated, speculation increases 89 
 
 
that country effects in European equity returns will diminish. This is precisely what motivates Rouwenhorst 
(1999) to re-examine their original result for the same set of twelve European countries, of which it is now 
known that seven will enter EMU, with the inclusion of the post-Maastricht Treaty period of 1993-1998. 
Rouwenhorst concludes that “despite the convergence of economic policies and interest rates of EMU 
countries following the Maastricht Treaty, no evidence exists that industry effects have become more 
important than country effects in European stock returns” (1999, p 63). With the benefit of hindsight, this 
conclusion is perhaps too strong and his results do show early signs of a turning point. It is true that over 
the whole sample period of 1978-1998 as well as in each of the four equally long subperiods, the average 
absolute value of country effects remains dominant over that of industry effects and that country effects 
are larger for the prospective EMU countries than for the non-member countries. However, the 36-month 
moving averages of the absolute values of country and industry effects also show a trend-decline of country 
effects from their peak in the late 1980s and mostly so among the future EMU members. Industry effects 
start to pick up significantly from 1997, breaching the top of their 1988-1998 range by the middle of 1998. 
   The reversal in the importance of country and industry effects in stock returns from 1997 is 
detected by subsequent studies that use the Heston and Rouwenhorst model, such as Cavaglia et al. (2000) 
and Baca et al. (2000) whose sample periods include 1999. Both studies provide evidence that industry 
effects are growing in relative importance and that country effects no longer dominate equity return 
variation. Both studies are also based on equity returns from firms in developed countries in Europe and 
elsewhere. They therefore conclude that the increasing relative importance of industry sector effects is a 
global phenomenon that is explained by the increased integration of capital markets and cross-border 
activity of firms. 
   Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) focus exclusively on Europe and apply the Heston and Rouwenhorst 
methodology to the FTSE Eurotop300 stocks for the period 1990-2000. They find that industry effects have 
started to outpace country effects since the middle of 1998. Following the creation of EMU, a number of 
studies set out to determine the effect of the Euro on country versus industry effects in stock markets, 
including Flavin (2004), Ferreira and Ferreira (2006) and Phylaktis and Xia (2006). Flavin (2004) employs a 
slight adaptation on the Heston and Rouwenhorst model with a panel data (or pooled regression) 
approach.  Though average absolute country effects are larger than average industry effects over the whole 
sample period of 1995-2002, rolling 48-month windows again demonstrate a reversal in the importance of 
these effects around 1998. The effect is a Europe-wide effect, as it seems to apply equally to the eleven 
EMU countries as to the four other European countries’ stock returns. Ferreira and Ferreira (2006) resort to 
the Heston and Rouwenhorst model for the eleven first EMU countries’ stock markets for the years 
between 1975 and 2001 and ascertain that post-EMU industry effects are similar in magnitude to country 
effects. Phylaktis and Xia (2006) apply the dummy variable regression framework of Heston and 90 
 
 
Rouwenhorst to a much wider sample of countries for the period 1992-2001 and find on the whole that 
there is a major shift in industry effects since 1999. When they group countries together, this effect is 
especially noticeable in Europe, but also in North America.   
   On the whole, the inference from these studies is that country effects dominate industry effects in 
explaining the cross-sectional variation of equity returns up to the late 1990s and that since then industry 
effects have noticeably increased. The turning point is discernible to 1997-1999.  Brooks and Del Negro 
(2004) is one of the few studies to confirm the ongoing dominance of country effects with a sample 
extending into the new millennium. However, since an examination of the sensitivity of stocks’ exposure to 
industry and country-specific shocks (the betas) finds that industry-betas are much more heterogeneous 
than country-betas, the separate inclusion of a global factor in their latent factor model alongside the 
country and industry factors could well be a contributing to the small role of industry effects.
1 Estimations 
of the model over four subperiods reveal that global factors increase in importance over the last subperiod 
of 1997-2002, while country and industry factors remain roughly the same over time. In a cyclical upswing 
or downswing, the importance of the global factor and country factors are amplified due to homogeneous 
country-betas, but industry factors are de-amplified due to heterogeneous industry-betas. Brook and Del 
Negros’ result of the overall dominance of country factors in equity returns can likely be ascribed to the 
selection of their model.   
   So the overall conclusion remains that country effects are more important than industry effects for 
the variation of stock returns until the late 1990s and that industry effects have grown substantially in 
importance since then. The conclusion is often conjured up in studies that include a survey of the 
decomposition literature, like in Catao and Timmermann (2010). Whilst it is accepted as the common 
ground, the many studies that have emulated the Heston and Rouwenhorst methodology also find that the 
results obtained from it are subject to sample bias in a number of ways. Everything else being equal, the 
inclusion of stock returns from emerging market countries tends to increase the importance of country 
factors, a finer industry classification tends to lower the industry effects, and the conversion of stock 
returns to one common currency tends to increase country effects. Furthermore, results are sensitive to 
the length of the sample period under selection.  De Moor and Sercu (2009) test the robustness of the main 
results from the Heston and Rouwenhorst methodology for the size of firms included in the sample, but fail 
to detect a significant sample bias in this sense. Several authors also find that results are robust to periods 
of high stock price volatility in certain sectors, such as the IT-bubble in the early 2000s. 
                                                
1 Brooks and Del Negro relax the restriction that the exposure to country or industry effects, whenever it is non-zero, is the same 
across all stocks. This turns the fixed effects model into a latent factor mode. Brooks and Del Negro then introduce a global factor 
alongside the country and industry factors to explain stock returns. Their latent factor model nests the fixed effects model of 
Heston and Rouwenhorst. 91 
 
 
   The timing of the reversal of the importance between country and industry effects in stock returns 
coincides with the creation of the single currency in Europe. EMU may well have been a driving force for 
this region. However, evidence of an EMU-effect is not conclusive since the reversal has also been noted 
elsewhere. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the surge of industry effects is sustained.  According to 
my knowledge, there is no study of European stock returns based on the Heston and Rouwenhorst 
decomposition method on a sample that extends beyond 2002. Therefore, no conclusion can be drawn as 
to the importance of country versus industry effects in equity returns in recent years.     
2.2. On bond returns 
 
As outlined in the previous section, the results from the Heston and Rouwenhorst decomposition of equity 
returns into country and industry effects are replicated several times and are more or less consistent. How 
do they translate to bonds? Bonds are a separate asset class from equities and it is not obvious at all that 
the same results of largely dominating country effects until the late 1990s and surging industry effects 
thereafter should emerge. Bond returns will need to be examined on their own merit as to whether country 
or industry associations play a larger role in the variation of their returns. As with stocks, the results are of 
more than academic interest with potentially strong implications for bond portfolios, which are often 
managed separately in practice.  
   Unfortunately, similar studies on the bond markets are rare with Varotto (2003) only one of the 
few exceptions. The lack of similar studies is probably due to more esoteric nature of bond markets 
compared to equity markets and the lack of readily available time series data on bonds to academics. 
Bonds are mostly traded over-the-counter, while stocks are exchange-traded for which prices are officially 
recorded, time-stamped and publicly available. 
Varotto (2003) puts the Heston and Rouwenhorst methodology to use on the returns of corporate 
eurobonds. Varotto realizes that the diversification of corporate eurobond portfolios is analyzed only 
partially and sporadically and sets out to fill the void with his study which extends the Heston and 
Rouwenhorst model especially to suit a set of 2,984 corporate eurobond returns provided by Reuters. His 
data set of eurobonds cover the period January 1993 to February 1998, are issued by 633 firms from nine 
countries, including five from Europe, and are assigned to eight broad industry sectors. Being mainly 
concerned with the credit risk diversification of corporate eurobond portfolios, Varotto uses excess returns, 
which is the portion attributed to credit spread changes (of the corporate eurobond to its local government 
bonds). Portfolio volatility is reduced through diversification of so-called locally systemic risk factors as 
represented by country, industry, maturity, seniority and rating characteristics of the eurobonds, estimated 
as deviations from the average market return. The residual risk is interpreted as idiosyncratic, which cannot 92 
 
 
be diversified away. Varotto finds that country diversification is best for reducing eurobond portfolio credit 
risk. This is in line with results for equity returns from the same period. However, in the case of eurobonds, 
industry effects are not only less important than country effects in the explanation of the variance of their 
returns, they are also overtaken by maturity and credit rating effects (while the effect of seniority is very 
small and the least significant).  
   Varotto’s finding from the performance of the Heston and Rouwenhorst model on eurobonds that 
country effects also seem to dominate industry effects for eurobond returns in the 1990s is significant. 
Unfortunately, his is only one study and his sample just stops short of the introduction of the Euro. Besides 
addressing my overall research question, an empirical analysis of eurobond returns in Europe into the 
effects have been the most influential in explaining cross-sectional variance and to determine the impact of 
EMU fills a void in the research field. The remainder of this chapter centers on the setup, performance and 
results of such an analysis. 
 
3.  The data 
 
 
The objective is to gather monthly holding period returns on corporate eurobonds for as many EU countries 
that joined the Euro on 1
st January 1999 as possible and for at least two that did not to form a meaningful 
EMU control group. Ideally, the returns series should start early in the 1990s so as to have data for 
approximately the same length of period prior to the start of EMU and following this date.  This section 
details the sources for my data set and methods used to cleanse and prepare the data for incorporation 
into the econometric models.  
3.1. Sources and downloads 
 
For the Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) style studies on equity returns typically a set of country indexes 
from one data source provides the total or holding period return on a monthly (sometimes weekly) basis. 
By virtue of the fact that the composition of the relevant country indexes into individual stock components 
is known, stocks can be assigned to an industry category based on an industry classification from either the 
same or an alternative source.  The analysis can also be performed at the level of the indexes as opposed to 
individual stocks, provided that the set of industry indexes spans the country indexes (e.g. Griffin and 
Karolyi, 1998). 
  Unfortunately there is, to the best of my knowledge, no set of corporate eurobond indexes 
available for the European eurobond markets that dates back to the early 1990s and that otherwise suits 
the purpose of this research. Mostly, corporate bond indexes for Europe start only after 1999 and virtually 93 
 
 
nothing is available prior to this date, let alone a further breakdown into industry sectors, which even today 
is a rarity in the bond markets. Corporate bond indexes are typically divided over credit rating categories. In 
the absence of this, I resort to collecting a comprehensive set of individual European eurobond prices from 
which monthly holding period returns can be calculated.  
Corporate eurobond price data is partly obtained from Bloomberg and partly from Morgan Stanley. 
Bloomberg is one of the most comprehensive sources available (among the very few) to have stored 
corporate eurobond price data for the European markets for the long period under consideration. In order 
to indiscriminately obtain all available corporate eurobond price series from Bloomberg, the bond search 
function is utilized to create portfolios using the same broad criteria for each market: fixed-rate, bullet 
bonds issued by corporations (corporate guaranteed) from all countries of all industry groups and including 
the bonds that have already matured. The search can only be conducted by currency and the currency 
markets of the eleven first EMU-entrants are selected plus that of the ECU, the British Pound and the 
Swedish Krona. 
Bloomberg relies on market makers to input prices, on a real-time basis during the day for highly 
liquid securities and at the close of the business day for less liquid securities. It receives its day-to-day price 
information from a broad range of intermediaries, the quality and quantity of which varies per market and 
even submarket, from time to time and depends on the market activity and interests of the respective 
intermediary. In order to capture the best prices across their range of price providers, Bloomberg has what 
is called a generic price source, Bloomberg Generic (BGN). The price source is set to BGN for all corporate 
portfolios and indicate specific intermediaries as the preferred other choice, access allowing, which are 
deemed the most active in each currency market.  
For each corporate eurobond in each portfolio the historic price series with a daily frequency is 
requested from January 1990 using the bond’s unique ISIN code; bid prices if available otherwise mid or ask 
prices. These are clean prices, i.e. the price in which the accrued interest is not incorporated. Through the 
Bloomberg corporate eurobond portfolios, a sufficiently broad selection of price series is obtained over the 
requested sample period for the following currency markets: Deutschemark (DEM), French Franc (FRF), 
Italian Lira (ITL), Dutch Guilder (NLG), European Currency Unit (ECU), Spanish Peseta (ESP), Belgium or 
Luxembourg Franc (BEF), British Pound (GBP) and Swedish Krona (SEK). For some of the Euro legacy 
currency markets that could not ultimately be included – the Austrian Schilling (ATS), Portuguese Escudo 
(PTE), Finnish Marka (FIM) and Irish Pound (IEP) - data downloads were made but yielded insufficient series 
and therefore dropped out. This is a reflection of the reality that in the pre-EMU period a thriving eurobond 
market is only present in the largest countries. For one such market, the Austrian Schilling (ATS), sufficient 
corporate eurobond price series are left, but only from June 1999 onwards and are therefore also 
altogether excluded from the analysis. The Euro (EUR) set, which naturally starts only on 1
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includes the ECU eurobonds and those from the legacy currencies that are absorbed in the new single 
currency, as the redenomination of bond contracts happens almost instantly.  The Euro set also includes all 
the new corporate eurobonds that are quickly issued in the newly created and much larger Euro market. 
Following EMU, the corporate eurobond market grows rapidly in Europe and this is also reflected in the 
data.      
Apart from the historical price series, the following descriptive information of the eurobonds is 
obtained: amount issued, amount outstanding, announcement date, country of the issuer, coupon rate, 
coupon frequency, currency, final maturity, industry sector of the issuer, industry subgroup, issue date, 
issuer name, Moody’s issuer rating of foreign currency debt, Moody’s issuer rating, Moody’s rating of long-
term foreign currency debt, and S&P rating of long-term foreign currency issuer credit.  
No separate Bloomberg corporate portfolio is created for the Euro for two reasons. For one, the 
overlap with the portfolios of the legacy currencies is considerable and the Bloomberg Euro portfolio is 
automatically populated with those from the Euro legacy currency portfolios for the bonds that continue to 
run after 1
st January 1999. More importantly, the fixed income research desk of Morgan Stanley in London 
provides a set of European corporate eurobond price series and similar descriptive information from their 
proprietary database. The Morgan Stanley data set contains 2,484 of mainly EUR but also GBP (and the 
occasional USD and CHF) corporate eurobonds. As Morgan Stanley built its database for the European 
eurobond market only after the Euro market is created, the vast majority of price series do not start much 
before 2000. The Morgan Stanley data set provides a good complement to the Bloomberg eurobond data.  
I obtain end-of-month exchange rates of the various local currencies congruent with the portfolios 
of eurobonds that are ultimately included into the analysis versus the US Dollar (USD) from Datastream.  
3.2. Data cleansing and preparation 
 
 When historic price series are requested, Bloomberg provides a series for each and every ISIN code among 
the selection, irrespective of whether the series holds zeros, non-available or real price values. Even if the 
series contains real price values, this may not be for the entire period and/or the same price value may 
reoccur for more than one trading day. When a bond is issued, it is allocated with a unique ISIN security 
code and Bloomberg then captures this security for its system (to allow their users to apply its quantitative 
tools to it) and starts to build a historic time series. But not all eurobonds are traded every day and even if 
they are traded, the trading desk of the intermediary may not give the price input to Bloomberg. The latter 
is not so much a problem anymore nowadays because the links (called “feeds”) between trading systems 
and the Bloomberg terminal are automated, but in the beginning of my time period Bloomberg was much 
more reliant on manual inputs from traders. If a price input is provided for a particular bond on a particular 95 
 
 
trading day, but not for the subsequent day(s), then Bloomberg automatically copies the value over from 
the previous day. This is an important difference with Morgan Stanley’s proprietary database, which does 
not show a value if no input has been given for that trading day. 
   To extract end-of-month prices from the daily price series from Bloomberg which may or may not 
contain prices that have been held constant for a number of days, the monthly prices series are constructed 
according to the following rule:  replace a value that has been held constant from the previous trading 
day(s) with a linearly interpolated value and allow for such interpolation only if the value has been left 
constant by less one calendar month and otherwise to eliminate the price value. The assumption is that 
bond prices move every trading session, even if the specific bond did not trade that day. Therefore, if on 
day t=0 a fresh price input is given but then not for x number of days, and then on day t=x+1 a new price 
input is given, then if the end of the month date falls within that range and provided that x+1 is not longer 
than one calendar month, it is preferable to take the linear interpolation between the prices on days t=0 
and t=x+1 rather than the constant price value from day t=0. 
  The data sets from Bloomberg and Morgan Stanley are integrated according to the following rule: 
give preference to Bloomberg as a source and add a Morgan Stanley eurobond price series to the data set 
only if it is not already incorporated from the Bloomberg series. These would only be eurobonds from the 
Morgan Stanley source that are not initially part of the Bloomberg set or are among the Bloomberg series 
but drop out because it contains all zeros or non-available values. 
  Bloomberg’s downloads picks up government bonds in the corporate eurobond portfolios. This is 
acceptable if it concerns other sovereigns than the one presiding over the respective currency (e.g. the 
Kingdom of Belgium issuing in DEM is a ‘corporate’ eurobond) but otherwise not and need to be eliminated 
(e.g. Kingdom of Belgium issuing in BEF is a domestic government bond). In the Morgan Stanley portfolio 
this problem does not exist, but it does have the occasional USD and CHF bond which too are eliminated. 
  Three final adjustments are made in the descriptive information that Bloomberg provides for each 
individual corporate eurobond. This concerns the identification of the country base and industry sector of 
the issuer, and missing issue dates. Bloomberg populates the country field with the country of the issuing 
entity. There are several occasions where the mother company is based in one particular country but issues 
a eurobond through its entity in a different country (often for tax reasons) and then the latter country is 
recorded. For example, Deutsche Bank AG from Germany issues through its finance vehicle Deutsche 
Finance N.V. in the Netherlands. The country base indicator is manually overridden to reflect where the 
mother company as the ultimate guarantor of the issuer is based. Equally, Bloomberg gives the industry 
sector of the issuing entity. Again, if a company issues through it finance vehicle, the industry indicator 
provided by Bloomberg would be ‘financial’ even though the corporate business of the mother company is 
better described as something else. Also in the case of the industry indicators, it is manually overridden to 96 
 
 
that of the mother company. The country and industry fields are used to create the country and industry 
bond portfolios in the next phase of my empirical analysis and thus quite important. 
For a number of eurobonds from the Bloomberg source certain descriptive information is missing. 
Missing fields invariably include amount issued, the issue date and final maturity date. An issue date can be 
manually inserted, since it does otherwise not matter for the calculation of returns. The applied rule is to 
consider the first date a price record appears in the historic price series of the respective eurobond and 
then to work back from the first price record date to the next anniversary of the maturity date. For 
example, if for a eurobond the final maturity date is 1/1/1998 and the first price record date is 28/2/1995, 
then an issue date of 1/1/1995 is inserted. This manual input is performed for 153 eurobonds. As regards 
the missing fields of amount issued and final maturity date no manual inputs can justifiably be given. These 
eurobonds are excluded from the data set. 
Thus, I arrive at a data set of 6,440 eurobonds whose price series cover the period May 1990 to 
March 2008 though starting and ending at different times within that period. Table 4.1 lists how the total 
number of eurobonds is divided over the ten currencies of issuance that make up the sample. The largest 
currency market is not actually GBP, because the EUR market will also in fact incorporate the eurobonds 
originally issued in Euro legacy currency that continue to run after  1
st January 1999. The GBP eurobond 
market is nevertheless a very sizeable market because of its long history of corporate and financial 
institution issuance. Within the Euro zone, the DEM market is the largest in the sample, followed by 
 
Table 4.1 





% of total  From domestic 
issuers
* 







% of total in 
respective 
currency 
BEF/LUF  466  7%  125  27%  360  77% 
DEM  607  9%  528  87%  558  92% 
ESP  105  2%  6  6%  36  34% 
EUR  1,274  20%  802  63%  802  63% 
FRF  483  8%  222  46%  316  65% 
GBP  1,927  30%  716  37%  525  27% 
ITL  399  6%  65  16%  226  57% 
NLG  526  8%  424  81%  509  97% 
SEK  529  8%  348  66%  98  19% 
XEU  124  2%  44  35%  44  35% 
Total  6,440           
* with ‘domestic issuer’ is meant the issuing entity based in the country belonging to the respective currency. In the case of the EUR and XEU 
issuing entities based in any of the eleven countries that first enter EMU have been taken.  The supranational issuers have been ignored in all 
figures in this column.  
** with ‘Euro zone issuer’ is meant the issuing entity based in any of the eleven countries that first enter EMU.  The supranational issuers have 
been ignored in all figures in this column.  97 
 
 
the NLG, which is larger in terms of number of eurobonds to both the FRF and ITL markets. The second 
largest currency market outside the Euro zone is the SEK market. Table 4.1 also shows that some currency 
eurobond markets are more “domestic” by the nature of their supply than others.  The Deutschemark and 
Dutch Guilder markets are both for more than 80% populated with eurobonds from issuing entities from 
the home country. This contrasts with the ESP and ITL markets where the majority of issuers are foreign. 
For the Euro currency, 63% originates from issuers with the Euro zone. For the non-Euro markets, the GBP 
market is clearly more open to non-EU issuers than the SEK market. 
3.3.  Deriving holding period returns 
 
Let’s denote the data set as consisting of N eurobonds. Local currency total returns for the n
th eurobond at 
the end of month t for all t = 1,…,T, where the re-investment of the coupon until the rebalancing at the 
beginning of the following month is assumed, are derived from:   
                    
    , 
   = 
   ,    ,    ,  
   ,      ,     - 1                 (1) 
 
where   LC  denotes local currency, 
               Pn,t = clean price (for the n
th bond at month t), 
  An,t = accrued interest (for the n
th bond at month t), calculated from 
2 
           
A,n,t = coupon rate *   
                                               
    /                    , and            
 
  Gn,t = value of the coupon received between t and t-1. 
 
These local currency total returns are converted to one common currency using spot exchange rates as 
proposed by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994, p 6), through:  
 
    , 
  
 = (1 +   , 
  ) (St / St-1) – 1                (2) 
 
 
where   CC  denotes common currency,  
                                                
2 Note that the assumption is made of one and the same daycount method for all bonds of actual/365. See Fabozzi, F. J. (2005, 7
th 
ed., Handbook of Fixed Income Securities. McGraw-Hill, p 82) for the formula of accrued interest. 98 
 
 
St = spot exchange rate of the common and local currency at month t (the amount of 
       local currency that can be obtained for one unit of common currency). 
 
The common currency for the monthly returns is the US Dollar (USD). These USD returns obtained from the 
clean prices through Eqs. (1) and (2) provide the input for the decomposition models, both the standard 
and the extended model.
3   
 
4.  Decomposing eurobond returns 
 
In order to allow a close comparison of the results for bonds with the ones obtained originally by Heston 
and Rouwenhorst (1994) and ensuing studies using their standard decomposition model for equity returns, 
I will first follow their model and approach as closely as possible. This is the main model in Section 4.1. In 
the second instance, I propose a Varotto (2003) style extension based on what the information in my data 
set allows. This is the extended model in Section 4.2. 
4.1. The main model 
 
   Suppose we have K countries and J industries. Furthermore, we have  n = 1, … , N eurobond returns 
which are measured over the period t = 1, … , T. Note that I do not have a complete panel of eurobond 
returns as not all eurobonds n are traded over all time periods t . Let     (t) be the time t return on 
eurobond n that is related to industry j = 1 ,.. , J and country k = 1, … , K. The basic cross-sectional 
decomposition that Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) propose can be written as: 
 
      = α + ∑ φ    
 
     + ∑ ψ    
 
     + ε               (3) 
 
where the dependence of time is suppressed and where the vector     consists of all eurobonds     .      
and     are dummy variables defined as 
 
                                                
3 Note that in this chapter both the standard and the extended decomposition is performed on outright returns. Heston and 
Rouwenhorst (1994) use the term ‘excess returns’, but in their case it refers to the return relative to the average market but 
decomposition is performed on outright (equity) returns. Varotto (2003) uses excess returns instead of outright (bond) returns as 
the data input for his extended decomposition model. These excess returns are derived from the contractual cash flows of the bond 
in question discounted by the risk-free rates derived from its zero government benchmark curve. Whenever the term ‘excess 
returns’ is used in this chapter, it has the meaning Heston and Rouwenhorst assign to it. Empirical results from the decomposition 
based on excess returns as the data input, calculated from the 1-month USD deposit rate, are very similar to results obtained from 
outright returns. These results are not shown in this chapter but can be provided upon request. 99 
 
 
         
1,    if bond   belongs to industry  
0,   otherwise                                       
   
and 
         
1,    if bond   belongs to country  
0,   otherwise                                       
  
     
  This decomposition needs to be performed for every time period t = 1, … , T. The coefficients φ  
and ψ  capture the returns that can be assigned to specific industries and countries, respectively.  
   The decomposition in Eq. (3) shows that a eurobond return     can be decomposed into a general 
global component α, industry components φ (j = 1 ,.. , J), country components ψ  (k = 1, … , K), and an 
idiosyncratic term ε   . Note that the coefficients  φ and ψ  are not identified, unless additional 
restrictions are imposed. Heston and Rouwenhorst add the following restrictions: 
 
  ∑   φ 
 
      = 0                    (4a) 
  ∑   ψ 
 
     = 0                    (4b) 
 
where         are the value-weights of industry j (country k) in the total universe of eurobonds.
4  All the 
weights sum to unity: 
 
  ∑   
 
     = ∑   
 
     = 1               
 
The USD-equivalent of the amount issued is used as an indicator for the market value weight of each 
eurobond.
5  
   The cross-sectional regressions subject to its restrictions are performed over all eurobonds that are 
present at time t. The industry and country coefficients, φ  and ψ , do not depend on the individual 
eurobonds n. Rather, the systemic part of the returns that can be assigned to these effects is obtained from 
the fitted values of the returns from the regressions and represented by the resulting estimated 
coefficients  φ    and ψ   .  
   This estimation procedure allows a decomposition into country and industry indexes in the 
following way (see Appendix A for the derivation). Let’s focus on the country indexes first introducing 
                                                
4 By construction all individual weights are larger than or equal to zero:    ≥ 0 and    ≥ 0. 
 
5 The discussion focuses on value-weighting the returns. The same logic can be applied to the case of equal-weighting the returns. 
The latter can be achieved by giving each eurobond an equal weight in the computations. 100 
 
 
weight     that is the weight a particular eurobond n has in country   from set k = 1, … , K, then the sum 
over the eurobonds results in: 
 
       α    + ∑ φ     
    ∑    
 
        + ψ                           (5) 
 
The value-weighted index return of country   can be decomposed into a component that is similar 
to all countries, α   , the average of the industry effects of the eurobonds that make up its index, and its 
country-specific component, ψ    . 
For the industry indexes, a similar decomposition can be made if     is the weight a particular 
eurobond n has in industry   from set j = 1, … , J and a summation over the eurobonds yields:  
 
     α    +  φ       ∑ ψ   
 
    ∑    
 
                      (6) 
 
The construction of the decompositions in Eqs. (5) and (6) is repeated for every time period  
t = 1, … , T, giving indexes       and       for countries and industries respectively on which the underlying 
sources of variation can be determined. 
To investigate whether the country effects are in part induced by the conversion of local currency 
returns into common currency, affecting all eurobonds of that country equally, the methodology proposed 
by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) is followed.  Suppressing time dependency, the currency components 
of common currency returns on the value-weighted country indexes of country   from set k = 1, … , K 
relative to the total market, denoted FX , is given by: 
 
                                     FX  = S  – ∑   
 
       ,              (7) 
 
where    is the percentage change of the local currency of country   vis-à-vis the common currency and 
∑   
 
     = 1.  ∑   
 
       is the weighted-average change of all local currencies that make up the total 
market (including the local currency of country  ) to the common currency (a sort of ‘basket’), weighted by 
the size of their component in the total market. The calculation of the currency component through Eq. (7) 
is repeated for all t in the time period and for all countries k (where vk varies at each t) so as to obtain a 
time series for each,       , which is then regressed on the estimated country effects obtained earlier, 
ψ        in the following manner: 
 




The null hypothesis H0:    = 1   is accepted for those currency components and country effect pairs 
that are fully correlated. The   
   of the regression for each country   further indicates how much of the 
variance of country effects is explained by currency movements. The interpretation of this analysis is that it 
seeks out the part of the country effect that can be attributed to the fluctuation of the currency of that 
country to the common currency that has affected all businesses in that country equally, thereby leading to 
a common bond price move of entities located in that country. If this is the case then the macroeconomic 
situation and/or policy decisions in countries induce a strong correlation between eurobond returns and 
exchange rates beyond a mere currency conversion effect. 
4.2. The extended model 
 
Thee major differences between stocks and bonds influence the investment return made on a portfolio of 
each type of security and ought to be considered in the analysis. First, stocks have an infinite life (with the 
exception of those that are delisted) and bonds have a finite life (with the exception of perpetual bonds but 
these are excluded from my data set). The remaining life of the bond at the time of the investment is an 
important decision for an investor. It determines where along the yield curve one invests and this has a 
bearing on anticipated return prospects. The time horizon of the investment matters for bond and equity 
investors alike (as it is well-known in finance that uncertainty and return volatility increase with time), but 
bonds are by their nature more sensitive to the term structure of interest rates. Varotto (2003) finds a 
significant effect for maturity as a separate strategic portfolio investment allocation decision for corporate 
eurobonds that is more important even than industry diversification. My data set allows for the separate 
testing of the maturity effect in a Varotto-style extension of the Heston and Rouwenhorst model. 
   The second important difference between stocks and bonds is that debt holders in general and 
bond holders among them rank above equity holders in terms of priority for repayment in case of the 
bankruptcy of a company. Where risk distribution of a company’s default probability is virtually binary in 
the case of equities, it is more graded for bonds. In order to assist bond holders in the assessment of 
default risk, companies as issuers of bonds and their individual bonds are often credit rated. This issuer and 
bond credit rating indicates the probability that a corporate issuer will make a timely and full payment on 
its outstanding debt liabilities under the contractual obligations of the bond in question. The credit rating, 
in conjunction with an investor’s own assessment of an issuer’s default risk, may change during the life of 
the bond but is at all times reflected in its market price and thereby its investment return prospects. Credit 
rating is therefore a contributing strategic investment decision for the composition of corporate eurobond 
portfolios. Varotto finds a significant effect for credit rating in eurobond returns, though not as significant 
as maturity but again more significant than industry sector as a means of risk diversification. Though it 102 
 
 
would be interesting to separately test for a credit rating effect, my data set does unfortunately not allow 
for it. The credit rating information on the individual eurobonds is static (recorded at the issue date) and 
not dynamic as with Varotto’s database and is above all incomplete.  Related conditions of the bond, such 
as its seniority, have a bearing on the return prospects in case of a default situation because the level of 
seniority among different types of bond issues determines the priority repayment privilege the respective 
holders have.  As the eurobonds are pre-selected on the basis that they are senior unsecured, my database 
is not able to pick up on the point of seniority as a separate means of risk diversification. This less worrying 
though, as Varotto finds a very small effect for seniority, the least significant of all. 
  The third important difference between stocks and bonds concerns liquidity. Companies generally 
list only on one stock exchange so there is one unique price record for one stock from one company in the 
market place. Companies tend to issue a multiple of bonds which are not exchange traded but trade over-
the-counter (OTC), resulting in multiple price records in different places in the market for multiple bonds 
from one company. This is the basic reason why liquidity differences are greater for corporate bonds than 
for equity, and hence matter more as an investment decision in the case of eurobonds. Varotto 
acknowledges the importance of liquidity differences for bonds but decides against picking this up as a 
separate strategic diversification choice on the basis that liquidity is indirectly accounted for in the 
weighted-least squares estimation. In line with recent research (see e.g.,  Lin, H.,  Liu, S., Wu, C., 2009; 
Fontaine, J., Garcia, R., 2008; De Jong, F., Driessen, J., 2007) that liquidity premiums are a significant 
element in the determination of credit bond yield spreads, the liquidity effect is included in the extended 
Heston and Rouwenhorst model.  
   Based on the above discussion, the following modifications of the model defined under Eq. (3) are 
adopted: 
 
      = α + ∑ φ    
 
     + ∑ ψ    
 
     + ∑   
 
        + ∑   
 
        +             (9) 
 
where dummy variables     and     remain as before and new dummy variables are incorporated to 
capture the liquidity effect,     for l = 1, …, L, and remaining life-to-maturity effect ,     for  
m = 1, … , M, which are defined as 
 
         
1,    if bond   belongs to liquidity bracket  
0,   otherwise                                                       






         
1,    if bond   belongs to maturity bracket  
0,   otherwise                                                          
  
 
Additional restrictions are incorporated to define the model, where    and    are the value weights of 
liquidity type l and remaining maturity type m in the total value-weight market. 
 
  ∑   φ 
 
      = 0                    (10a) 
  ∑   ψ 
 
     = 0                    (10b) 
  ∑     
 
     = 0                    (10c) 
  ∑     
 
     = 0                   (10d) 
and  ∑   
 
     = ∑   
 
     = ∑   
 
     = ∑   
 
     = 1           
 
Similar to Eqs. (5) and (6), the value-weighted index excess returns for the portfolios selected along 
the two main dimensions of country and industry sector are each decomposed as follows
6: 
 
       α   +∑ φ     
    ∑    
 
       +∑       
     ∑       
 
    +∑       
     ∑       
 
    +ψ      (11) 
       α    ∑ ψ   
 
    ∑    
 
       +∑       
     ∑       
 
    +∑       
    ∑       
 
    +φ     (12) 
 
whereby     and     are the weights of each bond n in liquidity sector    from l = 1, … , L and maturity 
sector   from m = 1, … , M. Terms ψ     and φ    continue to represent the pure country and industry effects. 
In the country index decomposition, the term  ∑ φ     
    ∑    
 
        continues to represent the value-
weighted sum of industry effects in the portfolio of country   and is added to by the value-weighted sum 
of its liquidity (∑       
     ∑       
 
    ) and maturity (∑       
     ∑       
 
    ) structure. Similarly for the 
industry sector portfolios,   . The repeated estimation of Eqs. (11) and (12) gives time series for these 
effects.    
 
5.  Empirical results from the main model 
 
The empirical results from the main decomposition, as outlined in Section 4.1, on my data set of 6,440 
eurobond returns are discussed in this section.  Eurobonds are classified into countries and industry sectors 
                                                
6 One could equally construct decomposition liquidity and maturity indexes. I refrain from doing so because liquidity and maturity 
are not typically first-order considerations on the basis of which bond portfolio asset allocations are made. Liquidity and maturity 
are rather treated as second-order decisions in portfolios otherwise allocated along country or industry lines.  104 
 
 
and the variance of each of these factors in their returns is determined through a series of cross-sectional 
regressions. This is initially done for the whole sample period of May 1990 to March 2008, and 
subsequently for two periods around the start of 1999 to see if EMU has any impact on results. 
5.1. Summary and performance statistics 
 
   The 6,440 eurobonds are, by virtue of their issuing entity, assigned to one of ten origins 
(‘countries’) and to one of seven broad industry groups. The ten country categories are: 
Belgium/Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, supranationals 
and other. The seven industries are: financials and funds, government institutions, consumer, 
communications and technology, basic materials and energy, industrials and utilities. Table 4.2 shows that 
the distribution of the sample over these countries and industries is uneven. According to Panel A more 
than half of all the eurobonds originate from one of four countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, France 
and the Netherlands. Since supranational institutions cannot be related to one country in the same way as 
other issuers, a separate category is created for eurobonds from these entities.  The category non-EU is 
numerous because it captures eurobonds from issuers from the rest of the world that entered into the 
sample as they issued in the currencies of selection (see Section 3.1.). Panel B shows that the most 
dominant industry group by number of issues is financials and funds. This sector accounts for more than 
half of the sample. This is an accurate reflection of the composition of the corporate eurobond market in 
Europe where it is known that financial institutions are the majority of issuers, a feature discussed in 
Chapter 3. The government institutions sector, which contains all non-domestic sovereign and quasi-
sovereign issuers, is also well represented. The other industry groups’ numbers each account for less than 
10% of the total.   
According to Panels C and D, each country has at least one eurobond in each industry (with the 
exception of the supranationals which by nature all fall under government institutions). This indicates that 
the spectrum of corporate eurobonds included in the sample provides diversification opportunities. Some 
patterns of industry concentration in Europe can be observed, but the level of concentration is not very 
high: France in the industry sector; Italy in the government sector; Germany and Sweden in the government 
and the consumer sectors; and the United Kingdom in the consumer and utility sectors. All countries have a 
high number of financial institutions eurobonds, but the BENELUX the most vis-à-vis other sectors. When 
the eurobonds are value-weighted, only the ‘live’ eurobonds are counted. Now Italy emerges as the largest 
country due to the heavy weight of its government institutions. The supranational institutions and Sweden, 
which have either exclusive or high concentrations in the government sector, also increase in weight. Those 




Country and industry composition 
Panels A and B give for each country and industry, the number of eurobonds included in the total sample and as a percentage 
of the total number of eurobonds. Panel C gives for each country by industry the number of eurobonds included in the total 
sample. Panel D gives the average weight of the (live) eurobonds in the country by industry cross-sector in the total value-
weighted market over the whole sample.    
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tend to fall back. Because financial institutions issue frequently but in smaller size, their dominance is 
reduced on a value-weighted basis. This is reflected in the drop for this sector as a whole to just below 40% 
on a value-weighted basis from almost 60% on an equal-weighted basis.      
Table 4.3 lists the mean return and its standard deviation for eurobonds allocated by country (in 
Panel A) and by industry (in Panel B). These are considerably lower to what is typically observed for equities 
as a manifestation that eurobonds are less risky securities. The table shows that although country and 
industry sector returns are very similar with no great outliers, the variation in the average return and return 
volatility is larger among the country than among the industry sectors. Considering the value-weighted 
statistics, the high-low range of mean returns is 0.27% for the countries versus 0.16% for the industries. The 
range in standard deviations of the returns is 0.85% for the countries and 0.27% for the industries. In 
general correlations between the industry indexes appear to be higher than between the country indexes 
and there is greater variation in the country return correlations than the industry sector return correlations. 
The lowest correlation among the industry sectors (0.898, between communications and technology sector 
and government sector) is higher than the lowest of the country correlations (0.713, between Spain and 
Italy).  This implies that diversification gains are expected to be higher among countries than among 
industries. Judging from the value-weighted mean returns, the above-average performing countries are 
Spain, the United Kingdom and the supranationals, and the above-average performing industries are  
the government sector and utilities. Low performing countries are Germany and France, and industrials 
among the industry sectors.  The difference in return statistics between the value-weighted and the equal-
weighted are not great and do not change these observations. 
   The foreign currency return statistics in Panel A of Table 4.3 show that there are large discrepancies 
in the average impact of USD-denominated exchange rates. While the core-EMU bloc appreciates on 
average by just over 0.10% per month, the southerly EMU countries suffer a depreciation of just over 
 0.03%. Fortunes also differ for those EU countries that chose not to participate in EMU, with the Swedish 
Krona recording a monthly decline of 0.36% on average and the British Pound a 0.05% rise against the US 
dollar. The volatility of currency returns among the countries is again remarkably similar though.  
In sum, there are four main observations from the sample distribution over country and industry sectors 
and their performance statistics. First, in reflection of the composition of the European eurobond market, 
the sample is skewed towards the financial sector by numbers, but less so when value-weighted.  Secondly, 
there is some concentration of industries within European countries but it is not heavy. All industries are 
represented in all real countries. Thirdly, the difference in average country and industry returns is not big, 
but the variation of these returns and of their correlations is larger among countries than among industries. 
Fourthly, the conversion of returns from national currency to the US Dollar can potentially have a 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2. Decomposition into country and industry effects 
 
The excess return of country indexes are decomposed into pure country effects and a (weighted) average 
sum of seven industry effects and similarly for excess industry indexes returns. Note that with excess return 
is meant the return over the total market. Table B1 in Appendix B gives the performance statistics, similar 
to Table 4.3, for the actual country and industry indexes after decomposition (which are very similar). Table 
4.4 presents the results of the decomposition into pure (country/industry) effects and the sum of these 
effects in the country and industry indexes for the entire sample period of May 1990 to March 2008. The 
variance as well as the variance ratio in excess of the market of these effects is reported.   
   The most important result from the decomposition is that the variance of pure country effects 
outweighs that of the pure industry effects, on average by a factor of 3.8 (=1.29/0.34) for the equal-
weighted indexes and by a factor of 3.2 (=1.26/0.39) for the value-weighted indexes. Disregarding the 
supranationals and the other countries from the sample, which both have comparatively small pure country 
effects for understandable reasons, would have the effect that this result is even closer to the factor of four 
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) find for European stocks (but for the 1978-1992 period).  
The reasons for the stronger average country effects become apparent from the comparison with 
the pure industry effects and sum of country effects among the industries. First, the variances of pure 
industry effects (in Panel B) are all rather similar with only one relative outlier which is the utilities 
sector (0.67). But the variance of the pure industry effect of the utilities sector is higher than that of only 
four from the ten pure country effects (in Panel A). Variances of pure country effects differ more 
substantially than variances of pure industry effects. Country effects for Italy, Spain and the United 
Kingdom are at least nearly four times higher than that of the lowest among the real single countries 
(France), and at least more than seven times higher than for the non-EU countries. Note that the smallest 
variance of the pure country effects, 0.20 for the supranationals, is very similar to that of pure industry 
effects of the government institutions sector (0.18) and that the latter also happens to be smallest variance 
among the pure industry effects. Secondly, the variation in the excess country indexes returns is mostly due 
to pure country effects while this is not the case for the excess industry indexes. The sum of ten country 
effects explains nearly as much (in the case of the value-weighted indexes) and nearly six times as much (in 
the case of the equal-weighted indexes) as the pure industry effects on average of excess industry returns. 
Differences in results for the equal-weighted and the value-weighted indexes are not substantial, 
with the exception of the sum of country effects in the excess industry indexes returns. Results of the 
calculations based on the value-weighted indexes are the most representative of the two as it is most in 
line with market practice. Fixed income portfolio managers invariably take issue size into account with their  




Decomposition of excess eurobond index returns (May 1990 – March 2008) 
The table gives the variance of the components of the equal-weighted (EW) and the value-weighted (VW) excess country, in Panel 
A, and excess industry, in Panel B, index returns over the total market. The ratio is the variance ratio of the index in excess of the 
market. 
A.  Country Indexes 
  EW indexes  VW indexes 
  Pure country effect  Sum of industry effects  Pure country effect  Sum of industry effects 












0.55     
0.51     
0.67     
3.71     
0.84     
2.90     
1.16     
1.93     
0.42     
0.22     
1.29     
0.628     
0.655     
0.594   
1.142    
0.671    
1.052     
1.374     
1.161     
1.191    
0.798    



































































B.  Industry Indexes 
  EW indexes  VW indexes 
  Pure industry effect  Sum of country effects  Pure industry effect  Sum of country effects 










































































the equal-weight results in Appendix B for completeness.  
  Table 4.5 presents the summary statistics for the estimated country indexes returns corrected for 
their industry composition and the industry indexes returns corrected for their country composition. The 
values in Table 4.5 can be directly compared with the summary performance statistics on the outright 
returns in Table 4.3. Significant differences are an indication that industry compositions are important for 





Performance statistics for estimated country and industry indexes 
Panel A summarizes the mean and the standard deviation of the monthly value-weighted (VW) estimated country returns 
corrected for industry compositions and their correlations. Panel B the same for the estimated industry returns corrected for 
country compositions. The summary statistics for the equal-weighted returns are in Table B4.5 of Appendix B. 
A.  Country indexes after decomposition, adjusted for their industry composition 
  VW return  Correlations 












0.535     
0.604     
0.593     
0.555     
0.728     
0.643     
0.817     
0.645     










2.960           






















































B.  Industry indexes after decomposition, adjusted for their country composition 
  VW return  Correlations 








0.648    
0.701     
0.612     
0.650     
0.576    
0.625     







2.972   




























decomposition and when adjusted for industry composition for Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
the non-EU countries, which all have high concentrations in the below-average performing consumer 
sector. The United Kingdom and non-EU countries are also heavy on basic material and energy companies, 
which is the worst performing sector. Average returns decline too for Spain, which has an above-average 
stake in the second best performing sector of communications and technology and a much smaller basic 
material and energy sector and industrials sector which also performs below-average. Average returns 
corrected for industry composition decline for the supranational institutions, which are exclusively in the 
best performing sector of government institutions. For these countries, the industry composition matters 
to their performance. France, BENELUX and Italy are areas where industry composition matters much less.  
For these countries their performance can be attributed only to the country-specific component of their 
index return.  This result is especially remarkable for Italy given that its industry composition is so heavily 
dominated by government institutions which constitute the best-performing sector. 111 
 
 
  The differences between values reported in Table 4.5 and those in Table 4.3 are smaller for the 
industry sectors than for the countries. Industry sector performances decline following decomposition and 
adjustment for geographic composition for all but the consumer and technology, industrials and 
government sectors. The stronger performance of the government sector is remarkable because it is 
already the best performing sector. Industry sectors where the geographic compositions matters the least 
to their return performance are consumer and technology and industrials, despite higher concentrations of 
these industries in the United Kingdom, the best-performing country. The performance of these sectors is 
due almost completely to their industry effect.  
   The correlation structure of index returns provides another way to establish whether industry 
composition matters for country returns and vice versa. If industry composition matters for country index 
returns, then correcting for industry compositions should result in a rise in country return correlations, and 
the same for industry sector correlations.  Rather than gauging the difference in the correlation matrixes of 
Tables 4.3 and 4.5, which is a painstaking task, the so called Jennrich test is utilized to formally establish 
whether two correlation matrixes are from the same population.
1 Appendix C contains a detailed 
description of the Jennrich test.   
    The Jennrich test statistics in Table 4.6 are reported for the comparison of the correlation structure 
of indexes before and after decomposition. For both country and industry indexes the outcome of the test 
statistic exceeds the critical value and the hypothesis of stability is rejected. These results show that the 
correlation matrixes for the country and the industry indexes from before and after decomposition and 
adjustment for industry and country composition are statistically different. This implies that the 
decomposition produces country and industry indexes that may have different portfolio implications than 
indexes based on a straightforward allocation of eurobonds. It also suggests that on the whole industry 
compositions matter for country returns and country compositions matter for industry returns. 
 
 Table 4.6 
Jennrich test of stability of correlation matrixes before and after decomposition 
The table shows the results of the Jennrich test statistic and its corresponding critical value and p-value computed on the 
correlations of eurobond value-weighted (VW) returns from the country and industry indexes before and after decomposition 
over the full sample period. The results of the equal-weighted correlation matrixes are in Table B4.6 of Appendix B. 
  Country correlation matrixes  Industry correlation matrixes 
Jennrich  χ
2 test statistic  309.9043  155.0512 
Degrees of freedom  45  21 
Critical value  61.6562  32.6706 
p-value  0  0 
                                                
1 From Jennrich (1970). See Adjaoute et al. (2000) for an example of a practical application of the Jennrich test to comovements of 
stock returns.  112 
 
 
   In sum, the decomposition of eurobond returns into country and industry effects over the whole 
sample period of May 1990 to March 2008 yields three main results. First, the decomposition of eurobond 
returns makes a difference on country and industry indexes because their correlations are statistically not 
the same. Secondly, the decomposition shows that country effects explain more of the variation in returns 
than industry effects. The ratio of their importance is nearly the same as Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) 
initially find for equity returns, albeit for a sample period that only partially overlaps. Thirdly, the industry 
composition almost always matters for country index returns and vice versa. The most notable exceptions 
are Italy and the consumer and technology and industrials sectors. 
5.3. The common factor in eurobond returns  
 
While correlations are evidently different before and after decomposition, I observe that they are very high 
in general. A possible explanation is that eurobond returns have a high common factor. In order to 
investigate this, Table 4.5 is recreated by correcting the country and industry indexes for the common 
factor in Table 4.7. Mean returns and volatilities in country indexes can now only be attributed to the pure 
country effects and the same for industry indexes. The result is a dramatic alteration in the correlation 
structure of returns on both the country and the industry indexes when the common factor is removed. 
Correlation coefficients plummet and in several cases even turn negative. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the common factor over the full sample period and Table 4.8 compares the mean 
and standard deviation of the common factor with that of the other two types of (pure) coefficients for the 
entire sample period, the periods before and after EMU.  The variance of the common factor for the full 
sample period (not listed in Table 4.8) is 8.3, which compares to a variance of the pure country effects of 
1.3 and of the pure industry effects of 0.4 (in Table 4.4). This suggests that the common factor in eurobond 
returns is indeed high, especially for the first forty months of my sample period. This finding merits a 
further investigation of the common factor in eurobond returns and its driving forces. 
A-priori, I suspect that the common factor is concurrent with dynamics that distinctly influence the 
outcome of bond investment decisions. These dynamics can broadly be described as the currency 
conversion to the US Dollar and changing expectations of the term structure of interest rates.  Because the 
local currency eurobond returns are immediately converted to USD, the common factor could well 
represent this pure currency conversion effect. Otherwise, when underlying factors cause changes in term 
structure of interest rates which are common to all eurobond markets under consideration or affect these 
markets more or less equally, the common factor could represent these changes dynamically. In portfolio 




  Table 4.7  
Performance statistics ignoring the common factor 
Panel A summarizes the mean and the standard deviation of the monthly value-weighted (VW) estimated country returns corrected 
for industry compositions and the common factor, and their correlations. Panel B the same for the estimated industry returns 
corrected for country compositions and the common factor. The summary statistics for the equal-weighted returns are in Table B4.7 
of Appendix B. 
A.  Country indexes adjusted for their industry composition and the common factor 
  VW return  Correlations 





















































































B.  Industry indexes adjusted for their country composition and the common factor 
  VW return  Correlations 



















































Common factor in eurobonds over the sample period 
The figure depicts the common value, or the alpha, from the decomposed indexes. The x-axis expresses  
the number of months into the sample period; 0 starts in May 1990 and 214 ends in March 2008.  
 












Common factor in relation to pure country effects and pure industry effects 
The table summarizes the mean, standard deviation and variance of the common factor in both value-weighted (VW) country and 
industry indexes and for the pure country effects from the country indexes and the pure industry effects from the industry 
indexes. Table B4.8 in Appendix B shows the results for the equal-weighted (EW) indexes. 
  Mean  Standard deviation 
  Full period  Pre-EMU  Post-EMU  Full period  Pre-EMU  Post-EMU 
Common factor  0.660  1.148  0.207  2.879  3.390  2.228 
Average of pure 
country effects 
-0.022  -0.032      -0.013      1.032  1.039  0.907 
Average of pure 
industry effects 
-0.030  -0.096  0.032      0.612  0.760  0.378 
 
Two origins cause expectations of the term structure of interest rates to change: the international 
economic outlook and the prevailing risk preference of investors. Table 4.9 lists the set of pre-selected 
variables that are deemed to represent each cause adequately, together with a description of the time 
series used, their frequency and source. The goal is to identify the combination of variables that best 
explain the common factor in eurobonds. For this purpose, each explanatory variable is tried in a single-
variable OLS regression with a constant term in the first instance to determine their individual explanatory 
power.   
The common factor in eurobonds is denoted as CFEt and is a monthly series from May 1990 to 
March 2008. Most variables are available on a monthly basis and for the full sample period. Exceptions are 
GDPt and EECt,which are quarterly series, and GAPt, DEBTt and DEFt which are annually. In those cases, a 
monthly series is derived through interpolation. The currency adjustment and economic outlook variables 
are generally available for the eight distinct local markets (or countries) in my data set. They are weighted 
with the same market value weights with which the common factor is obtained to derive one series for 
these variables that is representative for the whole market. The M3 and M1 series used for the MONt 
variable are only available for the Euro area as a whole, Sweden and the UK in case of M3 and only the Euro 
area in case of M1 so the weights for M3 are adjusted accordingly and M1 is taken outright. The EECt, BCIt 
and risk preference variables are one series already so no weights need to be applied. 
Table 4.10 lists the results of the single-variable OLS regressions with a constant term obtained with 
series for the explanatory variable that provide the best overall fit. I omit BCIt in these series since this 
variable is defined as a dummy. It can immediately be seen from Table 4.10 that the common factor in 
eurobond returns is in large part explained by the direct conversion of eurobond returns from national 
currency to USD. The beta-coefficient of the OLS regression with CURt as the only explanatory variable for 
CFEt is not significantly different from one at the 95% confidence level and the r-squared is high (0.87). The 




Overview of explanatory variables used for common factor analysis 
Variable  Description  Frequency  Source 
For currency conversion 
CURt :  Percentage move of national currency to the USD  monthly  Datastream 
For international economic outlook 
GDPt :  Gross Domestic Product at constant prices, seasonally adjusted (market prices 
for Spain and the UK), chained 2007 (base year). Germany starts Q2-1991 and 
Sweden starts Q2-1993. 
quarterly  Datastream 
IIPt :  Indices of Industrial Production  
Original series; normalized; ratio of original to trend; trend; original, 
seasonally adjusted; 12 month rate of change of the reference series 
monthly  OECD 
CLIt :  Composite Leading Indicator 
Normalised; amplitude adjusted; trend restored; 12 month rate of change 
of trend restored 
monthly  OECD 
GAPt :  Output gap, calculated as actual GDP less potential GDP as a percent of 
potential GDP. 
annually  IMF 
INFt :  Index of Consumer Prices, neither seasonally nor working day adjusted.  
Consumer Prices – all items for Germany, UK, Belgium, Spain. HIPC for others.  
monthly  OECD 
UMPt :  Rate of Employment. The numbers of unemployed persons as a percentage of 
the labour force, seasonally adjusted. Harmonised unemployment rate for all. 
monthly  OECD 
MONt :  Monetary Aggregate.  
-  M3: only available for Sweden, UK and Euro-area 
-  M1:  only available Euro-area 
monthly  OECD 
DEBTt :  Maastricht definition of general government gross public debt, as a 
percentage of GDP 
annually  CESifo DICE 
(EU) 
DEFt :  Cyclically adjusted net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of the  general 
government, as a percentage of potential GDP 
annually  CESifo DICE 
(OECD) 
EECt :  Long time-series of the Climate Indicator for the Euro Area (R1)  quarterly  IFO 
BCIt :  Business Cycle indicator for Euro area defined as a dummy variable (=1 for an 
upturn and =0 for a down turn in the cycle). Based on GDP before 1999 and 
“Eurocoin” series thereafter. 
monthly  CEPR 
For investor risk preference 
STIRt :  Short-term Interest Rates 
-  US Federal Funds target rate 
-  US Federal Funds effective rate 
-  German/Euro repo rate (blended series: German 28-day repo until 
10/1/1992, German 14-day repo until 12/1/1998, Euro short term 
repo for remainder) 
monthly  Datastream 
LTYt :  Long-term Bond Yield 
-  US benchmark 10-year DS government index – interest yield 
-  German benchmark 10-year DS government index – interest yield 
monthly  Datastream 
YSPt :  Yield Curve Spread 
-  Difference between US benchmark 2- year and 10-year DS 
government index – interest yields 
-  Difference between German benchmark 2- year and 10-year DS 
government index – interest yields 
monthly  Datastream 
RISKt :  Risk in global financial markets 
-  CBOE spx volatility VIX (new) – price index 
-  DJ US total stock market – price index 
-  S&P 500 Composite – price index 
-  EURO STOXX 50 – price index 
-  Gold Bullion LBM U$/Troy Ounce 




the month vis-à-vis the USD contributes positively to USD-denominated returns. This is because the 
decision to convert local currency bond holdings into USD is taken at the beginning of the month by the 
portfolio manager. Compared with the currency move, the other variables have less explanatory power for 
the common factor in eurobond returns. The beta-coefficients of the economic variables all have the right 
sign with the exception of INFt and DEBTt. Inflation and debt-to-GDP on all variants have a remarkably weak 
relation with the common factor. This may be because eurobond markets are forward looking and not so 
much interested in realised, i.e. ex post, inflation and debt levels as indicators that risks are building or 
subsiding.  
   Ex ante indicators for economic growth, such IIPt, EECt and UMPt , perform better and are 
statistically significantly different from zero (at the 95% confidence level). GDPt and GAPt are weaker in  
their explanation for the common factor than IIPt and CLIt. As regards the investor risk-preference variables, 
the beta-coefficients have the expected sign for STIRt, LTYt, and YSPt. Best explanatory power is not with the 
steepness of the yield curve, as one would perhaps expect a priori, but with the rate of change in the level 
of long-term US Treasury yields. The rate of change in the US Dow Jones stock index is the best among the 
risk variables. The sign of its beta-coefficient does not necessarily have to be negative if the substitution 
effect between bonds and stocks dominates. 
   In the second instance, the variables identified with the largest individual explanatory power on the 
common factor are combined into multi-variable regressions. To determine which explanatory can safely be 
added into the model without causing a problem of multicollinearity, direct regressions with a constant 
term of one explanatory variable on another are performed. Table 4.11 lists the r-squared of these 
regressions. Fortunately none of the explanatory variables are much correlated with CURt, the variable with 
the highest explanatory power for CFEt.  None of the correlations are alarmingly high. The highest values for 
the r-squared are among the group of actual and potential economic growth indicators (GDPt, CLIt  and IIPt), 
which is not surprising.  It is preferable to include just one of these in the multi-variable model. It is also 
preferable not to include both EECt and CLIt or both DEFt and UMPt in the same regression, which seem 
somewhat interchangeable. 
  Table 4.12 shows the results of the multi-variable regressions to explain the common factor in 
eurobond returns, CFEt. This table only shows the results for the tree of explanatory variables that provide 
the overall best fit. I refer to Table D1 in Appendix D for other tried models, which provide a lower quality 
fit but feature in the discussion below. 
  In combination with the currency move, IIPt is selected from among the four economic growth 
variables, as it has the highest explanatory power. The estimated coefficient of IIPt drops from -0.67 as a 
single-variable to –0.27 in a multi-variable regression with CURt but remains significantly different from 




Single-variable regressions to explain common factor in eurobonds 
The table shows the results of single-variable OLS regressions of the type CFEt =  αt + βt VARt + εt where VARt is filled in with 
different explanatory variables. The table only shows the results for those explanatory variables for each that provide the 
overall best fit. 
VARt  Variant with best fit    Estimated coefficients  
(95% confidence intervals) 
Standard error 
                p-value 
R
2 
CURt  m/m  α: 
β: 
 (0.0055) 





0.00010489      
                      0 
0.8741 
GDPt  percentage change per month (q/q)  α: 
β: 
(0.0028)     






                      0.2911 
0.0053 




(0.0049)   
(-1.0803)        
0.0090 
-0.6716 
(0.0131)   
(-0.2629) 
0.00079356                       
                      0.0014 
0.0472 




(0.0028)    






                      0.0810 
0.0143 
GAPt  percentage for the whole year, 










                      0.4182  0.0031 
INFt  q/q 
α: 
β: 
(-0.0014)   






                      0.5369 
0.0018 
UMPt  q/q 
α: 
β: 
(0.0028)   






                      0.0222 
0.0244 




(0.0040)    






                      0.1314 
0.0107 
DEBTt  percentage change per month (y/y) 
α: 
β: 
(0.0020)     






                      0.0571 
0.0170 
 
DEFt  percentage for the whole year, 
repeated each month of that year 
α: 
β: 
(-0.0045)     






                      0.0736 
0.0150 
EECt  percentage change per month (q/q) 
α: 
β: 
(0.0027)   






                      0.0016 
0.0460 




(0.0027)   






                     0.1139 
0.0117 




(0.0021)    
(-0.1317)      
0.0059 
-0.0766 
   (0.0098)  
(-0.0216) 
0.00080429  
                     0.0066 
0.0343 











                     0.1626 
0.0092 




(0.0020)   






                     0.0619 
0.0163 
m/m is from one month-end to the next; q/q is from one month-end to the same month-end in the previous quarter;  m/av(q) is from one month-end 




Multicollinearity between explanatory variables for the common factor in eurobonds 
The table lists the r-squared from direct regressions with a constant term of variables listed down the column individually on the 
variable along the row. The combination of variables with the highest r-squared is marked in bold. 
  CUR  GDP  IIP  CLI  UMP  MON  DEF  EEC  STIR  LTY 
GDP  0.00099                   
IIP  0.0199  0.4030                 
CLI  0.0041  0.2950  0.3186               
UMP  0.0072  0.2169  0.1258  0.0073             
MON  0.0093  0.0130  0.00023
  0.0312  0.0106           
DEF  0.00049  0.1162  0.0385  0.0048  0.3859  0.0202         
EEC  0.0205  0.1815  0.1353  0.3741  0.00088  0.0278  0.00042       
STIR  0.0051  0.0792  0.1252  0.0804  0.0974  0.00008  0.0085  0.1023     
LTY  0.0159  0.0529  0.0710  0.1761  0.0150  0.0092  0.0062  0.1983  0.0851   
RISK  0.0265  0.0038  0.00065  0.0429  0.00028  0.0153  0.0059  0.00073  0.00042  0.00005 
 
the model with an estimated coefficient for DEFt that has the right sign and is statistically different from 
zero while the explanatory power of CURt and IIPt remain as before. Trials reveal that UMPt  also improves 
the model with a beta-coefficient of the correct sign and statistically different from zero. However, 
compared to DEFt, UMPt takes away more from the explanatory power of IIPt (since IIPt and UMPt are more 
closely related variables than IIPt and DEFt) and has less explanatory power. Hence the inclusion of DEFt 
over UMPt in the model in combination with IIPt is preferred. The variable for the long-term bond yield, 
LTYt, can be added to the model with its beta-coefficient showing the right sign and being statistically 
significantly different from zero, but its explanatory power is low. No other variable is capable of further 
enhancing the model.   
 
Table 4.12 
Multi-variable regressions to explain common factor in eurobonds 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions of the type CFEt = αt + βt VAR
1
t + γt VAR
2
t + δt VAR
3
t + λt VAR
4
t + εt. The table only 









t  Estimated coefficients 
(95% confidence intervals) 
Standard error         
                      p-value 
F-statistic               
R
2 













  (0.0093) 
(1.0627) 
(-0.1232) 
   
0.000099172             0 
784.677                    
0.8815 









(0.0020)   
(0.9614)    
(-0.3595)   










0.000093309            0 
560.7387                  
0.8890 














 (0.0017)  
 (0.9569)  
(-0.3268)    
(-0.1573)   















Thus, from among the pre-selected variables, the best model to explain the common factor in eurobond 
returns over the full sample period is the following (standard errors of the estimated coefficients in 
brackets underneath):    
 
   CFEt = 0.004  +  1.0069 ∗ CURt  –  0.1790 * IIPt   –  0.1030 ∗ DEFt  –  0.0195 ∗ LTYt  +  et 
                              (0.0012)      (0.0254)                       (0.0750)                     (0.0275)                       (0.0098)       
 
    
In sum, the common factor in eurobond returns is high, especially at the start of the sample period 
(May 1990) to the first half of 1993. I find that the common factor is largely explained by the immediate 
conversion of returns into USD and otherwise by changes in the economic outlook as indicated by industrial 
production and deficits. The change in the long-term US Treasury yield, as a measure of adverse risk 
preference of bond investors, also has some bearing on the common factor, albeit small. 
5.4. Competitive currency moves and country effects            
 
Beyond the immediate currency conversion effect, which is evidently captured by the common factor in the 
standard decomposition model, do local currency moves to the US Dollar have any further role to play in 
the explanation of country effects?  This would be the case if through a more than average devaluation of a 
national currency to the US Dollar compared to that of the market as a whole, business entities presiding in 
that country benefit from a competitive advantage that then transpires into better returns on their 
eurobonds. In order to determine this, the currency component of each country is calculated as the change 
of its local currency to the US Dollar over and above that of the weighted-average change of all local 
currencies that make up the whole market (see Eq. (7), in Section 4.1). The supranationals and non-EU 
entities are omitted from the analysis as no one national currency can be assigned to them. The currency 
component thus established for each real country is then regressed on the pure country effects of that 
country from its country return index after decomposition. If the slope of this regression is one (or minus 
one), then the currency component and the country effect are fully correlated.   
   The scatter plots of the currency component and country effects are displayed in Figure 4.2 for all 
countries. An upward sloping relation between the currency component and the country effect in their 
eurobond returns is clearly visible for all. The strength of this relation is formally established through OLS 
regressions of the country effects on the currency component, the results of which are given in Table 4.13.   
   Without exception, the estimated coefficients for the constant are very close to zero and, more 
importantly, are positive for the slope which is intuitively correct. The latter means that when a country’s 




Scatter plot of the value-weighted currency components vs. pure country effects 
The graphs show, for each country, the scatter plot of the currency effect on the x-axis and the country effects on the y-axis for the 
entire sample period. Both need to be multiplied by one hundred to be able to interpret it as percent per month. Because both axis 
are forced within set limits, it is possible that more outliers exist that are not visible. 
 
Table 4.13 
Country effects and excess exchange rate returns 
The table summarizes the statistics of the regressions of pure country effects from the value-weighted (VW) country indexes on 
the currency component. Estimated coefficients are given for the constant and the slope with 95% confidence intervals on either 
side in brackets. Statistics for the equal-weighted (EW) country indexes are in Table B4.13 in Appendix B. 
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market combined, resulting in a positive currency component, this has a positive influence on its country 
effect. In other words, businesses based in a country whose currency depreciates more benefit and 
eurobond holders are rewarded in the form of better returns on their investment. The slope coefficient is 
the greatest for the Netherlands and the UK, but even in the lowest case (Germany) the slope’s steepness is 
still remarkable. All slope coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 5% confidence level, though 
none are statistically different from one either at this confidence level. The fit of the regressions is generally 
good, as can be seen from the 95% confidence intervals around the estimated coefficients and the very low 
p-values. The model fit is very good in the case of the Netherlands and France, good in the case of Sweden 
and the UK, reasonably good for Belgium and Germany but not so good for Italy and Spain. 
  In sum, currency effects, beyond the mere conversion effect of eurobond portfolio holdings, do 
play a significant role in explaining the prominence of country effects from the decomposition of eurobond 
returns in Europe. Though no one-for-one relation between the currency component and the country 
effectcan be established, it is statistically different from zero with the expected sign showing in all 
countries. The relation is stronger in case of some countries (e.g. the Netherlands) than others (e.g. Italy). 
5.5. Searching for an EMU effect 
 
 So far I have subjected eurobond returns over the entire sample period of May 1990 to March 2008 to a 
decomposition into country and industry effects and have come to two major conclusions. One, that 
country effects outweigh industry effects for eurobond returns from a predominantly European market; 
and two, that currency effects play a significant role in eurobond returns, in the common factor and in 
country effects. Since it is established in Chapter 3 that EMU brings about a remarkable and irreversible 
change to the constitution of European bond markets, this section investigates how these conclusions hold 
up if the sample period is partitioned at exactly the time of the introduction of the Euro. Will country 
effects still dominate in eurobonds returns as much post-EMU? Are the currency effects for the Euro-bloc 
as significant as for the national currencies before they enter into EMU? 
  To answer these questions, two time vectors of almost equal length are created: May 1990 to 
December 1998 (103 months) and January 1999 to March 2008 (111 months). It first ought to be 
established that there is indeed a statistically significant difference in the correlation and covariance 
structure of the decomposed country and industry index returns from the pre-EMU to the post-EMU 
period. So again the Jennrich test is performed to test this formally. Table 4.14 describes the result of the 
Jennrich tests of statistical equality of the correlation and covariance structure of country and industry  
(decomposed) index returns in both subperiods. The values of the correlation and covariance matrixes 




Jennrich tests of stability of correlation and covariance return matrixes from two subperiods around EMU:  
5/1990 – 12/1998 and 1/1999 – 3/2008 
The table summarizes the results for the Jennrich χ
2 test statistic from the value-weighted (VW) correlations and covariations of 
the country and industry indexes returns resulting from decomposition and obtained over each subperiod. The results for the 
equal-weighted (EW) indexes are in Table B4.14 in Appendix B.    
  Country indexes  Industry indexes 









2 test statistic  364.48  580.19  157.41  367.01 
Degrees of freedom  45  55  21  28 
Critical value (95% conf.)  61.66  73.31  32.67  41.34 
p-value  0  0  0  0 
         
  The test of stability is rejected in all four cases, indicating that the correlations and covariances of 
country and industry returns after decomposition are statistically different from the first subperiod to the 
next. In other words, both the correlation and covariance structure of country and industry returns are 
different before and after EMU. Having established this, the decomposition of eurobond returns into 
country and industry effects in both periods is performed next. 
  Table 4.15 presents the variances and ratios in excess of the market of the pure country and 
industry effects and the sum of the country and industry effects in the decomposed indexes for the pre-
EMU and the post-EMU periods. They can be directly compared with those in Table 4.4 in Section 5.2, 
which are for the whole sample period. There are two main results observable from Table 4.15. On the one 
hand, the average variance of country effects remains similar and even slightly increases pre to post-EMU. 
On the other hand, the average variance of industry effects, which is already lower than that of the country 
effects before EMU, falls away significantly after EMU. The two main results combined lead to a noticeable 
relative change in importance between country and industry effects pre to post-EMU. While country effects 
dominate industry effects before EMU, by a factor of nearly two (=1.24/0.63), they do so even more after 
EMU, by a factor of precisely eight (=1.28/0.16). 
   Though the importance of country factors in eurobond returns remains as before, this general 
observation hides a more diverse picture. On the one hand, the core-EMU countries’ indexes have the 
variance of their pure country effects very much reduced, from 1.18 to a mere 0.26, which is low. This 
indicates that eurobond exposures to Germany, France and BENELUX countries are almost perfect 
substitutes under EMU, at least up until March 2008. On the other hand, the peripheral-EMU members’ 
country indexes have the variance of their pure country effects very much increased, from an already 





Decomposition of excess index returns, pre and post-EMU 
The table gives the variance of the components of the value-weighted (VW) excess country, in Panel A, and excess industry, in 
Panel B, index returns over the total market for May 1990-Dec 2000 and Jan 1999 – Mar 2008. The ratio is the variance ratio to 
the index in excess of the market. The results for the equal-weighted (EW) indexes are in Table B4.15 in Appendix B. 
A.  Country Indexes 
  May 1990 – Dec 1998  Jan 1999 – Mar 2008 
  Pure country effect  Sum of industry effects  Pure country effect  Sum of industry effects 
























































0.32     
0.24     
0.11     
4.85     
0.40     
4.49     
1.20    
1.02     
0.13     
0.07     
1.28    
0.976    
1.055     
0.743     
1.094     
0.974    
1.018     
1.171    
0.908     
0.262     
1.114    
0.932     
0.06     
0.04     
0.03    
0.05   
0.02    
0.04    
0.03     
0.03     
0.24     
0.03     












B.  Industry Indexes 
  May 1990 – Dec 1998 
 
Jan 1999 – Mar 2008 
  Pure industry effect  Sum of country effects  Pure industry effect  Sum of country effects 
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0.24    
0.08     
0.28     
0.06     
0.15     
0.32     
0.16     
0.415     
0.725     
0.438     
0.725    
0.592     
0.877     
0.766     
0.648     
0.05     
0.07     
0.14    
0.06     
0.04     
0.03     
0.10     










  The result of the continuing importance of country effects in European eurobond returns, and 
above all of their divergence within the Euro zone between the core and the periphery is striking. It grinds 
against the a priori expectation of diminishing country effects following EMU.  
Moreover, these results show that from the perspective of eurobond investors that insofar there 
has been financial and economic convergence, it is only within the set of core member countries. There is 
national-economic divergence between the core and the periphery under EMU. This result is the opposite 
of one of the main prior objectives and expectations of EMU, not in the least of the founders of the 
economic and monetary union. They considered economic convergence as both a precondition for and a 124 
 
 
consequence of monetary integration and unification.
2  It also contradicts the convergence expectation 
implicit in “One Market, One Money” a report commissioned by the European Commission in 1990 into the 
economic benefits and costs of EMU. This convergence expectation is based on the macroeconomic 
stability effects EMU is anticipated to have by the various economists contributing to the report on prices, 
output and other variables and from the monetary and fiscal policy discipline EMU is expected to 
encourage. In so far as can be discerned from the prevailing importance of country effects and disparages 
within the Euro bloc post-1999, the reality of EMU has turned out differently.  
   There is no real pattern for the EMU-outs, for the variance of the pure country effects, for Sweden 
goes up and for the UK goes down significantly after EMU. The sample partitioning now reveals that the 
high variance of the UK’s pure country effect can be attributed to eurobond price behaviour in the years 
before EMU.  
   As regards the industry indexes, it can be seen that the variance of pure industry effects are, with 
the exception of the government institutions sector, significantly higher pre-EMU than post-EMU. Sectors 
that previously had an above-average variance of their pure industry effects, such as communication and 
technology and utilities, still do in the second period.  For other previously above-average industry effect 
variances this is clearly not the case. Particularly the drop in the variance of the pure industry effects for the 
financial and funds, consumer sector and basic materials and energy is remarkable.  
  The result of fading industry effects in eurobond returns post-EMU also stands out. This is in 
contradiction with the ex ante prediction from prevailing economic theory on the subject at the time.  
While the scenario that monetary integration leads to industry dispersion is favoured on balance in “One 
Market, One Money”, this view is not that of the mainstream of international trade theories that rather 
tends to follow the Krugman school and predict one corollary: industry specialisation. These economists 
predict a concentration of industries driven precisely by local scale economies and partially reduced spatial 
transaction costs under EMU (see Krugman 1989, 1991, 1993; and Krugman and Venables, 1990). However, 
the diminishing importance of industry effects that results from eurobond returns strongly suggests that 
rather than countries specializing in certain industries under EMU, intra-industry dispersion is what seems 
to have taken place across the single currency region.  
   Given that the currency component effect, i.e. the effect from a larger than market average local 
currency move to the US Dollar on eurobond returns via companies’ relative competitiveness, is significant 
                                                
2 The Delors Report of 1989 puts as much emphasis on the economic integration as on the monetary unification of European 
countries in the process leading up to and ultimately achieved through EMU. While the Delors Committee takes the view that “the 
completion of the single market [through the establishment of EMU, MPB] will link national economies much closer together and 
significantly increase the degree of economic integration” (article 10), it also calls for a need of greater economic policy 
coordination in the meantime. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 states that “the Community shall have as its task, by establishing a 
common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies […], to promote throughout the 
Community […] a high degree of convergence of economic performance” (article 2).    125 
 
 
in explaining the pure country effects over the entire sample period, and the above finding of the prevailing 
dominance of country effects in eurobond returns after EMU, the importance of currency components in 
the explanation of the country effects is again analyzed both before and after EMU. Does the entry of the 
national currency of a number of countries in our sample to the Euro make any difference to the earlier 
detected importance of the currency components on country effects?   
   Table 4.16 summarizes the results of regressions of the pure country effects on the currency 
components for each period around the introduction of the Euro. The scatter plots of currency components 
and country effects for each subperiod are in Figure B1 in Appendix B. The results in Table 4.16 can be 
directly compared with those in Table 4.13 in Section 5.4, which are for the whole sample period. From 
Table 4.16 it can be seen that the model fit is quite good in both periods. Estimated coefficients for the 
constant factor are all close to zero and all estimated slope coefficient, with the exception of Italy post-
EMU, positive and significantly different from zero. There are, however, some important differences 
discernible among the various countries in the transition from the pre-EMU to the post-EMU era. Again, the 
divide between core, peripheral, and non-EMU countries is helpful in detecting certain patterns.   
   For all core-EMU countries the slope coefficient and the r-squared of the regression increase 
significantly from the pre to the post-EMU period. For the Netherlands, the slope is no longer statistically 
significantly different from one under EMU, which indicates that its pure country effect is fully correlated 
with its currency effect. For the other core-EMU members, their currency effects explain an even greater 
amount of their pure country effects of which it is also known to have a lower variance post-EMU.  Of the 
peripheral-EMU member states, for whom it is known that the variance of their pure country effects 
increases after EMU, the correlation for Spain’s country effect and currency effect is also statistically equal 
to one, but the model fit is not all that great. For Italy, any relationship that is there between its pure 
country effect and currency component prior to the Euro, breaks down under EMU. Italy post-EMU is the 
only case where there is virtually no relation between its currency and its country effect. In other words, 
only for Italy among all EMU members, its currency now tied to the Euro-bloc does not play a role in 
explaining the prominence of its country effects.  
   For the non-EMU members, the correlation between their currency and country effects of each 
converges post-EMU. Whereas for Sweden the currency effect explained only a quarter of its country effect 
prior to EMU, it rises to nearly 80% after EMU. For the UK, the strength of the currency effect in the country 
effect drops, but is still 66% under EMU. The model fit for both EMU-outsiders improves significantly post-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In sum, these are exceptional and important results from partitioning the full sample period at the 
start of 1999, the date of the introduction of the Euro. The correlation and covariance structure of 
decomposed country and industry index returns are statistically different, justifying the separate analysis 
and comparison of each subperiod.  The variance of all industry effects significantly reduces in the post-
EMU period, while the variance of country effects remains on average as big in explaining eurobond 
returns.  The difference in the evolution of the importance of country effects between core-EMU countries 
and peripheral-EMU countries is striking though. Results indicate that core-members are virtually complete 
substitutes with respect to their country effects following EMU, which is what one would expect, but have 
strongly diverged with southerly EMU countries in this respect whose country effects rise significantly. The 
divergence within the monetary union is contrary to ex ante expectations. Post-EMU, the currency 
component is an even stronger factor in the explanation of the country effects of core-EMU countries, but 
this relation breaks down for the peripheral-EMU countries and especially for Italy. The competitive effects 
of the behaviour of the Euro, to which their currency is now tied, vis-à-vis the USD for these latter countries 
does not play a role in explaining the greater prominence of their country effects in eurobond returns. The 
much reduced importance of industry effects in eurobond returns post-EMU is also remarkable. It implies 
that intra-industry dispersion is taking place rather than industry specialisation of countries. This is again 
contrary to ex ante predictions of EMU, from the Krugman school of economists that dominated this 
debate at the time.         
 
6.  Empirical results from the extended model 
 
In this section, the basic decomposition model is extended with the inclusion of liquidity and maturity 
effects. For this purpose, each eurobond is assigned to one of four liquidity brackets (< $500 mn, $500 mn - 
$1 bn, $1bn - $3bn, > $3 bn) and one of four maturity brackets (< 3 yrs, 3 -5 yrs, 5-10 yrs, >10 yrs). Note that 
while the liquidity of a eurobond is based on its issue size and remains in the same liquidity bracket 
throughout its life, the maturity is in fact the life-to-maturity of the eurobond and varies over the sample 
period. Country and industry classifications remain as before.   
6.1. Summary statistics 
 
Table 4.17 gives the distribution of the sample of 6,440 eurobonds by liquidity and maturity and is 
complementary to Table 4.2 in Section 5.1. From Table 4.17 it can be seen that the liquidity composition of 
the sample is heavily skewed towards eurobonds with issue sizes less than $500 million (71% of the total 
number). However, because smaller eurobonds not only weigh less but also tend to have fewer price 128 
 
 
   Table 4.17 
Liquidity and maturity composition 
Panels A and B give for each liquidity and maturity bracket the number of eurobonds included in the total sample and that number 
as a percentage of the total number of eurobonds. Panel C gives for each country by liquidity and industry by liquidity the number 
of eurobonds included in the total sample. Panel D gives the average weight of the (live) eurobonds in the country-by-liquidity 
cross-sector in the total value-weighted market over the whole sample.  Panels E and F the same for country by maturity and 
industry by maturity.   
A.  By liquidity (number and percent of total)  B.  By maturity (number and percent of total) 
≤  $500 mn: 
$500 mn - ≤  $1 bn: 






4,561     
1,157     
600       





≤  3 years: 
3 years - ≤ 5 years: 














Total  6,440    Total  6,440   
C.  Number of eurobonds by liquidity and country, and liquidity and industry 
  Liquidity by country  Liquidity by industry 









































































D.  Average weights of eurobonds by liquidity and country, and liquidity and industry 
  Liquidity by country  Liquidity by industry 









































































E.  Number of eurobonds by maturity and country, and maturity and industry 
  Maturity by country  Maturity by industry 









































































F.  Average weights of eurobonds by maturity and country, and maturity and industry 
  Maturity by country  Maturity by industry 












































































observations, this is largely evened out in the value-weighted calculations. The average total weight of the 
four liquidity brackets in the value-weighted indexes are 34%, 21%, 20% and 25% respectively.  
    Life-to-maturity is more evenly distributed by number of eurobonds than liquidity. Still, eurobonds 
of less than five years account for more than two-thirds of the total sample. The majority of short-term 
eurobonds originate from the financial sector. This is not surprising as banks and financial institutions have 
a disproportionate need for such funding by the nature of their business. Because eurobonds with a 
remaining life of less than three years from the financial sector also are for the majority the smallest size 
issues, the average weight shifts between maturity brackets, such that the 3- to 5-year sector is now most 
dominant (42% average weight in total).   
   With the exception of the largest liquidity category in Italy, liquidity and maturity tend to be much 
more evenly spread over the countries than over the industry sectors. 
6.2. Decomposition with liquidity and maturity effects 
 
Next, the decomposition or eurobond returns over the entire sample is performed with these additional 
factors of liquidity and maturity included alongside country and industry. Excess country and industry 
return indexes are decomposed into four components: pure country or industry effects, sum of industry or 
country effects, sum of liquidity effects and the sum of maturity effects. It is theoretically feasible to create 
liquidity and maturity returns indexes and to decompose these in similar fashion. However, practice learns 
that bond portfolio investors hardly base their primary asset allocation decisions on liquidity or maturity 
alone and tend to use them only as secondary considerations. Hence, liquidity and maturity effects are 
merely incorporated as second order effects in country and industry indexes.  
Table 4.18 gives the decomposition of the excess country and industry indexes into the four 
components and shows the variance and ratio of these components by country and by industry. Table 4.18 
is complementary to Table 4.4 and results can be directly compared. The main conclusion is that the 
dominance of pure country effects in eurobond returns with the inclusion of liquidity and maturity effects 
remains. The pure country effects are naturally somewhat diminished with the inclusion of these additional 
effects, largely so in Italy and the UK. Their country portfolios are both skewed towards the largest liquidity 
segment and the longest maturity bonds respectively, which each have inherently larger variances. The sum 
of industry effects in the country indexes is virtually unchanged from before, but the sum of liquidity and of 
maturity effects are on average similar in size to the sum of industry effects. With respect to the industry 
indexes, the size and pattern of pure industry effects is broadly as before. Now, the sum of country effects 
in the industry indexes is much reduced, but still nearly three times as large as the sum of liquidity and of 
maturity effects each.   130 
 
 
 Table 4.18 
Decomposition of excess index returns with liquidity and maturity effects (May 1990 – Mar 2008) 
The table gives the variance of the four components of the value-weighted (VW) excess country, in Panel A, and excess industry, 
in Panel B, index returns over the total market. The ratio is the variance ratio to the index in excess of the market. The results for 
the equal-weighted (EW) indexes are in Table B4.18 in Appendix B. 
A.  Country indexes 
  Pure country effects  Sum of industry effects  Sum of liquidity effects  Sum of maturity effects 




































































































B.  Industry indexes 
  Pure industry effects  Sum of country effects  Sum of liquidity effects  Sum of maturity effects 











































































Variance of pure liquidity and maturity effects 
The table gives the variance of the pure liquidity effects of the value-weighted (VW) excess 
liquidity index returns over the total market, in Panel A, and the variance of the pure maturity 
effects of the excess maturity index returns over the total market, in Panel B. The results for 
the equal-weighted (EW) indexes are in Table B4.19 in Appendix B. 
























  The overall result is that country effects remain dominant in eurobond returns over the full sample 
period. While liquidity and maturity structure of the portfolio matter for the explanation of returns of the 
country and industry indexes and their effect takes away from the importance of country effects, it is 
overall not that huge.  
   As discussed, it is somewhat theoretical to compose liquidity and maturity indexes. This theoretical 
exercise is useful only to show the variance of pure liquidity and pure maturity effects that result from 
these indexes’ returns for purposes of comparison. The determination of the pure effects of the four 
factors now incorporated into the extended decomposition model provides insight into their ranking of 
importance in explaining eurobond returns. Table 4.19 gives the variance of the pure liquidity effects 
resulting from the excess liquidity returns indexes and the variance of the pure maturity effects resulting 
from the excess maturity returns indexes. These can be compared with the variance of pure country effects 
and pure industry effects shown in Table 4.18. By and large, variances increases with liquidity and are  
J- shaped with respect to remaining maturity. So a eurobond portfolio tilted towards largest size issues and 
the extreme ends of the maturity spectrum with a strong emphasis on long maturities will have greater 
variance in its returns and more opportunities for risk reduction. The ranking of the strength of the various 
pure effects in terms of their average variance is country first, maturity second, industry third and liquidity 
fourth. This is similar to results from Varotto (2003) for a sample of eurobond returns from the pre-EMU 
years of 1993-1998. Varroto finds that country diversification is best for reducing portfolio credit risk, 
followed in turn by the diversification of maturity, rating, and only then by industry diversification (the 
effect of seniority is very small). 
  In sum, results from the decomposition model extended with liquidity and maturity factors are that 
the addition of these effects does little to mitigate the importance of country effects in eurobond returns.  
They do alter the position of industry effects in that maturity effects on average rank ahead in terms of 
importance. This is purely because eurobonds with a remaining life of more than 10-years have large 
variation in their returns. While the liquidity of eurobonds makes some difference on returns, their effect is 
not as big on average as industry sector. These results, which are over the whole sample period of  
1990-2008, are in line with what Varotto (2003) finds for eurobond returns from 1993-1998. 
6.3. EMU and the ranking of factors 
 
 The results from the extended model in the previous section are for the full sample period. It is worth 
analysing how they turn out in the roughly ten years before and after the creation of the Euro eurobond 
market to which so many of the eurobonds in the sample belong.  Is there a change in the ranking order of 
importance of factors in explaining eurobond returns between the pre-EMU and the post-EMU eras?   132 
 
 
   As in Section 5.5, the sample period is partitioned in two: May 1990 to December 1998 and January 
1999 to March 2008. The decomposition according to the extended model is separately performed over 
each subperiod. Results for the variances of the four effects in each period around EMU for the excess 
country and industry indexes are shown in Table 4.20 and can be compared with Table 4.18. Judging from 
the average variance of all effects, it can be seen that one of the main conclusions from the previous 
analysis remains valid; country effects are the dominant factor in explaining eurobond returns, both before 
and after EMU. The average variance of pure country effects remains roughly the same (1.14 versus 1.11). 
All other effects – pure and sum of industry effects, liquidity and maturity effects – decline significantly 
from the first period to the next. 
  The performance of the extended decomposition over the two subperiods reveals further 
interesting details. For example, that the Italian country index return pre-EMU contains a high liquidity 
effect. The country index return for Spain has a high maturity effect and for the Netherlands and the UK has 
a high industry effect in the same period. Post-EMU, the maturity effect in the Italian country index actually 
increases and is an outlier amongst otherwise declining maturity effects in country and industry indexes. 
  To determine the ranking of effects in eurobond returns pre and post-EMU, the variance of pure 
liquidity and maturity effects is computed for each subperiod. Table 4.21 lists the results of the variance for 
each liquidity and maturity bracket as well as their overall average. The comparison of the average variance 
with that of the pure country and industry effects for each period, listed in Table 4.20, shows that the 
overall ranking of effects – country first, maturity second, industry third and liquidity fourth - remains intact 
with the only difference that industry and liquidity effects are similar in importance on average post-EMU.     
   Tables 4.20 and 4.21 tell an interesting tale and that is of the ripening of European eurobond 
markets. This is concluded from the fact that maturity and especially liquidity characteristics play a much 
less significant role in the return variance post-EMU. The reduced maturity effect, which remains most 
pronounced for longer dated eurobonds, could off course be the result of structurally lower and flatter 
yield curves under EMU, but is more likely the result of higher frequency of issuance at these maturities. 
The reduced liquidity effect, which is the most significant of the two, can be attributed to the much larger 
issuance of eurobonds under the Euro, both in number and in size. Both features of the European bond 
market are discussed in Chapter 3. 
  In sum, the decomposition of the extended model with the four factors of country, industry, 
liquidity and maturity over the periods before and after EMU yields three important results. First, the 
variance of country effects remain the most important and equally important in explaining eurobond 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variance of pure liquidity and maturity effects (pre and post-EMU) 
The table gives the variance of the pure liquidity effects of the value-weighted (VW) excess liquidity index returns over the total  
market, in Panel A, and the variance of the pure maturity effects of the excess maturity index returns over the total market , in 
Panel B. Result for the equal-weighted (EW) indexes are in Table B4.21 of Appendix B. 
A.  Pure liquidity effects  B.  Pure maturity effects 
































pre-Euro era to the next, so do liquidity and maturity effects. Thirdly, the ranking of importance of effects 
for eurobond returns – country first, maturity second, industry third and liquidity fourth - remains intact. 
This much reduced maturity and especially liquidity effects for returns is signifying for the maturing 
eurobond market under EMU. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
This chapter empirically studies the factor decomposition in European eurobond markets and the impact of 
the formation of EMU on the relative importance of effects in their return variation. It does so in the 
approach first established by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) and followed by many for equities but rarely 
for bonds.   
  For the purpose of this empirical analysis, I collect a database of 6,440 eurobond prices from 
Bloomberg and Morgan Stanley. These eurobond price series are denominated in local currencies. Holding 
period returns for individual corporate eurobonds are calculated for each month from the end-of-month 
prices with the incorporation of the accrued interest. The local currency holding period returns are 
subsequently converted into USD using spot exchange rates from Datastream. The resulting 6,440 
eurobond USD monthly return series cover the period May 1990 to March 2008, though starting and 
ending at different times within that period. By virtue of the geographical base and corporate activity of the 
ultimate guarantor of the issuing entity, obtained from the same source, each eurobond is allocated to one 
of ten countries (Belgium/Luxembourg, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the UK, 
supranationals and other) and one of seven industry groups (financials and funds, government institutions, 
consumer, communications and technology, basic materials and energy, industrials and utilities). This is the 
base for the standard decomposition analysis, which aims to determine the importance of country and 135 
 
 
industry effects in returns. The issuer information otherwise contained within the data set allows for the 
allocation of eurobonds into four liquidity brackets (<$500 mn, 500mn - <$1bn, $1bn - <$3 bn, >$3 bn) and 
four life-to-maturity brackets (<1 yr, 1 – 3 yrs, 3 – 5 yrs, >5 yrs). This is utilized in the extended 
decomposition analysis, where liquidity and maturity effects are determined as second order effects in 
European eurobond returns alongside country and industry effects.   
The standard decomposition methodology follows Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) and starts from 
cross-sectional regressions of 6,440 individual USD eurobond returns on a set of ten country and seven 
industry dummy variables for a set time interval. As these dummies are orthogonal in each cross-section, 
their estimated coefficients represent the return of the country and industry sector they belong to in excess 
to that of the average market. The contribution of each factor is then computed as the time series’ variance 
of the coefficients estimated in the successive cross-sectional regressions. Excess return country indexes 
are thus decomposed into pure country effects and the sum of industry effects, and excess return industry 
indexes into pure industry effects and sum of country effects. In a second instance, excess return country 
and industry indexes are added to with liquidity and maturity factors for which dummy variables are 
included. This extended decomposition follows a similar analysis by Varotto (2003) for eurobonds. Standard 
and extended decompositions are performed as such, first for the whole sample period of May 1990 to 
March 2008 and secondly for the two subperiods around the start of EMU in January 1999.  
The correlation structure of country and industry indexes of outright eurobond returns can be 
compared with that of the indexes after decomposition and adjusted for industry and geographical 
composition to determine whether decomposition yields a set of indexes that is significantly different. The 
Jennrich (1970) test establishes whether the two sets of correlation matrixes are from the same population. 
Results reject the hypothesis that the correlation structure among country indexes does not change after 
applying the Heston and Rouwenhorst decomposition for both the equal and value-weighted indexes.  The 
Jennrich test equally shows that decomposed country and industry return indexes have correlation and 
covariance structures that are statistically significantly different pre to post-EMU.  These results formally 
validate the decomposition of eurobond returns and the split of the sample period at the time of the start 
of EMU.   
  The decomposition analysis is a priori expected to confirm four main expectations. First, one can 
expect to observe diminishing country effects in European eurobond returns as time progresses. Especially 
following the start of EMU, the financial integration and macroeconomic convergence of participating 
member states should lead to reduced country effects. This macroeconomic convergence is predicted by 
the founders of EMU and implicit the “One Market, One Money” ex ante cost-benefit analysis in 1990. 
Since countries participating in EMU make up the majority of the sample, reduced country effects should 
be the overall trend. The expectation is of diminishing and not entirely fading country effects, as Euro zone 136 
 
 
countries’ fiscal policies remain at a national level resulting in differences in credit worthiness. Secondly, 
one can expect industry effects to increase post-EMU if the ex ante predictions from the Krugman school of 
international trade economists for regional industry specialization in Europe’s monetary union that 
dominate thinking at the time become real. “One Market, One Money” rather predicts that industry 
dispersion is more compatible with EMU though. Thirdly, while the expectation for the EMU-ins on the 
direction of their country and industry effects is relatively firm, it is immediately obvious what this 
expectation should be for the EMU-outs. Two such countries are included in the sample (UK and Sweden) 
and for them the effects could go both ways. Fourthly, one can expect that with the creation of a larger, 
deeper, and more liquid bond market under the Euro, the importance of liquidity and maturity effects 
lessen post-EMU. Reduced maturity effects would be the result of higher frequency of issuance in all 
segements of the yield curve, especially the longer end. Reduced liquidity effects would result from the 
much larger issuance of eurobonds under the Euro, both in number and in size.   
   Results from the decomposition analysis largely contradict these a priori expectations and are 
therefore noteworthy. First, country effects dominate industry effects over the whole sample period by 
more than three times (= 1.26/0.39, for the value-weighted indexes) and in both subperiods around EMU. 
Post-EMU country effects remain on the whole equally important compared to the period before and even 
rise slightly. More detailed observation of the course of country effects under EMU brings out the striking 
result of a North-South divide within the Euro zone. The average of country effects of core-EMU countries  
Germany, France and BENELUX shrinks to nearly one-fifth (from 1.18 to 0.26) under the Euro, while the 
average of country effects of the peripheral-EMU countries Spain and Italy rises nearly five times (from 1.00 
to 4.67) pre to post-EMU. The immediate observation from eurobond returns therefore is of economic 
divergence between the core and the periphery. These results imply that ex ante convergence predictions 
of the monetary union that motivated its creation and as predicted in “One Money, One Market” have not 
been realized. Secondly, the importance of industry effects is significantly reduced, from 0.63 to 0.16, pre 
to post-EMU. The implication of these observed increased industry effects under EMU is that the ex ante 
prediction of Krugman economists on industry specialization under EMU is defied by that of industry 
dispersion predicted in “One Money, One Market”. These two results combined lead to the finding that 
country effects outweigh industry effects pre-EMU by a factor of nearly two (=1.24/0.63) and post-EMU by 
a factor of precisely eight (=1.28/0.16). The final conclusion from the standard decomposition is that there 
is indeed no consistency in the pattern of country effects among the EMU-outs. Thirdly, the results from 
the extended decomposition analysis are that country effects remain dominant throughout and that indeed 
the importance of liquidity and maturity effects both reduce after EMU. The first verifies that the main 
conclusions from the standard decomposition are robust and the latter that the depth and maturity of the 137 
 
 
eurobond markets under the Euro has improved. The ranking of importance of the various effects is 
country first, maturity second, industry third and liquidity fourth, in line with results from Varotto (2003). 
The result of dominating country effects is indeed similar to what Heston and Rouwenhorst find for 
equity returns (and many others that followed them) and to what Varroto finds for eurobonds returns, at 
least up until 1998. Beyond this date, which of course coincides with the start of EMU in Europe, the 
dominance of country effects in equity returns is challenged by the surge of industry effects in Europe in 
several studies, while to date not sufficiently researched for bonds. My results confirm the dominance of 
country effects in European eurobond returns pre-EMU. In contrast to this common finding for European 
equity returns, they also confirm that country effects increase their dominance over industry effects in 
eurobond returns post-EMU.   
In the course of the (standard) decomposition analysis it is found that the common factor in 
eurobonds is high. Through a multi-variable regression analysis it is established that this is largely caused by 
the conversion of eurobond returns from national currency to US Dollars. Beyond that, economic outlook 
factors, such as industrial production and deficit levels and bond market factors, such as the long-term US 
Treasury yield, have some effect. Further to this mere currency conversion effect, it is found that the 
currency component, defined as the percentage change of the national currency of each country to the US 
Dollar over the weighted-average basket of these currencies, can in a number of cases be related to the 
country effects. The interpretation of this relation is that a more than average depreciation of the national 
currency results in a competitive business advantage for the company presiding in that country which 
translates into better eurobond returns. The relation, established through OLS regressions, is shown to be 
stronger for core-EMU countries than for peripheral-EMU countries and intensifies in the post-EMU phase.  
The main conclusion from the empirical analysis performed in this chapter is that for eurobonds 
country effects matter in their return variation, and contrary to common perception under fund managers, 
even more under EMU than before. From this one might want to conclude that the willingness on the part 
of investors to prefer country allocations over industry allocations is established. This is only the case in 
part, for the decomposition methodology remains bound to the separate identification of factors as main 
sources of reduction in return variation, i.e. the risk in portfolios. The overall conclusion that is appropriate 
from the empirical analysis in this chapter is that a diversification across countries within an industry is a 
more effective tool for risk reduction of portfolios than the other way around, both pre and post-EMU. The 
empirical study in Chapter 5 extends this analysis and investigates how results from the decomposition 
analysis translate into the mean-variance performance of country and industry-based bond portfolios. 





From Eqs. (3) and (4) in Section 4.1.: 
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Rewrite the first two restrictions in (A2) as,  
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and incorporate into the regression equation (A1), using the last country/industry as benchmark,
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The cross-sectional regressions (A4) are performed over all eurobonds that are present in time period t.  
The systemic part of the return is represented by the fitted values of the returns from the regressions and 
can be written as: 
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     , 
 
where I have included the imputed values for φ  and ψ  from (A3).
37 Note that there is no longer a 
disturbance term in the above equation because the residuals sum to zero by construction. The estimated 
coefficients are indicated with hats. 
 
                                                
36 See also Bai and Green (2010) for similar derivations. 
 
37 Note that in a particular time period t it may be that data is not available for all countries and industries. In those cases the 
regression (A4) is adapted by dropping those countries/industries for which no information is given.  139 
 
 
Decomposition into country and industry indexes can be constructed in the following way. Let me focus on 
a country index first. Weigh all systemic returns  ̂  with a weight     that represents the weight a 
particular bond n has in country    from set k = 1, … , K and sum over the eurobonds.
38 
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The global factor α    is left unchanged since  ∑    
 
     = 1.  The pure country factor ψ    remains as the 
terms        will be zero for k    . Note that the terms ∑    
 
         can be interpreted as the weight 
of industry j in country   as the     dummies pick out those eurobonds that belong to industry j. 
 
For the industry indexes we can do the same. Let     be the weight a particular eurobond has in industry   
from set j= 1, … , J. Sum again over the eurobonds: 
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The global term is unaffected by the weighting as ∑    
 
     = 1.  The pure industry factor  φ  
  results from 
the observation that term        will be zero for all j    .  The term ∑    
 
         can be interpreted as 
the weight of country k in industry   as the     dummies pick out those bonds that belong to country k. 
 
 
   
                                                
38 Important to note here is that    = 0 for all those bonds that do not belong to country k. This also implies 
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Summary statistics for estimated country and industry indexes 
Panel A summarizes the mean and the standard deviation of the monthly equal-weighted (EW) estimated country returns 
corrected for industry compositions and their correlations. Panel B the same for the estimated industry returns corrected for 
country compositions.  
A.  Country indexes after decomposition, adjusted for their industry composition 
  EW return  Correlations 
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B.  Industry indexes after decomposition, adjusted for their country composition 
  EW return  Correlations 










































































Jennrich test of stability of correlation matrixes before and after decomposition 
The table shows the results of the Jennrich test statistic and its corresponding critical value and p-value computed on the 
correlations of eurobond equal-weighted (EW) returns from the country and industry indexes before and after decomposition 
over the full sample period.  
  Country correlation matrixes  Industry correlation matrixes 
Jennrich  χ
2 test statistic  128.3636  141.9633 
Degrees of freedom  45  21 
Critical value  61.6562  32.6706 








Performance statistics ignoring the common factor 
Panel A summarizes the mean and the standard deviation of the monthly equal-weighted (EW) estimated country returns 
corrected for industry compositions and the common factor, and their correlations. Panel B the same for the estimated industry 
returns corrected for country compositions and the common factor.  
A.  Country indexes adjusted for their industry composition and the common factor 
  EW return  Correlations 
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B.  Industry indexes adjusted for their country composition and the common factor 
  EW return  Correlations 










































































Common factor in relation to pure country effects and pure industry effects 
The table summarizes the mean, standard deviation and variance of the common factor in both equal-weighted (EW) country and 
industry indexes and for the pure country effects from the country indexes and the pure industry effects from the industry 
indexes.  
  Mean  Standard deviation 
  Full period  Pre-EMU  Post-EMU  Full period  Pre-EMU  Post-EMU 
Common factor  0.657  1.133  0.214  2.919  3.469  2.221 
Average of pure 
country effects 
-0.022  -0.022      -0.021      1.040  1.064  0.927 
Average of pure 
industry effects 







Country effects and excess exchange rate returns 
The table summarizes the statistics of the regressions of pure country effects from the equal-weighted (EW) country indexes on 
the currency component. Estimated coefficients are given for the constant and the slope with 95% confidence intervals on either 
side of the coefficients in brackets.  
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Jennrich tests of stability of correlation and covariance return matrixes from two subperiods around EMU:  
5/1990 – 12/1998 and 1/1999 – 3/2008 
The table summarizes the results for the Jennrich χ
2 test statistic from the equal-weighted (EW) correlations and covariations of 
the country and industry indexes returns resulting from decomposition and obtained over each subperiod.  
  Country indexes  Industry indexes 









2 test statistic  314.23  569.46  151.49  378.30 
Degrees of freedom  45  55  21  28 
Critical value (95% conf.)  61.66  73.31  32.67  41.34 















Decomposition of excess index returns, pre and post-EMU 
The table gives the variance of the components of the equal-weighted (EW) excess country, in Panel A, and excess industry, in 
Panel B, index returns over the total market for May 1990-Dec 2000 and Jan 1999 – Mar 2008. The ratio is the variance ratio to 
the index in excess of the market.  
A.  Country Indexes 
  May 1990 – Dec 1998  Jan 1999 – Mar 2008 
  Pure country effect  Sum of industry effects  Pure country effect  Sum of industry effects 
























































0.37     
0.30     
0.13     
5.15     
0.43    
4.61     
1.43     
0.87     
0.13     
0.04     
1.34 
1.178     
1.208     
0.955     
1.074     
1.034     
1.021     
1.205     
0.910     
0.295     
0.690     
0.957 
0.03     
0.03     
0.02    
0.03     
0.02     
0.05     
0.05     
0.03     
0.25     













B.  Industry Indexes 
  May 1990 – Dec 1998 
 
Jan 1999 – Mar 2008 
  Pure industry effect  Sum of country effects  Pure industry effect  Sum of country effects 
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Figure B1  
Scatter plots of value-weighted currency components vs. pure country effects per subperiod 
The graphs show, for each country, the scatter plot of the currency effect on the x-axis and the country effects on the y-axis for the 
entire sample period. Both need to be multiplied by one hundred to be able to interpret it as percent per month. Because both axis 
are forced within set limits, it is possible that more outliers exist that are not visible.  
May 1990 – Dec 1998  Jan 1999 – Mar 2008 
 
 














































































































Decomposition of excess index returns with liquidity and maturity effects (May 1990 – Mar 2008) 
The table gives the variance of the four components of the equal-weighted (EW) excess country, in Panel A, and excess 
industry, in Panel B, index returns over the total market. The ratio is the variance ratio to the index in excess of the market.  
A.  Country indexes 
  Pure country effects  Sum of industry effects  Sum of liquidity effects  Sum of maturity effects 
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B.  Industry indexes 
  Pure industry effects  Sum of country effects  Sum of liquidity effects  Sum of maturity effects 
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Variance of pure liquidity and maturity effects 
The table gives the variance of the pure liquidity effects of the equal-weighted (EW) excess 
liquidity index returns over the total market, in Panel A, and the variance of the pure maturity 
effects of the excess maturity index returns over the total market, in Panel B.  
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Variance of pure liquidity and maturity effects (pre and post-EMU) 
The table gives the variance of the pure liquidity effects of the equal-weighted (VW) excess liquidity index returns over the total  
market, in Panel A, and the variance of the pure maturity effects of the excess maturity index returns over the total market , in Panel 
B.  
A.  Pure liquidity effects  B.  Pure maturity effects 














































When a sample period is partitioned into two subsamples, correlation (m1c  and m2c) and variance-
covariance (m1v and m2v) matrixes can be computed for both periods.  
 
I wish to conduct a test of stability of each type of matrix between both subsamples. The null hypothesis of 
the tests holds if the two correlation or variance-covariance matrixes are equal.  Jennrich (1970) 
established that this test has a  χ
2 distribution with degrees of freedom related to n, as follows: 
 
Let T1 and T2 be the sample size and n the number of assets (and the dimension of the correlation and 
variance-covariance matrixes). Define: 
 
   c  = (T1m1c + T2m2c)/(T1+T2) = (    ) = ‘average’ correlation matrix 
δij = Kronecker delta = identity matrix of the same dimension as    c 
S = (δij  +            ) where the elements       are from the inverse of the matrix       
Z =  
     
T  T 
 
1/2    c
-1  (m1c  - m2c)   
 
The Jennrich test statistics for the stability of the correlation matrixes is: 
 
χ
2  =   
 
   trace (Z
2) – (diag(Z))’ S
-1 diag(Z)    with  
      
    degrees of freedom 
 
Replacing the correlation matrixes with the corresponding covariance matrixes, the Jennrich test statistic 
for the stability of the covariance matrixes is:  
 
 χ
2  =   
 
   trace (Z
2)         with  
      
    degrees of freedom 
                                  






Additional multi-variable regressions to explain common factor in eurobonds 
The table shows the results of regressions of the type CFEt = αt + βt VAR
1
t + γt VAR
2
t + δt VAR
3
t + λt VAR
4
t + ηt VAR
5
t  + εt. 











t  Estimated coefficients 
(95% confidence intervals) 
St.error     
               p-value 
F-stat.               
R
2 




















(0.9530)     
(-0.3317)   














                       0 
406.839           
0.8862 






















(0.0018)    



















                       0 
341.082          
0.8913 






















(0.0008)    
(0.9557)   
(-0.3271)    
(-0.1569)   
(-0.0394)   















                      0 
340.405          
0.8911 





















(0.9568)   
(-0.3336)  
(-0.1574)   
















                      0 
340.276          
0.8911 























(0.9580)   

















                      0 
340.707          
0.8912 
 






























International bond diversification and EMU: Country versus industry portfolios 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This is the second of empirical chapters. Following the factor decomposition analysis in the previous 
chapter, it uses a complementary methodology to study whether a country or an industry portfolio 
diversification strategy performs better in European bond markets.  
   The methodological approach adopted in this chapter is a mean-variance portfolio optimization 
setting from which the risk-return performance of country and industry-based bond portfolios can be 
compared. In this setup unconditional mean-variance portfolio optimization results in three efficient 
frontiers: one for a portfolio based on country indexes alone, one based on industry indexes alone and one 
constructed from both. By definition the efficient frontier from all available indexes will be the most 
efficient and the other two investment strategies are nested. Spanning and efficiency tests are applied to 
determine how these investment strategies compare among each other statistically, building on earlier 
analytical work from Huberman and Kandel (1987) and De Roon and Nijman (2001) and as has been 
performed on European equity returns by Moerman (2004, 2008) and Eiling et al. (2006). The mean-
variance test of spanning analyzes the effect that the introduction of additional industry (country) assets 
has on the efficient frontier of a benchmark country (industry) portfolio. The test of efficiency compares the 
maximum Sharpe ratios of the different portfolios.    
  Results from this empirical analysis balance the ones from the previous chapter in the aim to 
determine whether EMU justifies a change in the composition of European bond portfolios and potentially 
also a shift in diversification strategy from a country-first to an industry-first allocation. While the 
decomposition analysis of the previous chapter focuses on risk-contributing properties of country and 
industry factors in returns, the tests performed in this chapter consider whether an investment portfolio 
strategy based on either has a relatively better mean-variance performance. This allows for qualifications 
on optimal portfolio construction with respect to the twin objectives of risk and return and not just risk 
alone.  
  While the analysis in the previous chapter is from individual eurobond returns, mean-variance tests 
are performed at the portfolio index level. This allows for the addition of government bond indexes in the 
analysis of the outright performance evaluation with portfolio indexes from eurobonds. Thus for the first 
time in the empirical analysis the merit of a portfolio of government bonds allocated on a country basis vis-
à-vis a portfolio of eurobonds allocated on an industry basis is analyzed.  154 
 
 
In this chapter, mean-variance tests are performed on country and industry portfolios built from 
three types of content. Portfolio indexes are first constructed through the straightforward direct allocation 
into country and industry groups. It is shown how from the 6,440 eurobond returns utilized in the previous 
chapter, 4,587 are selected to form a so-called ‘closed’ data set. Secondly, portfolio indexes are calculated 
from the main decomposition model of the previous chapter. This builds on the result that decomposition 
creates country and industry indexes with different portfolio implications than indexes from their direct 
allocation. In this chapter, it is tested whether this is also visible in the comparable mean-variance 
performance of the two sets of indexes. In the third instance, industry portfolio indexes constructed from 
the set of 4,587 eurobond returns on either basis, direct and decomposed, are compared with a new and 
separate set of country indexes created from government bond returns. For the latter, I obtain index series 
from the European Federation of Financial Analysts’ Societies (EFFAS) which are published by Bloomberg 
and available from December 1991. In my model set-up, spanning tests are performed on outright returns 
but for the efficiency tests returns in excess of the risk-free rate are required. For this purpose, 1-month 
USD deposit rates are obtained from Datastream. 
Mean-variance tests of spanning and efficiency on all three sets of country and industry portfolio 
indexes are performed for the whole sample period and either period around EMU. This renders results 
comparable to those in the previous chapter. A priori, one would expect from the analysis in Chapter 3 that 
the inclusion of eurobonds in European bond portfolios results in a better mean-variance performance. 
Before EMU, portfolios are likely to have been overweight government bonds Any prospective change to 
shift from a country to an industry-based diversification of bond portfolios post-EMU, alluded to in Chapter 
3, has come under question by results of Chapter 4 of dominating country effects in European bond 
returns. From this result, one might actually expect that a country-based diversification strategy for bonds 
ought to be preferred over an industry-based diversification from a mean-variance perspective before and 
after EMU. As will be seen from the results of the tests of spanning and efficiency performed in various 
setups and analyzed in detail in this chapter, these a priori expectations are confirmed in part. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the reach of the results 
obtained from the decomposition analysis in the previous chapter in order to outline how the empirical 
analysis of this chapter complements it. Section 3 outlines the mean-variance framework and derivation of 
its two main statistical tests, spanning and efficiency. Section 4 details the construction of country and 
industry portfolio indexes from the closed set of 4,587 eurobond returns, from their direct allocation and 
from their decomposition. It also describes the use of the EFFAS government bond indexes for the 
alternative set of country indexes. Section 5 gives the empirical results of the spanning and efficiency tests 




2.  Critique of the standard decomposition model  
 
The decomposition methodology of Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) has a number of attractive features.  
Above all, it is capable to clearly and separately attribute the variation in asset returns to the factors 
incorporated in the model. In the case of my sample of 6,440 eurobond returns from predominantly 
European countries for May 1990 to March 2008, it is thus established that country effects account for 
more of the return variance than industry effects (in Chapter 4). The portion that cannot be attributed to 
either country or industry effects resides with the common factor of which it is determined that this is 
largely the conversion effect of local currency to common currency returns. This is again a clear-cut result 
for eurobond returns and a great quality of the decomposition model that it can so unambiguously extract 
and capture these distinct effects.  
   It is tempting to conclude from these results that a geographical portfolio allocation yields better 
results than an industry sector portfolio allocation for eurobonds in Europe.  I am careful not to draw such 
stark conclusions from the decomposition analysis on superior or even preferable bond portfolio allocation 
strategies for two reasons. One, because the assumptions innate to the decomposition model can prejudice 
the measure for country and industry effects. Two, because there are limitations with respect to the 
interpretation of the results from the model calculations. Each of these deserve further elaboration, if only 
because it points out directions for further research. 
   The two assumptions inherent to the Heston and Rouwenhorst decomposition model that have 
drawn the most criticism are of unit and constant factor exposures.  First, consider the assumption of unit 
factor exposure, which is built in because all assets under consideration within a country and within an 
industry sector have a unit exposure, or beta, to global market shocks. This is in contrast with mainstream 
asset pricing theory (such as CAPM), which contends that differences in systemic risks across firms are 
precisely to be explained by their betas, i.e. their exposure to common market shocks. Brooks and Del 
Negro (2002, 2004) are often quoted in this respect because they demonstrate, as one of the first, that the 
assumption of unit betas is less well supported by the data. Their latent factor model relaxes the restriction 
that all stocks with exposure to a given shock have the same exposure to that shock and nests the fixed 
effects model of Heston and Rouwenhorst. Their results also uncover that many industry betas are negative 
while almost all country betas are positive, at least for their sample of USD-denominated stock returns 
from 1985 to 2002 from a broad range of countries. These differences within groups in beta-heterogeneity 
are thought to be the reason why country factors have historically outweighed industry factors in 
explaining international return variation. Their research has set up a strand of literature where factor 
coefficients are left unconstrained (though zero restrictions on the exposures to other countries or industry 
sectors are maintained, which would otherwise lead to the identification problem familiar from standard 156 
 
 
exploratory factor analysis).  De Moor and Sercu (2006) is a more recent example of this type of studies. Via 
a two-stage estimation approach, provisionally estimated factor returns determine sensitivities through 
time series OLS and then the revised factors are extracted from cross-section regressions on these 
estimated sensitivities. They also verify that this makes a difference.  
   Secondly, the assumption of constant factor exposures is inherent in Heston and Rouwenhorst’s 
decomposition model because the factors driving country and industry-affiliation in the standard 
decomposition model have very little to no dynamics. This is in contrast with considerable evidence from 
current literature of time-varying betas. Consequently, there is another strand of literature motivated by 
this evidence that attempts to overcome these limitations. Examples are Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2009) 
who use an arbitrage pricing theory (APT) model where the identity of the important systemic factors may 
change over time. Likewise in Baele and Inghelbrecht (2009, 2010), a GARCH-framework explicitly allows 
both factor exposures and asset-specific volatilities to vary over time.  
   It is entirely plausible that models that overcome the restrictive assumptions of unit and constant 
betas provide a better fit for asset returns data, as all studies discussed so far claim. That in itself has made 
a commendable contribution to the research field. Yet, it is doubtful that this direction of research will 
provide any further insights into my key question of optimal portfolio diversification strategies in European 
bond markets. For one, both strands of literature, with their various additions and estimated in two or 
sometimes even three stages, continue to rely on linear factor specifications, which is the main trait of the 
decomposition model.  Secondly, results from these studies have by and large left the overall conclusion of 
domineering country effects over industry effects in stock return variations intact. If a rise in the primacy of 
industry versus country effects is detected, then this is not recognized as a lasting trend but rather as a 
temporary phenomenon (e.g. Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang, 2009). Thirdly, these studies, and especially the 
time-varying type, are mostly concerned with the explanation of the empirically observed time variation of 
stock (and recently also bond) return correlations and covariances, as the most recent study from this 
group of authors confirms (Baele, Bekaert and Inghelbrecht, 2010). Through the better identification of 
asset return correlation and covariance structures and varying determinants over time, these studies aim to 
dynamically identify factors as sources that most contribute to risk diversification in a portfolio setting. By 
extension of the standard Heston and Rouwenhorst model, which these studies essentially are, therein also 
lies the limitations of the interpretation of the results that are obtained from it.  
2.1. Alternative methodologies 
 
 
In essence, the Heston and Rouwenhorst decomposition of stock returns model determines the extent to 
which separate factor-related effects explain their return variation.  In so far as the objective of the 157 
 
 
portfolio manager is to reduce risk from these variation or risk-contributing factors, is a valid conclusion 
that “diversification across countries within an industry is a much more effective tool for risk reduction than 
industry diversification within a country” (Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994, p3). The proper identification of 
the importance of country and industry (and potentially other) effects in asset return variation is an 
important achievement in itself, but little more in terms of portfolio design can justifiably be concluded 
from it.  I concur with De Moor and Sercu (2009, p 6) when they state that “the Heston and Rouwenhorst 
(1994) methodology does not tell us anything about the correlations among sectors or countries, and no 
conclusion can therefore be made to international risk diversification”.  While more recent studies 
highlighted earlier go much further in explaining asset return comovements, theirs remain bound too to the 
identification of the main sources of reduction of variation (or volatilities) in portfolio returns. Portfolio 
allocation is about more than just risk reduction. 
   It seems altogether that a complementing tool is needed to enable any qualifications of country 
versus industry portfolio construction. Certainly if any statements wish to be made on the portfolio 
allocation strategies in terms of the twin objectives of return optimization in relation to the amount of risk 
a portfolio manager is willing to take, as is often the case in fund management practice. This is offered by a 
strand of literature that adopts a model-based approach in the outright comparison of the performance of 
country and industry-based portfolios. Building on the analytical work of Huberman and Kandel (1987) and 
De Roon and Nijman (2001), Moerman (2004, 2008) and Eiling et al. (2006) evaluate the risk-return 
characteristics of equity portfolios constructed from a country and industry allocation. Taking an investor’s 
perspective, the starting point is a Markowitz-style mean-variance optimization problem from which 
efficient frontiers can be created for country and industry portfolios (and both combined, which by nature 
is always best). So-called spanning and efficiency tests are devised which are able to establish whether a 
country or industry portfolio has superior mean-variance properties.  Spanning tests show whether the 
inclusion of extra investment opportunities enlarges the efficient set of portfolios. They are conducted by 
Moerman (2004, 2008) using the MSCI equity indexes for Euro zone countries (excluding Luxembourg) over 
the period 1995-2004. He finds that a stock investor is better off diversifying over industries rather than 
over countries, both for the full sample period and for two subperiods around EMU, but especially post-
EMU. Moerman’s result is robust when sectors affected by the IT-bubble are neglected, though the 
difference in performance between the country and industry diversification becomes less pronounced. 
Eiling et al. (2006) conduct similar spanning tests for the Euro zone’s equity markets for the period 1990-
2003. They also introduce efficiency tests, which test for the difference in maximum Sharpe ratios between 
cross-country and cross-industry diversified portfolios. Eiling et al. find, however, that country and industry-
based portfolios cannot be distinguished in terms of mean-variance performance and Sharpe ratios. Their 
style analysis, which examines the ability to replicate the variation of industry portfolio returns with 158 
 
 
country indexes and vice versa, suggests an increasing relative importance of industry effects over country 
effects. This style analysis is further elaborated upon and comparable results confirmed in a subsequent 
study of Euro zone equity returns over the 1990 to 2008 period (Eiling et al., 2010). These latter results of 
the increased importance of industry effects are obtained through a related but different methodology (i.e. 
style analysis) from spanning and efficiency tests though. 
   The performance of mean-variance tests of spanning and efficiency provides yet another 
perspective in addition to the results obtained from the decomposition model in Chapter 4 on optimal 
portfolio diversification on a country or industry sector basis. For this reason and because this analysis has 
so far, to the best of my knowledge, not been performed on bonds, do I prefer to go down this route in this 
second chapter of the empirical analysis.  
 
3.  Mean-variance testing of country and industry portfolios 
 
For the mean-variance comparison of bond portfolios, results are utilized of De Roon and Nijman’s (2001) 
survey of mean-variance tests and as empirically tested for stocks by Moerman (2004, 2008) and especially 
Eiling et al. (2006). For the outline of the model specification, I stay as closely as possible to theirs to allow 
best comparison of the results for bonds with their results for stocks.    
3.1. Spanning and efficiency tests 
 
Starting point of the analysis is an investor with a mean-variance perspective who optimizes her European-
wide country and industry portfolios constructed from country and industry subindexes. Consider   
countries and   industries. The typical Markowitz-style unconditional portfolio optimization problem
1 
results in three mean-variance efficient frontiers: one for a portfolio based on country indexes alone, one 
for a portfolio based on industry indexes alone and one constructed from both country and industry 
indexes. By definition the efficient frontier for all investment opportunities (countries and industries) is the 
most efficient. The other two investment strategies - countries alone and industries alone - are nested. The 
efficient frontiers can be plotted graphically in an average risk-return grid for the entire sample period and 
various subperiods, and their position compared.  
   Two types of tests, spanning and efficiency, are performed to determine whether country 
portfolios that are the aggregate of equal and value-weighted industry subindexes European-wide, or 
                                                
1 Where the investor minimizes the amount of portfolio risk as measured by the portfolio variance given a certain demanded 




industry portfolios that are the aggregate of equal and value-weighted subindexes of European countries 
across industries are the most optimal.  
   The mean variance spanning test analyzes the effect that the introduction of additional industry 
(country) assets has on the mean-variance frontier of country (industry) portfolios. If the mean-variance 
frontier of the portfolio consisting of country or industry indexes alone coincides with the frontier of both, 
then there is spanning.
2 De Roon and Nijman (2001) show that testing for spanning can be done in a 
regression analysis framework, which is adopted by Eiling et al. (2006). I also use this regression framework 
for the purpose of testing the efficiency of bond portfolios.  
   With   countries (with k = 1, … ,  ),   industries (with j = 1 ,.. ,  ) and T observations (with   
t = 1, … , T), the returns of the portfolios on the two sets of indexes over time can be formulated as: 
 
  
  =    +       
  +    
                   (1) 
   
  =     +      
  +    
                   (2) 
 
Eq. (1) considers whether the addition of industry indexes to a set of country sector indexes improves the 
investor’s portfolio performance from a mean-variance point of view. The Jensen measures are the 
intercepts in Eqs. (1) and (2). A zero Jensen measure supports mean-variance spanning. Since outright 
returns are used, constraints have to be imposed also on the beta-coefficients for the spanning tests.
3 The 
null hypothesis of spanning implies that the intercepts are jointly statistically insignificantly different from 
zero and the sum of beta-coefficients are statistically insignificantly different from one. This hypothesis 
indicates that the diversification benefits of the portfolio of country indexes cannot be further improved 
from adding industry indexes to the portfolio. Eq. (2) can be given a similar interpretation with respect to 
the addition of industry indexes to a portfolio of country indexes.  
   Regressions performed for all T for all countries   result in a  ×1 of vector of estimated intercept 
coefficients,     , a  ×  matrix of estimated beta coefficients,     , and a T×  matrix of error terms,   
 ; 
and for all industry sectors   similarly in a  ×1 of vector of estimated coefficients of intercepts,     , a  ×  
matrix of estimated beta coefficients,     , and a T×  matrix of normally distributed error terms,   
 . The 
                                                
2 If the mean-variance frontier of the portfolio consisting of country or industry indexes alone and the frontier of both have exactly 
one point in common, then there is intersection. Intersection is thus one special case of spanning, tested for one investor’s 
assumed risk-preference often taken to be directly related to the (gross) risk-free rate, while spanning tests for all investors’ risk-
preferences, i.e. whether it enhances diversification opportunities in general. Spanning is a more restrictive test than intersection 
(De Roon and Nijman, 2001).  
 
3 Eiling et al. (2006) use excess returns (i.e. returns in excess of risk-free returns) throughout and do not need to impose constraints 
on the beta-coefficients. In the case of excess returns, the spanning test is reduced to a test of whether the intercepts are jointly 
equal to zero. 160 
 
 
restrictions imposed by the null hypothesis of the two spanning tests, corresponding with Eqs. (1) and (2) 
respectively, are defined as:  
 
H0 :     = 0  and          -    = 0                (3) 
H0 :     = 0   and          -    =  0                (4) 
 
where    and    are  ×1 and  ×1 unit vectors respectively with all elements equal to one. De Roon and 
Nijman (2001) proof that the test statistic for the null hypothesis of Eq. (3) has a χ
2 distribution with 2  
degrees of freedom and can be derived from a standard Wald test as: 
 
    
   =      , 
         ,            , 
   
-1      ,             (5) 
 
If       =  vec               , a  ( +1)-dimensional vector of regression coefficients, and    
       =  cov (    ) , the consistent estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix thereof. 
And       ,         ,       -    ⨂  0
1
  , a 2 ×1 matrix, wherein ⨂ is the Kronecker delta and 
       ,       ⨂  
1 0 
 
0   
    , is a 2 × ( +1) matrix created from a  ×  identity matrix times the 
Kronecker delta of   
1 0 
 
0   
    which also contains the (transposed) elements of  0 , a  ×1 unit vector of 
zeros.  
   Likewise, the null hypothesis of Eq. (4) has a χ
2 distribution with 2  degrees of freedom and can be 
derived from a standard Wald test as: 
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         ,          , 
   
-1      ,             (6) 
 
If       =  vec               , a  ( +1)-dimensional vector of regression coefficients, and    
       =  cov (    ) , the consistent estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix thereof. 
And       ,         ,       -    ⨂  0
1
  , a 2 ×1 matrix, wherein 
       ,       ⨂  
1 0 
 
0   




   The interpretation of the rejection of the null hypotheses in the spanning tests is relatively 
straightforward. In case the null hypothesis is rejected, mean-variance efficient country (industry) indexes 
do not span the universe of both types of indexes. This implies that all investors in general can improve 
their mean-variance efficient set by including the other set of indexes.  
   The spanning tests compare a portfolio of country or industry indexes to a portfolio consisting of 
both. The characteristics of the country and industry portfolios can be compared outright with the use of 
the maximum Sharpe ratio. De Roon and Nijman (2001) demonstrate that if the Sharpe ratio of a portfolio 
is defined as the expected excess portfolio return divided by the standard deviation of the portfolio returns, 
that by definition for a given expected portfolio return or for a given standard deviation of portfolio 
returns, the maximum attainable Sharpe ratio is the Sharpe ratio of the mean-variance efficient portfolio. 
Note that excess returns, i.e. the return over a risk-free rate, are utilized instead of outright returns to test 
this relation.  
   The efficiency test introduced by Eiling et al. (2006) uses this notion from de Roon and Nijman to 
devise a statistical test that determines whether the maximum Sharpe ratio of mean-variance efficient 
industry-based portfolios (denoted   ) equals that of country portfolios (denoted   ). Based on Gibbons et 
al. (1989) and Gerard et al. (2006), Eiling et al. (2006, p 8-9) write the difference in the maximum Sharpe 
ratios, denoted λ, as:  
   
λ =   
  -   
  =  ̂ 
   ̂  -  ̂ 
    ̂                 (7) 
 
where  ̂  and  ̂  are  ×1 and  ×1 matrixes of estimated coefficients obtained from the regressions of Eqs. 
(1) and (2) of excess returns scaled by the covariance matrixes of the error terms from the same 
regressions, Ω   and Ω  , in the following way: 
 
Ω  
  /    
  =    +       
  +   
   , where  Ω    = cov (  
 )        (8) 
Ω  
  /     
  =     +      
  +   
   , where  Ω    = cov (  
 )        (9) 
 
   The null hypothesis of the efficiency test is that the difference in maximum Sharpe ratios is 
statistically insignificantly different from zero: 
 
  H0 : λ =   
  -   
   =  ̂ 
   ̂  -  ̂ 
    ̂  = 0              (10) 
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   The test statistic of the null hypothesis is again χ
2 distributed with 1 degree of freedom and can be 
derived as a standard Wald test as   .  If the null hypothesis, i.e. efficiency, is rejected then the mean-
variance efficiency of either the country optimal portfolios or the industry optimal portfolios as measured 
by their maximum Sharpe ratios is significantly larger than the other.  
   Eiling et al. (2006) additionally perform both the spanning and efficiency tests with the 
incorporation of no-short sales assumption, which imposes constraints in the conditional analysis required 
to guarantee positive aggregate weights in the assets. I do not incorporate short sale restrictions in the 
analysis, as bonds can be shorted quite easily by professional investors. 
3.2. Excluding overlapping components 
 
Whenever country and industry indexes are by construction based on the same universe of subindexes, 
each country portfolio (e.g. Germany) that is industrially diversified and industry sector portfolio (e.g. 
consumer) that is geographically diversified contains one common subindex (consumer sector in Germany). 
Eiling et al. (2006) observe that these common or overlapping components could be a source of covariance 
between country and industry portfolios. They propose to perform the spanning and efficiency tests on 
portfolios from which common components have been removed, which allows them to extract pure 
country and industry effects.  
   The adjusted equations for the exclusion of common components to replace the base Eqs. (1) and 
(2) and where the same logic for either test can be followed through, are: 
 
  , 
   =    + ∑    
 
        , 
 \  +   , 
                  (11) 
   , 
   =    +∑    
 
         , 
 \  +   , 
                 (12) 
 
where    , 
 \  is the excess return on the  th European-wide geographically diversified industry sector 
portfolio from which country x components have been excluded, and the same for    , 
 \   for industry y. 
 
4.  Construction of the portfolios 
 
In principle, the spanning and efficiency tests specified in the previous section can be applied to country 
and industry portfolios of various content. Eiling et al. (2006) utilize monthly USD returns from a set of 
stock indexes, which are sectioned into country-industry subindexes. Their data set constitutes a closed set 
since each stock return belongs to exactly one country index and one industry index.  Starting from the data 163 
 
 
set of 6,440 eurobond returns, described in Chapter 4 Section 3, those belonging to the country group 
“other” are removed to similarly create a closed sample. Eurobonds from supranational institutions are also 
removed from the sample because all bonds in this subindex belong per definition to one industry group 
only. Following this, 4,587 eurobonds returns remain for the period May 1990-March 2008 that can be 
assigned to the eight remaining countries which are all from Europe (Belgium/Luxembourg, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK) and the same seven industry groups (financials 
and funds, government institutions, consumer, communications and technology, basic materials and 
energy, industrials and utilities). The summary and performance statistics of this subset of the original data 
set of eurobonds are in Tables A1 and A2 of Appendix A. They remain largely as described in Chapter 4 
Section 5.1. 
  I conduct the mean-variance testing on two types of portfolio index construction methods. The first 
set is based on straightforwardly constructing indexes from the country and industry classifications of the 
4,587 eurobonds in the sample. In this case a German bond issued by a consumer product manufacturer is 
included in both the German country index as well as the consumer industry index. The second set of 
country and industry portfolio indexes is based on the standard decomposition, since it is shown in Chapter 
4 (Section  5.2) that decomposition produces portfolio indexes that may have different portfolio 
implications than indexes based on the direct allocation of eurobonds. Both types of indexes are created on 
an equal and value-weighted basis and with and without overlapping components. They are calculated 
from outright returns for the purpose of the spanning tests and from excess returns for the purpose of the 
efficiency tests. Excess return is defined as the return obtained from the investment in the eurobond over 
the risk-free return. I obtain 1-month USD deposit rates from Datastream to proxy this risk-free return.
4  
4.1. Inclusion of government bonds indexes 
 
 
While the performance of the spanning and efficiency tests on these two types of subindexes will already 
render important insights on the diversification gains of country versus industry portfolios, these remain 
limited to portfolios of eurobonds only.  Eurobonds from government institutions are included in the data 
set, but these are not (pure) government bonds. Government eurobonds are bonds issued by sovereigns in 
a non-national currency and in international format. Government bonds are bonds issued by sovereigns in 
their national currency, often through an established debt management agency and pre-announced auction 
program and initially absorbed and traded by a group of primary dealers. As government bonds tend to be 
                                                
4 To calculate the risk-free return,   
   I extract from the 1-month deposit rate, which is expressed as an annualized rate and 
denoted    
   , the interest earned by the end of month t assuming compounded interest through the following equation:   
   = (1 
+ (    
   /100))
1/12 – 1.  The excess return for each eurobond is simply the subtraction of the 1-month risk-free return from the 
monthly USD eurobond return (obtained from Eq.(2) in Chapter 4). 164 
 
 
larger in size and thus more liquid than eurobonds, their yield curve is often one of the benchmarks for 
eurobond price setting and has its own price dynamic. The analysis of bond market practice in Chapter 3 is 
evidence of bond portfolios consisting predominantly of government bonds and being allocated along 
country lines as such before EMU. Investor interest in corporate eurobonds surges thereafter. The benefits 
of diversifying away from government bonds post-EMU into eurobonds can be further proven if the first are 
also explicitly included in the empirical analysis. For this purpose, indexes for government bonds will be 
used to create a third set of country indexes.  
   A number of institutions provide government bond indexes for the European markets from which 
the holding period returns series can be readily obtained. From the various providers, I choose the 
European Federation of Financial Analysts’ Societies (EFFAS) indexes as published by Bloomberg on three 
grounds. First, their indexes cover all countries otherwise included in the data set and date back the 
furthest. Secondly, as the only not-for-profit organization among potential providers, EFFAS are the most 
independent and transparent source in the marketplace with the finest methodology, least arbitrary rule 
changes and greatest level of consistency applied to their indexes calculations. Thirdly, the EFFAS 
methodology for calculating bond indexes is published and has become accepted as the industry-standard 
shortly after they were launched.
5  I obtain the end-of-month EFFAS local currency all-bond total returns 
index series for the whole market (i.e. all maturities above one year) from Bloomberg for eight government 
bond markets: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. These series are 
available from December 1991 to March 2008.       
  From the EFFAS local currency total return indexes, after conversion to US Dollar, the third set of 
eight country portfolio indexes are created. EFFAS performs the local currency return calculations on a 
(changing) set of government bonds weighted by amount outstanding for each country k and provides a 
total return index in local currency at each time t,    ,  ,  , which is set at a monthly interval. The country 
index return,   
 ,  , 
   , is value-weighted by nature of their calculation and simply obtained from:   
 
     ,  , 
    =     ,  ,     ,  ,    ⁄   -1,   k= 1, … ,K  and   = domestic government     (13) 
 
   The local currency returns for government bonds of the respective countries are converted to 
common currency through a variant of Eq.(2) in Chapter 4:  
 
  
 ,  , 
  
 = (1 +  
 ,  , 
   ) (St / St-1) – 1,   k= 1, … ,K  and   
*= domestic government     (14) 
                                                




Note that I stay with the formula as proposed by Heston and Rouwenhorst using spot exchange rates, 
rather than the method suggested by Brown (2002, pp 135-137) using forward rates. Excess return indexes 
are calculated as the difference in return obtained through Eq. (14) over the risk-free return, in similar 
fashion as before.    
   Country indexes thus obtained from the EFFAS government indexes are compared for spanning, 
using outright returns, and efficiency, using excess returns, with the two sets of eurobonds allocated by 
industry sector (from the straightforward allocation and from the decomposition). While it is theoretically 
feasible to incorporate government bonds into the industry sector of government institutions calculated 
from eurobond returns, there are two arguments against this. First, the government bond sector carries 
such substantial weight in some countries, particularly those with historically large public sectors and small 
corporate eurobond markets (such as Belgium and Spain), that the new value-weighted industry index 
returns would be heavily skewed towards governments bonds, while in other countries where it carries 
considerably less weight (such as the UK), the opposite is the case. The incorporation of the government 
sector in the industry indexes would result in considerable distortion of the returns. Secondly, while the 
industry indexes calculated from returns of individual eurobonds complies with the EFFAS guidelines, 
differences remain with the way in which EFFAS derives the government bond indexes. The reinvestment of 
a coupon payment received is from the start of the new balancing period in the calculation of the eurobond 
return indexes instead of immediately in the case of the EFFAS government bond indexes, and for the value 
weights of eurobonds the amount issued is used instead of the amount outstanding and only the amount 
issued failing that for the government bonds. Rather than mixing subindexes created from different sources 
and methodologies, albeit with just slight differences, it is preferable to keep the country indexes from 
government bonds separate from industry indexes from eurobonds and compare their mean-variance 
performance outright.      
 
5.  Empirical results 
 
This section gives the empirical results for mean-variance testing of country and industry bond portfolios. 
Spanning tests are performed, which will indicate whether country portfolios can be improved by adding 
assets from the industry indexes and vice versa. Efficiency tests are performed, which will indicate whether 
the maximum Sharpe ratio of one set of portfolios compared to the other is statistically better (or worse). 
Country and industry portfolios created from three types of input are the subject of these tests:  both 
created directly from eurobond (excess) returns (in Section 5.1), both created from eurobond (excess) 
returns after decomposition (in Section 5.2), and country indexes created from government bond returns 166 
 
 
and industry indexes created from (decomposed) eurobond (excess) returns (in Section 5.3). For the 
country and industry portfolios based on eurobond returns alone, before and after decomposition, result 
from both equal and value-weighted indexes are shown. Because in these portfolios, each eurobond 
belongs to one country and one industry simultaneously, results are also shown for portfolios excluding 
overlapping components. Country portfolios consisting exclusively of government bonds are always value-
weighted and have no overlapping components with industry indexes created from eurobond returns. 
Results are for the full sample period and two subperiods around EMU.  
   In contrast to Eiling et al. (2006) who find that for stocks from the Euro zone for the period 1990-
2003, country-based and industry-based portfolios cannot be distinguished in terms of mean-variance 
efficiency and Sharpe ratios, country and industry bond portfolios can in a number of cases be improved by 
adding assets from the other portfolio and do not always have (statistically) equal maximum Sharpe ratios. 
It is also found that there is a noticeable difference in the benefits of country and industry portfolios of 
bonds before and after EMU. These are noteworthy results, which are discussed below for each type of 
country and industry portfolios.  
5.1. From eurobond returns 
 
First, country and industry portfolios from the sample of 4,587 eurobond returns are constructed directly. 
Their monthly equal and value-weighted returns and excess returns in USD are calculated for the sample 
period of May 1990 to March 2008. Returns of country indexes are then regressed on the returns of 
industry indexes and vice versa and from the various regression estimates, the test statistics of the 
spanning tests from outright returns and efficiency tests from excess returns are calculated.
6 This is then 
repeated for the subperiods before and after EMU.  
Table 5.1 lists the results, where H0: spanning   ( ) is the result for the null hypothesis that 
country (industry) return indexes are spanned by industry (country) indexes and H0: efficiency is the result 
from the null hypothesis that the maximum Sharpe ratios of the country and industry excess return indexes 
are the same. When the result exceeds the critical level, indicated in bold in the table, the null hypothesis is 
rejected and is the country eurobond portfolio statistically distinguishable from the industry eurobond 
portfolio in terms of mean-variance performance over the respective period. The difference in the values of 
the maximum Sharpe ratios, λ , is also reported. It is consistently defined as the maximum Sharpe ratio of 
the industry-based portfolios less that of the country-based portfolios, which are reported directly 
underneath.   
                                                
6 Results from spanning tests for excess returns are very similar to those reported in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for outright returns and are 




Spanning and efficiency of country and industry portfolios of eurobond returns   
The table shows the results of the spanning and efficiency tests performed on country and industry indexes created from 
(excess) eurobond returns for the period indicated. H0: spanning   ( ) is the result for the null hypothesis that country 
(industry) indexes are spanned by industry (country) indexes. H0: efficiency is the result that the maximum Sharpe ratios are the 
same. Test results are in bold when it exceeds the critical level (95% confidence interval). 
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II. .Eurobond excess returns 
             
H0: efficiency 
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Mean-variance frontiers for country and industry indexes of eurobond returns 
The figure shows the mean-variance frontiers for corporate eurobonds for three investment types before and after EMU. The dashed 
line represents the set of optimal opportunities when only value-weighted industry indexes can be invested in. The dotted line is the 
mean-variance frontier when only value-weighted country indexes are considered. The solid line considers both types of indexes. The 
x-axis represents the standard deviation of returns and the y-axis the mean returns of the respective portfolios. Returns are in USD 
and per month and need to be multiplied by 100 for percentages. 
 
 
   




























It can be seen from Table 5.1 that the mean-variance performance of country and industry 
portfolios can in a number of cases be improved by adding assets from the opposite set. This is 
predominantly the case for value-weighted country and industry portfolios over the full sample period and 
pre-EMU. Note that spanning is rejected less often in the case of equal-weighted portfolios.  
Value-weighting the portfolios leads to a higher concentration in larger size issues from the government 
insititutions and the communications and technology sectors away from the numerous but smaller sized 
issues of financial institutions sector (see Table A1 in Appendix A). This evidently results in a deteriorating 
mean-variance performance. While in the pre-EMU period value-weighted country portfolios are not 
spanned by industry portfolios and vice versa, in the post-EMU period both types of portfolios are. This 
implies that in Europe before the introduction of EMU neither a pure country diversification nor a pure 
industry diversification of eurobonds is mean-variance optimal, but that following EMU both of them are 
more or less equally optimal.  
The results from the spanning tests allows for further qualifications. It has already been observed 
that there is a significant difference in results between equal and value-weighted portfolios. It is when 
eurobonds are incorporated according to their issue size rather than on a like-for-like basis that country 
and industry portfolios become mean-variance suboptimal. Also, the mean-variance performance of all 
portfolios deteriorates significantly when overlapping eurobonds are removed.  Both results are a reflection 
of the loss of diversification opportunity, the former because portfolios are skewed towards larger size 
issues and the latter because either complete geographical diversification or complete industrial 
diversification can no longer be achieved.   
   Figure 5.1 plots the mean-variance frontier for the three value-weighted investment opportunities 
from the outright eurobond returns pre and post-EMU. It visualizes that for a given amount of risk the 
difference between the average returns of country and industry portfolios is comparatively larger in the 
pre-EMU period. This corroborates the test results in Table 5.1, which show that in the pre-EMU period the 
performance of value-weighted portfolios can be improved by adding either country or industry-based 
indexes. 
The results from the efficiency tests show that country and industry portfolios cannot be 
distinguished in terms of their maximum Sharpe ratios, neither for the whole sample period nor in either 
subperiod. The maximum Sharpe ratio is consistently higher for the country portfolios than for the industry 
portfolios, which is confirmed by negative values for λ. This can also be observed in Figure 5.1, where the 
mean-efficient frontier of country portfolios lies outside that of industry portfolios. The difference in 
maximum Sharpe ratio between the two types of portfolios is not statistically different though.   169 
 
 
5.2. From decomposed eurobond returns 
 
To create the second set of portfolios, the returns of the 4,587 eurobonds are decomposed into country 
and industry effects. The motivation to include decomposed country and industry portfolios is not so much 
because such portfolios are immediately replicable by fund managers. They rather serve as a construct to 
build on and verify results from the previous chapter. Table A3 in Appendix A presents the results of this 
decomposition for the entire sample period of May 1990 to March 2008 for the closed set of eurobonds. 
Table A4 in the same appendix shows the decomposition results for the two subperiods around EMU, 
which are very similar to the ones described for the complete data set in Chapter 4. Here, equal and value-
weighted country and industry indexes are created from the decomposition for the full sample period and 
two subperiods, with and without overlapping constituents. Results for the spanning and efficiency tests on 
these sets portfolios are shown in Table 5.2, which has the same format as Table 5.1. 
Comparing the results in Table 5.1 with Table 5.2, it can be seen that the null hypothesis of 
spanning is rejected less often for the indexes based on decomposed returns. Generally, country and 
industry portfolios become more mean-variance efficient after decomposition. In Table 5.2 spanning is 
rejected mostly for industry indexes rather than country indexes. Over the full sample period, both equal 
and value-weighted industry indexes are not spanned by the country indexes. This is in line with the results 
from the decomposition analysis in Chapter 4, where it is established that country effects contribute more 
to the variation in eurobond returns than industry effects. It is now largely the industry indexes that can be 
improved in their mean-variance performance with the incorporation of assets from the country indexes 
rather than the other way around. Note otherwise that the difference between equal and value-weighted 
portfolios is less than in the case of portfolios from the direct allocation of eurobonds, but that the removal 
of overlapping components has as much of a deteriorating effect on mean-variance comparable 
performance of portfolios. Evidently, the loss in diversification from incomplete geographical or industrial 
spread remains the same after decomposition.  
The results from the efficiency tests in Table 5.2 show that the null hypothesis of equal maximum 
Sharpe ratios between country and industry portfolios cannot be rejected, as was the case with the 
previous set of portfolios. Figure 5.2, as is true for Figure 5.1, shows that the mean-variance frontier of 
country indexes allows for more risk and return combinations than the equivalent frontier of industry 
indexes. This is confirmed by the negative values of the lambda in Table 5.2, which indicate that the 
maximum Sharpe ratio of country portfolios is always greater than that of industry-based portfolios. The 






Spanning and efficiency of country and industry portfolios of decomposed eurobond returns   
The table shows the results of the spanning and efficiency tests performed on country and industry indexes created from 
decomposed (excess) eurobond returns for the period indicated. H0: spanning   ( ) is the result for the null hypothesis that 
country (industry) indexes are spanned by industry (country) indexes. H0: efficiency is the result that the maximum Sharpe ratios 
are the same. Test results are in bold when it exceeds the critical level (95% confidence interval). 
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II. .Eurobond excess returns 
             
H0: efficiency 
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Mean-variance frontiers for country and industry indexes of decomposed eurobond returns 
The figure shows the mean-variance frontiers for corporate eurobonds after decomposition for three investment types before and 
after EMU. The dashed line represents the set of optimal opportunities when only decomposed value-weighted industry indexes can 
be invested in. The dotted line is the mean-variance frontier when only decomposed value-weighted country indexes are considered. 
The solid line considers both types of indexes. The x-axis represents the standard deviation of returns and the y-axis the mean returns 
of the respective portfolios. Returns are in USD and per month and need to be multiplied by 100 for percentages. 
 
 




























5.3. Government bonds versus eurobonds 
 
Thirdly, the set of country portfolio indexes consists exclusively of government bonds and industry indexes 
exclusively of eurobonds. Because the EFFAS total return series for government bonds start in December 
1991, the full sample period is shortened by 18 months. Country indexes are always value-weighted, while 
industry indexes can be both equal and value-weighted. There are no overlapping components. Results of 
spanning and efficiency tests for these entirely separate country and industry portfolios are shown in Table 
5.3 (which has the same format as Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
The results of these tests give an indication, for the first time in the analysis, whether a portfolio 
strategy based on government bonds alone in Europe and allocated along country lines has been efficient 
and whether the inclusion of eurobonds enhances the performance of these portfolios, particularly after 
the monetary union. From the spanning tests it can be seen that both value-weighted country and industry 
indexes can be improved over the whole sample period and pre-EMU when the industry indexes are 
created directly from eurobond returns. When industry indexes are created from eurobond returns after  
 
Table 5.3 
Spanning and efficiency of country portfolios from government bond (excess) returns and industry portfolios from 
(decomposed) eurobond (excess) returns   
The table shows the results of the spanning and efficiency tests performed on country indexes created from domestic government 
bond returns and industry indexes created from (decomposed) eurobond (excess) returns for the period indicated. H0: spanning   ( ) 
is the result for the null hypothesis that country (industry) indexes are spanned by industry (country) indexes. H0: efficiency is the 
result that the maximum Sharpe ratios are the same. Test results are in bold when it exceeds the critical level (95% confidence 
interval). 
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I.b Government bond and eurobond excess returns 
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II.a Government bond and decomposed eurobond returns         
H0: spanning   
















II.b Government bond and decomposed eurobond excess returns 
H0: efficiency  (3.84)  0.25  0.36  0.07  0.11  406.1  341.1 
Difference in MSR (λ) 
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decomposition, however, country portfolios of government bonds can always be improved with the 
addition of eurobonds. It therefore seems that a bond allocation strategy based on government bonds 
alone, presumably the dominant practice in the days before EMU, is uncovered as sub-optimal. In the post-
EMU environment, such portfolios can be enhanced by adding assets from decomposed industry indexes.  
   From the efficiency tests it can be seen that there is now, in contrast to the previous two cases, a 
very clear result. In the post-EMU environment country portfolios of government bonds and industry 
portfolios of eurobonds can be distinguished in terms of their maximum Sharpe ratios. It has already been 
observed with the previous two sets of portfolios that the maximum Sharpe ratio is higher for the country-
based portfolios than for the industry-based portfolios. This is true in this third case as well. It can be seen 
from Table 5.3 that values of the lambda are negative throughout. This leads to an important overall 
observation; even in cases where industry portfolios are mean-variance optimal and cannot be enhanced 
with assets from country portfolios, country portfolios seem capable of achieving a higher maximum 
Sharpe ratio. This efficiency characteristic is only statistically significantly different in the case of country 
portfolios created from government bonds in the post-EMU environment.   
  
6.  Conclusions 
 
This chapter compares the mean-variance performance of country and industry portfolios of European 
bonds through spanning and efficiency tests. Similar studies, such as Huberman and Kandel (1987), 
Moerman (2004, 2008) and Eiling et al (2006) have been performed for equities but not for bonds. Not only 
can results from this analysis again be compared with the outcome for stock returns, they also allow for 
further qualifications on whether a country or an industry-based allocation strategy performs better in 
European bond markets overall.  
It is described that the empirical application of mean-variance tests is at the portfolio index level. 
Starting from the complete set of 6,440 USD of individual eurobond returns a closed set is created for the 
purpose of this analysis. By virtue of excluding eurobonds from supranational institutions and from the 
category other, 4,587 eurobond returns remain. These belong each to exactly one of eight European 
countries (Belgium/Luxembourg, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK) and the 
same seven industry groups (financials and funds, government institutions, consumer, communications and 
technology, basic materials and energy, industrials and utilities) as before. From this ‘closed’ set, country 
and industry portfolio indexes are created, first from their direct categorization and secondly after 
decomposition using the standard methodology of Chapter 4. Return indexes in these two cases are 
calculated on an equal and on a value-weighted basis. They are also calculated following the exclusion of 173 
 
 
overlapping components, as these could be a source of covariance. In the third case, country portfolios are 
created from the EFFAS government bond index series and compared with industry portfolios of eurobonds 
created either way (direct and decomposed). Such country portfolios are by their nature value-weighted 
and do not have overlapping components with the industry portfolios of eurobonds. While with the 
previous two sets of portfolios, the full sample period remains May 1990 to March 2008, in this third case it 
is reduced by 18 months because the EFFAS series have their base date in December 1991.  
In all three cases, country and industry portfolios are compared for spanning and efficiency for the 
full sample period and in each subperiod around the inception of EMU. The methodology of spanning 
follows that of Huberman and Kandel (1987) and De Roon and Nijman (2001). In a mean-variance 
optimization framework, the statistical test of spanning is devised to determine whether the return 
performance of one type of portfolio (e.g. country) can be improved by adding assets from the opposite set 
(i.e. industry portfolios). Based on this analytical work, the hypothesis for spanning is statistically derived 
from a standard Wald test with a χ
2 distribution. Rejection of the null hypothesis of spanning implies that 
the mean-variance efficient country (or industry) indexes do not span the universe of both types of indexes. 
Hence spanning tests compare a portfolio of country or industry indexes to a portfolio of both. The mean-
vairance test of efficiency compares country and industry portfolios directly in their maximum Sharpe 
ratios. From De Roon and Nijman (2001) and Eiling et al. (2006), the hypothesis of efficiency is similarly 
derived from a standard Wald test with a χ
2 distribution. Rejection of the null hypothesis for efficiency 
implies that the maximum Sharpe ratio of country-based and industry-based portfolios can be statistically 
distinguished. In the set-up followed in this chapter, outright returns of country and industry indexes 
provide the input for the spanning tests and returns in excess of 1-month USD deposit rates provide the 
input for the efficiency tests.  
Spanning tests find that for the first two sets of country and industry portfolios created from 
eurobond indexes alone, spanning on the whole is rejected less often in the case of decomposed portfolios. 
In cases it is rejected, in the pre-EMU and full sample periods, it is mostly found that industry portfolios are 
not spanned by their country components. Both the decision to incorporate bonds on a value-weighted 
rather than on an equal-weighted basis and the decision to remove overlapping components leads to a loss 
of diversification opportunities. Efficiency tests find that country and industry portfolios of eurobonds 
cannot be distinguished in their maximum Sharpe ratio, though it is consistently found to be higher for 
country-based portfolios. These first set of conclusions are in line with results from the decomposition 
analysis in Chapter 4, where it is found that country effects contribute more to the variation of eurobond 
returns than industry effects.  
Following the addition of government bonds in the analysis and their insertion an alternative set of 
country portfolios leads to yet further results. Spanning tests find that a country diversification of a 174 
 
 
portfolio of government bonds is largely a suboptimal strategy. In the majority of cases such country 
portfolios can be improved with the addition of eurobonds. In fact, country portfolios of government bonds 
can always be improved by the addition of assets from decomposed industry indexes of eurobonds. This is 
yet further confirmation that following decomposition, industry indexes of eurobonds become more mean-
variance optimal. In contrast to the first two sets of portfolios constructed from eurobonds alone, the null 
hypothesis for efficiency is rejected occasionally in this third case. Post-EMU, portfolios can be 
distinguished in their maximum Sharpe ratio whereby it is further established that this ratio is higher for 
country than for industry portfolios. The maximum Sharpe ratio is higher in all other cases too for country 
portfolios.  
These results from mean-variance tests of portfolios of European bonds are noteworthy; 
particularly if one considers that similar tests performed on European stock returns over comparable time 
periods have yielded mixed results at best. Formulated in terms of the willingness of investors to diversify 
on a country or an industry basis in European bond markets, they add two qualifications to those from 
Chapter 4. First strictly for eurobonds alone, investors are more willing to follow country-based allocation 
strategies pre-EMU, as these portfolios are more often spanned by industry-based portfolios than vice 
versa. Post-EMU, both strategies become mean-variance efficient, but country-based portfolios seem to 
generate better risk-adjusted returns in the long run (though not of statistical significance).  Thus the ex-
ante expectation based on the observation of dominating country effects in European eurobond returns 
that country-based portfolios ought to be preferred finds further confirmation through these results. 
Secondly, investors should be less willing to construct portfolios from government bonds alone despite 
their statistically superior maximum Sharpe ratios. Such portfolios can invariably be improved for their 
mean-variance performance with the inclusion of eurobonds. Thus, the ex ante expectation that European 
bond portfolios that were biased towards government bonds have benefitted from the incorporation of 
eurobonds is also confirmed with these results. Despite, the validation of a larger credit diversification of 
European bond portfolios post-EMU, fund manager should in light these results overall consider carefully to 
discard country-based diversification strategies in favor of industry-based diversification strategies. 






Country and industry composition of closed data set of eurobonds 
Panels A and B give for each country and industry, the number of eurobonds included in the total sample and as a percentage of 
the total number of eurobonds. Panel C gives for each country by industry the number of eurobonds included in the total sample. 
Panel D gives the average weight of the (live) eurobonds in the country by industry cross-sector in the total value-weighted market 
over the whole sample.    
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Total  4,587    Total  4,587   
C.  Number of eurobonds by country and industry 










139     
401     
912    
95     
610      
44     
198    
480     
2,879 
13      
58     
193     
47     
5     
14      
134     
20    
484 
2      
57     
76     
18     
19     
8     
49     
157     
386 
5     
48     
32     
15      
27     
12      
21     
55     
215 
15      
31     
28     
3      
21     
4      
13     










































































































  10.05 
  3.70 
  9.94 
20.82 
100.00 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Decomposition of excess index returns from closed data set of eurobonds (May 1990 – March 2008) 
The table gives the variance of the components of the equal-weighted (EW) and the value-weighted (VW) excess country, in Panel A, 
and excess industry, in Panel B, index returns over the total market. The ratio is the variance ratio of the index in excess of the 
market. 
A.  Country Indexes 
  EW indexes  VW indexes 
  Pure country effect  Sum of industry effects  Pure country effect  Sum of industry effects 










0.66     
0.59     
0.79     
4.19     
0.81     
3.25     
1.52     
1.75     
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0.565   
1.186    
0.596    
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1.709     
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B.  Industry Indexes 
  EW indexes  VW indexes 
  Pure industry effect  Sum of country effects  Pure industry effect  Sum of country effects 














































































Decomposition of excess index returns from closed data set of eurobonds, pre and post-EMU 
The table gives the variance of the components of the value-weighted (VW) excess country, in Panel A, and excess industry, in 
Panel B, index returns over the total market for May 1990-Dec 2000 and Jan 1999-Mar 2008. The ratio is the variance ratio to the 
index in excess of the market.  
A.  Country Indexes 
  May 1990 – Dec 1998  Jan 1999 – Mar 2008 
  Pure country effect  Sum of industry effects  Pure country effect  Sum of industry effects 
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0.506    
1.162     
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0.997    
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1.394    
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0.14     
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0.15   
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B.  Industry Indexes 
  May 1990 – Dec 1998 
 
Jan 1999 – Mar 2008 
  Pure industry effect  Sum of country effects  Pure industry effect  Sum of country effects 









































0.02     
0.69    
0.10     
0.33     
0.08     
0.15     
0.43     
0.26     
0.917     
3.585     
0.252     
0.646    
0.622     
0.661     
0.591     
1.039     
0.02     
0.68     
0.35    
0.12     
0.09     
0.04     
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Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
1.  Summary of main conclusions 
 
The main conclusions of this study into the impact of EMU on European bond market integration and 
investor portfolios allocations are summarized through the concepts of ability and willingness introduced in 
Chapter 1. Recall that ability refers to prevailing market barriers and results in an analysis of bond market 
integration. Willingness refers to investor behavior in dynamically integrated markets and results in an 
analysis of portfolio allocations and diversification. 
   The detailed review of literature on international financial integration in Chapter 2 leads to the 
main conclusion of largely integrated fixed income markets in Europe on the road to and following the 
introduction of the Euro. It arrives at this conclusion through an appraisal of the empirical evidence from 
theories that measure integration. The literary review starts from macroeconomic theories that emerge 
post-WWII and take flight in the 1970s through to the 1990s in an environment of increasing international 
capital flows. They are categorized into four strands, each with their own integration measures: interest 
parity conditions, savings-investment correlations, consumption growth correlations and capital control 
determinants. An analysis of the produce of these theories and measures results in the following 
conjectures. Capital controls are still in force in the 1970s in many industrialized countries, but are 
progressively dismantled in the 1980s. They are abolished in Europe by political agreement within the EEC 
by 1990. Studies based on deviations from interest parity conditions reflect the course of increasingly 
integrated financial markets in Europe in parallel with the EEC’s determination to create a single market 
under the Euro.  
Interest parity conditions are price-based measures and typically applied to short-term fixed 
income securities of the money markets. Closed interest parity and its synthetic approximation of covered 
nominal interest parity (CIP) are the narrowest among them. Both are shown to hold by close 
approximation in the money markets of the industrialized world including Europe already in the 1980s. Ex 
ante uncovered nominal interest parity (UIP), which in addition to CIP demands that exchange rate risks do 
not pose a barrier, generally holds less often. Specifically in Europe, exchange rate volatility within the ERM 
in the 1980s and the 1990s is identified as the principal obstruction to the advance of financial integration. 
The broadest interest parity condition is that of real interest parity (RIP). In empirical studies RIP hardly 
ever holds, not in Europe or elsewhere.  
Measures from the two remaining macroeconomic strands rely on savings-investment correlations 
(Feldstein-Horioka condition) and consumption growth correlations. They are quantity-based and are 180 
 
 
shown to be yet more broad measures of integration than RIP, which is also their prime weakness. Studies 
of savings-investment and consumption growth correlations produce either conflicting or weak empirical 
evidence on financial integration. In the course the theoretical debate in the 1990s they become widely 
discarded because of questions around the structural parameters they actually measure.       
   Following the successful changeover of Europe’s capital markets to the Euro, the measurement of 
their integration within the Euro zone takes on new rigor in the 2000s. Capital markets have grown more 
complex by now and measures are sought for its various instruments – e.g. bank credit, equities, fixed 
income. The fixed income markets are further segmented into money, government bond and eurobond 
markets. From among the traditional macroeconomic measures, interest parity conditions have best 
withstood the test of time. Yet they have found little application beyond the money markets into longer 
markets. Furthermore, it is shown that with the elimination of intra-market currency risk under the Euro, 
these price-based conditions resort to the measurement of either closed interest parity, already shown to 
hold, or real interest parity, widely shown not to hold. This motivates the choice to explore new fields for 
price-based measures. Among them, the theorem in financial economics that the less price behavior of 
securities with dissimilar risk characteristics is influenced by their country effects the better markets are 
integrated. Including such new theorems, the scope implicitly shifts from the measurement of financial 
integration alone (the old interest parity conditions) to that of financial ánd economic integration. Such an 
integrated set of measures provides compelling evidence that fixed income markets’ integration carries on 
with accelerated effect under EMU.  Some notable differences are observed though between instruments: 
(unsecured) money markets are deemed more or less fully integrated,  government bond markets largely 
integrated and eurobond markets the least but still fairly well integrated.    
  The ability of investors to make uninhibited asset allocation choices in fixed income markets in 
Europe is thus shown to have significantly improved pre to post-EMU. The degree of integration of the 
money markets, already large before the Euro, is with the removal of intra-market currency risk further 
improved and extends itself to longer markets, government bonds before eurobonds.  While the theoretical 
analysis of Chapter 2, and therefore by extension its conclusions, remain rather general, Chapter 3 provides 
further color and detail to the impact of EMU on financial integration from the perspective of bond market 
evidence. The first main conclusion of Chapter 3 is that the establishment of EMU causes a number of 
significant changes to the constitution of the European bond markets, which altogether lead to the creation 
of a larger, deeper and more liquid bond market under the Euro, but also one that remains segregated in 
some ways. The various impacts of EMU are grouped into direct and indirect effects. The direct effects are 
the immediate technical implications of one currency and one monetary policy. They also include the 
decision by EMU sovereigns to harmonize conventions, redenominate outstanding bonds and conduct new 
issuance in Euro. These actions create instant critical mass and further momentum is provided as market 181 
 
 
participants decide to quote and trade all securities in Euro. An indirect effect of EMU is the elevation of 
markets to a pan-European level. An important stimulus on the demand-side is the lifting of domestic 
market protecting and currency matching rules for institutional investors. On the supply-side, there is 
increased competition among borrowers to position their debt. Another significant indirect effect is that 
the success of the new Euro bond market encourages other issuers to enter. An array of fixed income 
securities data show that the whole market quickly becomes more than the sum of its parts. Initially the 
government bond sector takes the lead but, much sooner than expected, the corporate eurobond sector 
emerges as the main driver to its expansion. While EMU thus leads to the creation of a large ‘domestic’ 
bond market in Euro, which quickly grows in depth and liquidity, the market also remains segregated. This 
is most visible in the government bond segment where separate yield curves continue to exist. Not directly 
visible is the continued dispersion of post-trading infrastructure. Important national differences in the 
regulation and tax treatment of fixed income instruments also continue to exist.  
Overall, the ability for bond investors to freely allocate funds is significantly enhanced pre to post-
EMU. EMU, directly and indirectly, lowers the barriers for investors to seek opportunities across the pan-
European bond market. The second main conclusion from Chapter 3 is that EMU causes fund managers to 
respond to the new ability and opportunities with a certain willingness to adapt their portfolio allocations 
and diversification strategies. Indications from market practice, though on the whole circumstanstial, are 
that government bonds dominate bond holdings pre-EMU with a certain home bias. Financial studies of 
IMF CPIS survey data find that the international diversification of European bond portfolios improves post-
EMU, but that this diversification remains confined to the Euro zone. These studies are not able to detect 
any credit diversification, but there is some evidence from market practice that this has taken place. 
Converging yields of government bonds encourage investors to seek better investment opportunities in the 
corporate eurobond sector. Anecdotal evidence shows that the flurry of new eurobonds are keenly 
immersed into portfolios henceforth. Thus the willingness to diversify geographically within the Euro zone 
is confirmed by (CPIS) studies on international investment holdings. The willingness to diversify along the 
credit spectrum is established only anecdotally and could be deferred from market evidence.     
The conclusions so far also demonstrate that the factors involved with the ability and willingness to 
make free and optimal portfolio allocations become more numerous as the dissimilarity of instruments 
increases. Figure 6.1 illustrates this. Moving along the spectrum of fixed income instruments asset 
substitutability declines. Between money markets and government bonds this decline is due to the 
lengthening of the term structure; the decline between government bonds and corporate eurobonds is due 
to greater credit risk variation. In the context of the Euro zone, where capital controls have been abolished 
and exchange rate risks eliminated, any obstructions to the ability to freely allocate funds in the money 




Factors determining ability and willingness to allocate investments in Euro fixed income markets 
 
Asset substitutability of fixed income instruments 
    High                           Low       





Ability  Transaction costs 
Asset-specific risks 
   
    + Maturity risks 
+ Credit worthiness 
 
Willingness       + Credit familiarity 
+ Liquidity risks 
Note: Asset substitutability indicates, from high to low, the extend in which instruments from the respective segment of fixed income markets are 
comparable in terms of their overall investment-risk characteristics. The ability to freely and optimally allocate investment assets refers to 
remaining market barriers and the willingness to the behavior of investors. Within the grid, the factors are identified that influence this ability and 
willingness for each type of fixed income instrument. Transaction costs refer to the differential costs of trading; Asset-specific risks refer to 
differences in legal, tax and regulatory treatment of assets; Maturity risks arise from the lengthening of the investment horizon; Credit worthiness is 
the default risk of the issuer; Credit familiarity is the cost associated with overcoming information asymmetries on the credit risk of issuers; Liquidity 
risks are the costs associated with the timely execution of sizeable transactions. Factors initially indentified are added to by further factors as one 
moves along and down the spectrums, indicated by the plus sign. 
 
regulation and taxes). While these factors increase in importance for longer-dated bonds with comparable 
risk characteristics, maturity risk and creditworthiness risk add to the list of factors. With the inclusion of 
eurobonds, an investors’ familiarity of non-national corporations come into play with the willingness to 
invest. Liquidity risks also increase because eurobonds vary more in size and turnover than government 
bonds. 
The shift in focus away from the traditional ground of money markets to that of the bond markets 
renders the analysis richer, but its results also more complex for interpretation. There is hardly one single 
methodology in the dual study of financial integration and portfolio allocation that can precisely pinpoint 
these various factors. I find common ground in the analysis on ability and willingness in a further 
examination of the importance of country and industry, as first order effects, and liquidity and maturity, as 
second order effects, in the structure of European bond returns. The central idea is that bond investors 
strive to optimally allocate their portfolios to benefit from diversification opportunities in the more 
integrated bond markets of Europe. The assumption is that the ex ante benefits for return on investment 
can be determined ex post through an examination of observed returns. In the analysis, the inception of 
EMU is adopted as an explicit turning point to study its impact. The observed relative importance of effects 
is in turn indicative of the level of integration. Due to the nature of the empirical study and the applied 
methodologies, this results only in more general observations of financial ánd economic integration. 
 The empirical study in this thesis comprises starts from a decomposition analysis of returns into 
primarily country and industry effects and extends into a mean-variance performance analysis of bond 
portfolios allocated on either basis. Table 6.1 summarizes the main results of the entire empirical analysis 





Summary of main results from empirical analysis 
Data  Model  Full sample results  Pre to post-EMU results    Interpretation 
A.  Decomposition analysis of returns (Chapter 4) 
6,440 monthly USD 
eurobond returns, 
May 1990-Mar 2008; 
- assign to 10 country 




into a common factor, 
country and industry 
effects 
 
Country effects dominate 
industry effects more than 
three times (1.26 / 0.39) 
Country effects increase slightly while 
industry effects drop; pre-EMU the ratio 
of country to industry effects is two (1.24 
/ 0.63), post-EMU it is eight (1.28 / 0.16). 
Average country effects of core EMU fall 
(from 1.18 to 0.26), while that of the 







  (separate) multivariable 
regression analysis on 
the common factor 
Variance of common 
factor is high (8.3)  
Over the whole sample period the 
common factor is explained for 87% by 
the conversion of returns to USD, and 





   
(separate) OLS 
regressions of currency 
components on pure 
country effects 
 
Good statistical model fit, 
especially for core-EMU 
countries 
 
The model fit improves pre to post-EMU 
for core-EMU countries but deteriorates 




relates to country 
effects  
 
- assign to 4 liquidity 
and 4 maturity groups    
Extended decomposition 
with liquidity and 
maturity effects 
Country effects remain 
dominant (1.13), followed 
by maturity (0.73), 
industry (0.42) and 
liquidity (0.30) 
Country effects decrease slightly (from 
1.14 to 1.11) but remain dominant. 
Ranking of pure effects remains the 
same. Liquidity effects reduce 
significantly post-EMU (from 0.47 to 
0.14), as do maturity effects (1.04 to 
0.44). 
 
Growing depth and 
maturity of eurobond 
markets 
             
B.  Mean-variance testing of portfolios (Chapter 5) 
4,587 are a closed set;     
- assign to one of 8 
real countries and 
same 7 industries  
             
           
Spanning and efficiency 
tests on country and 
industry portfolios:  
 
first from their direct 
allocation and secondly 
from the decomposition 
Spanning is rejected for 
both VW country and 
industry portfolios. It is 
rejected less after 
decomposition, now 
mostly for industry 
portfolios  
 
Efficiency cannot be 
rejected 
Pre-EMU VW country and industry 
portfolios resulting from a direct 
allocation are not spanned but post-EMU 
they are. Following decomposition, 
spanning improves in both subperiods 
and can no longer be rejected. 
Efficiency cannot be rejected either in 
both subperiods, but the maximum 
Sharpe ratio of country portfolios is 
always higher.   
 
Industry-based 




EMU, all portfolios are 
optimal but country-
based generate better 
returns  long term 
EFFAS indexes of 
government bond 
returns added,  Dec 
1991 – March 2008 
- replace country 
portfolios and compared 
with industry portfolios 
from eurobonds either 
way 
Spanning is again rejected 
for both VW portfolios.  
 
Efficiency cannot be 
rejected 
Pre-EMU VW country portfolios of 
government bonds and industry 
portfolios resulting directly from 
eurobonds are not spanned but post-
EMU they are. Decomposed industry 
portfolios can improve such country 
portfolios. 
Efficiency is rejected post-EMU; country 








improves performance   
Note: Numbers in brackets in Panel A represent the variance in value-weighted excess returns after decomposition. VW  in Panel B stands for value-
weighted  
 
Chapter 4 commences with the factor decomposition of European bond returns. This analysis starts with 
eurobonds, though not only from pure corporates but also from (quasi-) sovereigns. 6,440 returns of 
individual eurobonds from Bloomberg and Morgan Stanley in local currency are converted to USD through 
exchange rates from Datastream. They cover the period from May 1990 to March 2008. They are separated 
into country and industry effects in a standard decomposition and into additional effects of liquidity and 184 
 
 
life-to-maturity in an extended decomposition. The methodology for the standard decomposition follows 
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994). It consists of cross-sectional regressions of the individual, in US Dollar 
converted eurobond returns on a set of country and industry dummy variables. Estimated coefficients of 
these dummies represent the return of the country and industry sector they belong to in excess of the 
average market. The contribution of each factor is subsequently derived from the time series’ variance of 
the estimated coefficients. Return indexes are thus decomposed into pure country effects and the sum of 
industry effects for ten countries (Belgium/Luxembourg, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden, UK, supranationals and other) and vice versa into pure industry effects and sum of country effects 
for seven industry groups (financials and funds, government institutions, consumer, communications and 
technology, basic materials and energy, industrials and utilities). Liquidity and maturity factors are added to 
decompose excess return country and industry indexes. Each are divided over four brackets for which 
dummy variables are included. This extended decomposition follows a similar analysis by Varotto (2003) for 
eurobonds. Standard and extended decompositions are performed on my set of 6,440 eurobond returns, 
first for the whole sample period and secondly for the two subperiods before and after the start of EMU in 
January 1999. Formal tests (i.e. the Jennrich test) demonstrate that the return structure of country and 
industry indexes resulting from their direct allocation is statistically significantly different from the indexes 
after decomposition. Equally, decomposed returns are shown to have correlation and covariance structures 
that are statistically significantly different pre to post-EMU.  
According to integration theory, one would expect to observe diminishing country effects versus 
industry effects over time in European eurobond returns and especially following EMU. Reduced country 
effects would be in response to progressing financial and economic integration of states participating in the 
monetary union which make up the majority of the sample.  As Euro zone countries’ fiscal policies remain 
at a national level, the expectation is of diminishing rather than disappearing country effects. One can also 
expect industry effects to increase post-EMU, if the ex ante predictions from the Krugman school of 
international trade economists for regional industry specialization in the monetary union become real. It is 
not obvious what the expectation of country and industry effects should be for the EMU-outsiders. Two 
such countries are included in the sample (UK and Sweden) and for them the effects could go both ways. 
The importance of liquidity and maturity effects would lessen as the Euro eurobond market becomes 
larger, deeper and more liquid.  
Results from the decomposition analysis are noteworthy because they largely contradict these a 
priori expectations. The first main conclusion is that country effects dominate industry effects over the 
whole period from May 1990 to March 2008 by more than three times. When the sample period is split 
around the introduction of EMU, the second main conclusion is that country effects remain on the whole 
equally important post-EMU compared to the period before and even rise slightly. This shatters the 185 
 
 
expectation of diminishing country effects under EMU. The third main conclusion is that the strength of 
industry effects decreases significantly. This shatters the prediction of increased industry effects under 
EMU. The combination of the latter two results is that country effects outweigh industry effects pre-EMU 
by a factor of nearly two, and post-EMU by a factor of precisely eight. The fourth main conclusion is that of 
a North-South divide within the Euro zone in the results of the direction of country effects. The average of 
country effects of the core-EMU countries Germany, France and BENELUX shrinks to nearly one-fifth under 
the Euro, while the average of country effects of the more peripheral-EMU countries Spain and Italy rises 
nearly five times pre to post-EMU. The immediate observation from eurobond returns, therefore, is of 
economic divergence between the core and the periphery. The final conclusion from the standard 
decomposition is that there is, as expected, no consistency in the pattern of country effects among the 
EMU-outs. The main conclusion from the extended decomposition analysis is that liquidity and maturity 
effects both diminish after EMU. This is the only case where a priori expectations are confirmed and the 
growing depth and maturity of the eurobond markets under the Euro is verified. Results from the extended 
decomposition also confirm that country effects remain dominant throughout. This implies that the main 
conclusions from the standard decomposition are robust.  
Finally, in the course of the decomposition analysis it is found that the common factor in European 
eurobond returns is high. A separate regression analysis concludes that the conversion of local currency 
casu quo Euro returns into US Dollar is predominantly responsible for this high common factor. In addition, 
it is found that the currency component, defined as the percentage change of the local currency of each 
country to the USD over the weighted-average basket of these currencies, can in a number of cases be 
related to the country effects. The interpretation of this relation is that a more than average depreciation 
of the national currency implies a competitive business advantage for the local companies and better 
returns on their eurobonds. The relation between currency components and country effects is stronger for 
core-EMU countries than for peripheral EMU countries and intensifies post-EMU.   
The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 extends the previous analysis by comparing the mean-variance 
performance of bond portfolios diversified on either a country or an industry sector basis. Country and 
industry portfolios are created first from their direct allocation and secondly after decomposition from a 
closed set of 4,587 eurobond returns that belong to exactly one of the same seven industry groups and one 
of eight remaining European countries. The decomposed country and industry portfolios use the results 
from the previous chapter. Whereas in the previous analysis, government bonds could not be included as 
their volume would have distorted results, the analysis in this chapter is performed at a portfolio index 
level which allows for their inclusion. Hence, in the third instance, country portfolios created from the 
EFFAS government bond return series are compared with industry portfolios of eurobonds created either 
way (direct and decomposed). In all three cases, country and industry portfolios are compared for spanning 186 
 
 
and efficiency.  Spanning tests determine whether the return performance of one type of portfolio (e.g. 
country) can be improved by adding assets from the opposite set (i.e. industry portfolios).  Efficiency tests 
determine whether the maximum Sharpe ratio of country-based and industry-based portfolios can be 
distinguished.  
The mean-variance tests of spanning and efficiency are performed for the complete sample period 
and again for each subperiod before and after the start of EMU. The first main conclusions are that 
spanning of eurobond indexes is rejected less often in the case of decomposed portfolios. In cases it is 
rejected, in the pre-EMU and full sample periods, it is most often that industry portfolios are not spanned 
by their country components. Efficiency tests find that country and industry portfolios of eurobonds cannot 
be distinguished in their maximum Sharpe ratio, though it is consistently found to be higher for country-
based portfolios. These conclusions confirm results from the decomposition analysis in Chapter 4, where it 
is found that country effects contribute more to the variation of eurobond returns than industry effects. 
The second main conclusion arises from the inclusion of government bonds in the analysis. Spanning tests 
find that a country diversification of a portfolio of government bonds is largely a suboptimal strategy and 
can in the majority of cases be improved with the addition of corporate eurobonds. Efficiency tests find 
that post-EMU country-based portfolios of government bonds can be distinguished from industry-based 
portfolios of eurobonds. The maximum Sharpe ratio is statistically significantly higher for country than for 
industry portfolios in these cases. It is higher in all other cases too for country portfolios, which seems to 
indicate that country-based portfolios are capable of generating higher risk-adjusted returns in the long run 
than industry-based portfolios. 
1.1. Implications for fund managers  
 
The main conclusions from the empirical analysis of both Chapters 4 and 5 have practical implications. The 
decomposition analysis in Chapter 4 separates and identifies factors as sources of reduction in return 
variation in portfolios, in this case of corporate eurobonds. This concerns the risk properties of portfolios. 
The appropriate practical implication that can be derived from the result that country effects dominate 
industry effects is that a diversification across countries within an industry is a more effective tool for risk 
reduction of eurobond portfolios than the other way around. Hence, for bond fund managers who consider 
only the riskiness of their portfolios, the implication is that a country allocation remains the most optimal 
means of diversification even under EMU.          
The mean-variance tests conducted in Chapter 5 compare country-based and industry-based 
portfolios on both risk and reward performance characteristics, in this case of corporate eurobonds and 
government bonds. This analysis allows for qualifications on whether a country or an industry based 187 
 
 
allocation strategy performs better in European bond markets overall, from a perspective of risk and 
reward and not just risk alone. From the results of the various mean-variance tests, the practical 
implications are several. First, for portfolios of corporate eurobonds, fund managers who consider both risk 
and the reward properties are indifferent between a country and an industry diversification in the post-
EMU environment. Each type of diversification results in a mean-variance performance that cannot be 
statistically distinguished. Even so, the choice between a country and an industry-based portfolio of 
corporate eurobonds needs to be made with the added consideration that it is likely over the longer term 
that country-based portfolios are rewarded with better risk-adjusted returns. This is because mean-
variance tests also demonstrate that the maximum Sharpe ratios tend to be higher overall for country-
based portfolios than for industry-based portfolios. Though portfolios are shown to have a better mean-
variance performance following decomposition, this is hardly an option for fund managers in real practice. 
Secondly, for bond fund managers who have stuck with a portfolio of government bonds, the practical 
implication is that this diversification strategy is distinctly suboptimal. In many cases, portfolios of 
government bonds can be improved with the addition of eurobonds. This was already true in the years 
prior to EMU, but even more so thereafter. In all this, the currency hedging decision remains of significant 
importance as well. 
 
2.  Contemplation of results  
 
The observations in this thesis are made through the prism of the European bond markets. Furthermore, 
specific methods are used to extract results from their return structure that lead to these observations. All 
the same, they have a bearing on judgments of the accomplishments of EMU. They also offer a perspective 
on the trace of the recent financial crisis in Europe.  
The European Commission’s report “One market, one money” (1990) is a foresight on EMU’s 
benefits and costs. It contains an implicit economic convergence expectation for those countries that will 
form a monetary union in Europe.  Results from the analysis in this thesis show that this most fundamental 
expectation of EMU has not borne out. Instead, national-economic divergence between the core and the 
periphery is observed.  The analysis in “One market, one money” is useful to identify where the 
discrepancies between expectation and reality could be. The report builds its economic convergence 
expectation on the two pillars of microeconomic efficiencies and macroeconomic stability effects of EMU.  
It can hardly be disputed that EMU has brought microeconomic efficiencies through the elimination of 
foreign exchange rate uncertainty, a reduction in transaction costs and a strengthening of the internal 
market. It is also plausible that these efficiencies have contributed to economic growth. Greater price 188 
 
 
stability (inflation), reduced variability of output and employment, monetary stability and fiscal policy 
discipline and coordination are all expected to contribute to macroeconomic stability. While EMU has 
fulfilled its expectations in the monetary sphere, it has not done so to the same extent in the fiscal sphere. 
Positive growth that appeared similar within the monetary union for most part of this decade masked 
diverging underlying trends, in competitiveness and fiscal policy, between core and peripheral countries.  
“One market, one money” defies the ex ante prediction of country industry concentration by the 
Krugman school of international trade economists and has proven right in this respect.  Industry-dispersion 
rather than concentration is indeed the other main observation that shines through in the empirical results 
of this thesis. The differences between the European Commission’s view and the Krugman view on the 
expected course of industrial trade patterns under EMU can best be explained with the use of Figure 6.2, 
which is from De Grauwe (2008). The European Commission’s view is that differential shocks occur less 
frequently under EMU, partially because of greater economic integration and partially because the 
industrial structure in Europe is that of intra-industry trade. The removal of barriers under EMU reinforces 
the positive relation between trade integration and symmetry between countries in the union, illustrated 
by the upward sloping line TT’ in Figure 6.2a. It bears an optimistic view on the EMU, for its dynamics sets it 
on a path to quickly cross the OCA (optimum currency area) line representing minimal combinations of 
symmetry and trade integration for EMU to break-even on costs and benefits. The Krugman (1989, 1991) 
view emphasizes centripetal forces resulting from economies of scale, externalities and transportation 
costs. In this view, trade integration that occurs as a result of economies of scale can lead to regional 
concentration of industrial activities. Lowering of barriers initially reinforces greater profits from a 
concentration of production than from a positioning closer to final markets. In Figure 6.2b, the relation 
between trade integration and symmetry of countries (TT’) is now downward sloping. This illustrates 
 
Figure 6.2 
Two opposing views on the course of integration under EMU 








Note: The European Commission view is as expressed in “One market, one money” (1990).  “Symmetry” is the correlation of output and 
employment between groups of countries about to form EMU, and “Trade Integration” is the trade between these countries. “OCA” is the 
optimum currency area line representing minimal combinations of symmetry and trade integration that make EMU break-even. “EMU” is 
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the theory that when integration increases, countries becomes more specialized and are more susceptible 
to economic shocks. This is a more pessimistic view on EMU, for it takes longer to get past the OCA line. 
The difference in assumption between these two views is primarily with respect to the dynamic 
development of countries’ industrial structure under EMU. The European Commission relies on greater 
intra-industry trade, i.e. product differentiation. In this scenario, industry sectors in less developed regions 
follow the pattern of more advanced countries. The Krugman view relies on greater inter-industry trade, 
i.e. product concentration. In this scenario, less developed regions specialize only in the sectors where they 
already have a comparative advantage. While the Krugman school dominated economic thinking on 
regional effects at the time, empirical results from this study confirm that the European Commission’s view, 
particularly as regards the industrial structure in Europe, has probably been closer to the truth. 
 Of my two empirical results that contradict ex ante expectations of EMU  – national-economic 
divergence and industry dispersion – the first is the most striking, particularly also when considered against 
the front of decidedly converging bond yields of EMU sovereigns. How are converging EMU government 
bond yields compatible with the disparaging country effects found in European bond returns especially 
between core and periphery? It is not inconceivable that a kind of investor herd behavior set into the 
government bond markets in Europe. The convergence narrative started to build in the run-up to EMU and 
gathered an ever larger crowd of investors after its launch, driving EMU’s sovereign yields together in turn 
confirming this belief. The narrative is reinforced by reports of the credit agencies. Good prospects for 
world economic growth, not spoilt by inflation expectations and fired by loose monetary policy in the major 
economic blocs, provide the backdrop to declining bond yields in the new millennium. In Europe, the 
emergence of a large domestic bond market invites a strong interest from investors all over, which is 
channeled into the more liquid sovereign debt market. These were factors that contributed to an 
overshooting of government bond prices.  
The highly visible convergence of government bond yields has for many years created an illusion of 
economic convergence within EMU. But in retrospect, there was only pseudo-convergence. An important 
result from my analysis is that beyond the façade of the Euro zone’s sovereign bond market investors held a 
more nuanced view on the total bond market. The return structure of corporate eurobonds is more closely 
related to real economic activity and subject to greater risks of default than government bond yields. 
Through the deployed methods, corporate eurobond returns signal a larger disparity in country effects than 
what can be superficially deferred from government bonds yields. The convergence story based on an 
overreliance on fiscal policy discipline and coordination under EMU, has given a false sense of security to its 
government bonds. It has driven a wedge in the pricing of country risks between this segment and that of 
corporate eurobonds.  190 
 
 
This wedge disappeared by the financial crisis that started in subprime credit first, catched the 
corporate bond markets later on and now, with increased force, seized government bonds. By now, the 
crisis has worked itself through the system and established widely different effects on countries within 
EMU. The government bond yields in the periphery have been driven wide away from the core. The 
pseudo-convergence in the government bond markets has been one of the cradles for this dire 
circumstance. The ability to issue debt in abundance and at very favorable terms for a near decade under 
EMU has fuelled credit driven growth and asset bubbles that were at the origin of the crisis. The inability of 
the government bond market to enforce better market discipline on sovereigns with diverging debt and 
deficit levels and declining competitiveness within the monetary union left this process unchecked for too 
long. This is evident too from the initial reaction in EMU sovereign bond yields. When the financial crisis 
erupted in June 2007 the yield spread divergence remained small and was originally caused by a flight-to-
liquidity, more than by a flight-to-credit quality. But beyond this façade, the signs of disparaging fortunes 
between EMU countries even at the onset of the crisis were already visible in the price behavior within the 
wider set of bond markets. Separate scrutiny of the July 2007 – March 2008 timeframe in my data set of 
eurobond returns reveals that the average of country effects in their variation in this nine month period is 
1.5 times greater than in the previous nine months. While country effects of core-EMU members such as 
Germany and the Netherlands remain as before or decline, those in periphery such as Italy and those with a 
heavy concentration in the financial services industry such as the UK show a significant rise. Industry effects 
also rise on average, but this is driven by the financial services sector and the government sector, as can be 
expected from the nature of the crisis. As the subprime financial crisis increasingly turned into a sovereign 
debt crisis beyond March 2008, an extended empirical study with more recent data would presumably 
reveal rising and diverging country effects in Europe.  
   The recent financial crisis will and should inspire an abundance of research under the common 
denominators of financial stability and financial contagion. The bedrock for this research is a thorough 
understanding of the financial integration of markets and the various ways in which they act either as a 
shock-absorber, a straightforward transmission channel or as a shock-amplifier. The bond markets have 
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Dit proefschrift is een onderzoek naar het gedrag van investeerders aangaande optimale 
beleggingsportefeuilles en diversificatie mogelijkheden in Europese obligatiemarkten, in de context van 
steeds verdergaande integratie van die markten ten gevolge van de monetaire eenwording.  
De twee onderwerpen van financiële marktintegratie en portefeuille diversificatie die in dit 
proefschrift worden behandeld zijn sterk met elkaar verbonden. Immers, goed geïntegreerde financiële 
markten zijn een voorwaarde voor het optimaal kunnen aanwenden van investeringsgelden. Omgekeerd is 
de mogelijkheid en de bereidheid van investeerders om een optimale diversificatie aan te brengen in 
portefeuilles ook indicatief voor de mate waarin markten werkelijk zijn samengesmolten. Toch worden 
beide onderwerpen in de academische literatuur vanuit twee aparte velden benaderd. Financiële integratie 
is lang onderwerp van debat geweest in de macro-economie, terwijl optimale portefeuillebelegging en 
diversificatie vooral in de financiële economie is bediscussieerd. Ieder veld legt zijn eigen invalshoek en 
methoden aan de dag. Slechts recent zijn er een aantal studies opgekomen die beide velden overbruggen in 
een tweeledig onderzoek naar marktintegratie en portefeuille allocatie. Dit met interessante en belovende 
bevindingen. Dit onderzoek is gepositioneerd op dit raakvlak. 
  De probleemstelling is als volgt: Op welke wijze hebben beleggingsportefeuilles zich qua 
samenstelling en qua diversificatie mogelijkheden bewogen in de Europese obligatiemarkten in de loop van 
de overgang naar de Euro, en wat is hieruit af te leiden over de integratie van deze markten? Het 
onderzoek is in drie fasen opgesteld. De eerste fase heeft als doel een theoretisch-empirisch overzicht te 
geven van de mate waarin de internationale financiële integratie al is geschied. De tweede fase beschouwt 
vanuit de praktijk wat de belangrijke ontwikkelingen in de Europese obligatiemarkten zijn geweest en in 
welke zin deze het gedrag van beleggers heeft beïnvloedt. Samen duiden deze twee analysen de mate aan 
waarin investeerders vrijelijk hun portefeuilles kunnen inrichten en optimale investeringskeuzes kunnen 
maken. Hierop volgt in de derde fase een empirisch onderzoek naar de mate waarin investeerders hiervan 
gebruik hebben gemaakt om met een optimale diversificatie van portefeuilles te profiteren van de 
veranderende investeringsmogelijkheden in Europese obligatiemarkten. De methodologie die voor dit 
empirisch onderzoek is gekozen veronderstelt dat ex ante gedrag van investeerders wordt geleid door 
verwachte opbrengst en dat dit ex post is af te leiden uit gerealiseerde opbrengst. Vanuit deze gedachte 
worden investeringsrendementen van een breed scala van Europese obligaties onderworpen aan een 
factor analyse. Door middel van deze analyse wordt bepaald welke effecten de grootste invloed uitoefenen 
op de variantie alszijde het risico in rendementen. Primair worden landen- en industie-effecten beschouwd 
en secundair worden liquiditeit- en looptijdeffecten beschouwd. Deze effecten zeggen ook allen impliciet 
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van Europese obligaties samengesteld op basis van een indeling naar land en naar industrie. Deze landen- 
en industrieportefeuilles worden met elkaar vergeleken op hun mogelijkheid een meer optimaal voor risico 
gecorrigeerde rendement te behalen.  
  De drieledige opstelling van het onderzoek is terug te vinden in de hoofdstukindeling. Hoofdstuk 2 
bevat een overzicht van de macro-economische literatuur over internationale financiële integratie. Dit 
literatuuroverzicht concentreert zich op theorieën die methoden hebben voortgebracht voor het kunnen 
kwantificeren ervan. Vier stomingen worden als zodanig besproken: rentepariteit condities, correlaties 
tussen nationale besparingen en investeringen, correlaties in de consumptiegroei van landen, en kapitaal 
controles. Het overzicht neemt in eerste instantie een theoretisch karakter aan, maar richt zich geleidelijk 
op de empirische bewijsvoering van de integratie van obligatiemarkten in Europa. De conclusies zijn dat 
kapitaal controles al door overeenstemming binnen de EEG rond 1990 zijn afgeschaft. Van de overige drie 
stromingen blijkt uit het overzicht dat de rentepariteit condities nog de meest eenduidige resultaten 
hebben opgeleverd. Uit deze condities blijkt dat rentepariteit in de meest enge zin in de loop van de jaren 
negentig al een feit is. Dit is vooral het geval voor korte termijn geldmarkten in Europa. Rentepariteit in 
bredere zin, en daarmee verdergaande integratie van financiële markten, wordt in deze periode nog 
geblokkeerd door valutarisico. Alleen al door de opheffing hiervan heeft EMU een sterk positieve invloed 
op de integratie van markten. Als de Euro eenmaal is ingevoerd, op 1 januari 1999, verrichten financiële 
markten in Europa snel de overstap van hun nationale munteenheid naar de nieuw geïntroduceerde 
Europese munt. Hiermee krijgt ook de bepaling van de integratie van financiële markten die deel uitmaken 
van de Euro nieuw elan. Financiële markten zijn complexer geworden in de tussentijd, en nieuwe relevante 
methoden voor het meten van integratie worden onderzocht voor verschillende deelmarkten: voor bank 
krediet, aandelen en vastrentende instrumenten. Vastrentende markten worden verder opgedeeld in korte 
termijn geldmarkten en lange termijn overheidsobligatie- en bedrijfsobligatiemarkten. De zoektocht naar 
relevante methoden voor het meten van integratie voor de nieuwe constellatie van financiële markten die 
de Euro teweeg heeft gebracht, belandt vanuit de traditionele macro-economie in de financiële economie. 
Vanuit hier verrijst de theorie dat geobserveerde prijzen in markten voor obligaties met een verschillend 
risicoprofiel minder worden beïnvloed door hun landeneffect naarmate die markten beter geïntegreerd 
zijn. Niet alleen duidt de gehele set van maatstaven die deze mede omvat op grotendeels geïntegreerde 
vastrentende markten in Europa vooral volgende op de totstandkoming van EMU, maar duidt deze nieuwe 
methode tevens op een constructieve onderzoeksaanpak van mijn probleemstelling. 
  Hoofdstuk 3 bevat naast de meer theoretische analyse in het voorgaande hoofdstuk, een 
praktische analyze van de integratie van obligatiemarkten in Europa. Dit hoofdstuk berust op statistieken 
van de uitgifte en verhandeling van obligaties, empirische resultaten vanuit de academische literatuur over 
portefeuille samenstellingen en anekdotische aanduidingen over beleggergedrag, om belangrijke 199 
 
 
ontwikkelingen in kaart te brengen. De conclusies van deze datarijke analyse zijn allereerst dat EMU een 
aantal verschuivingen teweeg brengt die samengenomen leiden tot het ontstaan van een grote, diepe en 
liquide Europese obligatiemarkt. De verschillende invloeden van EMU worden onderverdeeld in directe en 
indirecte invloeden. De directe invloed van EMU is niet alleen de onmiddellijke overgang naar één monetair 
beleid en één munt, maar ook de harmonisatie van conventies van obligaties, de omzetting van uitstaande 
obligaties naar Euro en de beslissing om nieuwe obligaties uit te geven in Euro door deelnemende lidstaten. 
Deze acties verschaffen het benodigde momentum aan de Euro obligatiemarkt. De indirecte invloed van 
EMU is dat obligatiemarkten verheven worden van nationaal naar Europees niveau, voor zowel 
investeerders als emiteerders. Met behulp van statistieken van nieuwe uitgiften wordt aangetoond dat de 
Euro markt een ware vlucht neemt. De markt is in de eerste jaren onder EMU al gauw meer dan de som van 
haar verschillende (voormalige) deelmarkten. Vooral het segment van bedrijfsobligaties groeit aanzienlijk. 
Terwijl er zo een diepere en meer liquide obligatiemarkt is ontstaan in Europa, blijft de markt ook in 
bepaalde, niet onbelangrijke opzichten, gescheiden. Ondanks die kanttekening, is de mogelijkheid voor 
investeerders om meer vrijelijk hun beleggingsportefeuilles te bepalen wel aangetoond, evenals de invloed 
die EMU daarop heeft gehad. Voor het overige deel, richt dit hoofdstuk zich op aanduidingen in hoeverre 
obligatieportefeuilles zich daarop hebben aangepast. Die aanduidingen zijn slechts sporadisch en 
onvolledig. Uit de academische literatuur die voornamelijk gebruik maakt van IMF survey data blijkt een 
zekere nationale voorkeur in obligatieportefeuilles te heersen in de periode voor EMU. Deze wordt 
verheven tot de Euro in de periode erna. Hiermee is een bredere geografische spreiding van portefeuilles 
over het EMU gebied aangeduid. Door een gebrek aan consistente data is er echter weinig bewijsvoering 
vanuit de academische literatuur wat betreft een veranderende spreiding van het krediet risico in 
portefeuilles. Op dit vlak zijn er slechts anekdotische aanduidingen uit investeerders surveys die zijn 
verricht. Eén daarvan duidt erop dat investeerders vlak voor de monetaire eenwording voorstaan een 
groter deel van hun portefeuille te beleggen in het sterk toenemende aantal en variëteit van 
bedrijfsobligaties.  
  Het empirische onderzoek van dit proefschrift is erop gericht om op consistente wijze deze 
tendensen van obligatiemarkt integratie en daarmee gepaard gaande veranderingen van portefeuille 
samenstelling en diversificatie mogelijkheden in Europa te analyseren. Hoofdstuk 4 maakt hiermee een 
aanvang met een factor analyse van Europese obligatierendementen. Deze analyse is op internationale 
obligaties gericht die vooral door bedrijven maar ook mede door overheidsinstanties in de markt zijn 
afgezet. Een data set van 6,440 rendementen is bij elkaar gebracht, die gezamelijk een periode van bijna 
twintig jaar bestrijkt, namelijk van mei 1990 tot en met maart 2008. Deze data is verkregen van Bloomberg 
en Morgan Stanley en oorspronkelijk aangeduid in nationale valuta. Rendementen worden ieder 
geconverteerd naar US dollar met wisselkoersen die van Datastream zijn verkregen. De totale set van 6,440 200 
 
 
USD rendementen worden toegekend aan tien landen (Belgie/Luxembourg, Frankrijk, Duitsland, Nederland, 
Italië, Spanje, Zweden, Groot Brittannië, supranationale instituten en overige) en aan zeven 
industriegroepen (financiele instanties, overheidsinstanties, consumentensector, communicatie en 
technologie, basis materialen en energie, industriële bedrijven en nutsbedrijven). De standaard 
decompositie methode van Heston en Rouwenhorst (1994) wordt benut om de variantie in de 
rendementen primair aan de effecten van deze tien landen en zeven industrieën te bepalen. In een verdere 
uitbreiding hierop worden liquiditeit- en looptijdeffecten in het model opgenomen. De analyse wordt over 
de gehele periode verricht. Vervolgens wordt deze periode opgesplitst in twee deelperiodes, één voor en 
één na de start van EMU om het belang ervan te kunnen waarnemen.  
  Vanuit de integratie theorie is te verwachten dat landeneffecten afnemen in belangrijkheid, vooral 
onder EMU. Landeneffecten verdwijnen echter niet in zijn geheel, omdat overheden verantwoordelijk 
blijven voor het nationale fiscale beleid. Vanuit de redenering van de invloedrijke Krugman school van 
economen is een zekere industriespecialisatie voorspeld onder EMU, van waaruit te verwachten is dat 
industrie-effecten juist toenemen in belangrijkheid. Verder is te verwachten dat met de groei van de 
Europese obligatiemarkt de belangrijkheid van liquiditeit- en looptijdeffecten afneemt. Resultaten uit de 
decompositie analyse in Hoofdstuk 4 zijn opmerkelijk, omdat ze deze verwachtingen ten dele 
tegenspreken. Allereerst wordt bevonden over de gehele periode genomen dat landeneffecten veel 
belangrijker zijn in de bepaling van de variantie van Europese bedrijfsobligaties dan industrie-effecten. In 
de vergelijking van de periodes voor en na EMU, blijkt juist dat die landeneffecten gelijk blijven terwijl 
industrie-effecten sterk afnemen. Dit staat haaks op wat er algemeen wordt bevonden voor rendementen 
van Europese aandelen, waarvoor een aantal studies aantonen dat de belangrijkheid van industrie-effecten 
toeneemt ten opzichte van landeneffecten na EMU. Voor Europese bedrijfsobligaties is de resultante dat de 
kracht van landeneffecten dat van industrie-effecten twee keer overheerst voor EMU, en acht keer 
overheerst na EMU. Een nog opmerkelijker resultaat is dat er een duidelijke Noord-Zuid tegenstelling waar 
te nemen is in het pad dat de landeneffecten volgen binnen EMU. De landeneffecten van Duitsland, 
Frankrijk en de BENELUX, de zogenaamde kernlanden van EMU, dalen terwijl die van Italië en Spanje, de 
zogenaamde periferielanden van EMU, sterk toenemen. Vanuit het perspectief van de Europese 
obligatiemarkten is er dus sprake geweest van divergentie tussen kern en periferie binnen de monetaire 
unie. Dit spreekt de gedachte en het doel waarmee EMU in eerste instantie is opgericht geheel tegen. Ook 
blijkt uit het resultaat van afnemende industrie-effecten dat er geen sprake is geweest van industrie 
specialisatie binnen de EMU. In tegendeel, industrieën hebben zich meer verspreid in het gebied dat de 
Euro bestrijkt wat de voorspelling van de Krugman economen tegenspreekt. Het is wel juist gebleken dat de 
belangrijkheid van liquiditeit- en looptijdeffecten afneemt na EMU. Hiermee is ontwikkeling van de 
Europese obligatiemarkt tot een grotere en diepere markt deels bewezen.  201 
 
 
  Een andere bevinding van de decompositie analyse is dat de gemeenschappelijke factor in 
Europese obligatierendementen groot is. Daarvan wordt bepaald dat deze voornamelijk resulteert uit de 
omzetting van rendementen naar US dollar. Ook wordt bevonden dat de landeneffecten in een aantal 
gevallen te relateren is aan de zogeheten competitieve valuta component. Deze laatste component is 
gedefinieerd als het meerdeel van de nationale valutabeweging ten opzichte van het marktgemiddelde wat 
een competitief voordeel oplevert voor de bedrijven in het betreffende land, wat zich in betere 
rendementen vertaalt. De relatie tussen de belangrijkheid van de landeneffecten en deze component is 
duidelijk aanwezig, vooral in het geval van de kernlanden van EMU, en versterkt onder de Euro. 
  De empirische analyse in Hoofdstuk 5 bouwt voort op het thema van landen- en industrie-effecten 
in Europese obligatierendementen. Dat gebeurt in dit hoofdstuk doordat beleggingsportefeuilles ofwel op 
een landenbasis ofwel op een industriebasis worden ingericht. Deze portefeuilles worden dan met elkaar 
vergeleken op hun opbrengst. Terwijl de decompositie methode eigenlijk alleen de mate waarin effecten 
bijdragen in de variantie ofwel het risicogehalte van portefeuilles bepaalt, kijkt de gehanteerde methode in 
dit hoofdstuk naar de opbrengst ten opzichte van het genomen risico. Volgende op Hubert en Kandel 
(1987) en De Roon en Nijman (2001) worden er zogeheten spannings- en efficiëntietoetsen opgesteld om 
een dergelijke vergelijking te kunnen maken. Spanningstoetsen bepalen of de set van landenportefeuilles 
verbeterd kan worden door toevoeging van delen van de industrieportefeuilles en andersom. Deze toets 
vergelijkt de ligging van de optimale belegging parabool in een risico-rendement spectrum ten opzichte van 
elkaar. Efficiëntietoetsen vergelijken direct of het maximum behaalde Sharpe ratio van iedere set statistisch 
significant van elkaar verschilt. De landen- en industrieportefeuilles worden op drie verschillende wijzes 
gecreëerd. Te beginnen wordt uit de data set van USD rendementen van bedrijfsobligaties die in het vorige 
hoofdstuk is benut, een gesloten set van 4,587 rendementen geselecteerd. Het is voor de analyse in dit 
hoofdstuk namelijk nodig dat ieder rendement toe te kennen is aan één specifiek land en industrie. Voor 
het eerste type portefeuilles worden deze rendementen direct toegekend aan de acht overgebleven 
Europese landen en dezelfde zeven industriegroepen. Voor het tweede type portefeuilles worden deze 
opnieuw gemaakt volgens de standaard decompositie methode in Hoofdstuk 4. Hiermee wordt het 
bevonden resultaat van het vorige hoofdstuk, namelijk dat portefeuilles een ander rendement structuur 
hebben na decompositie, verder benut. Ten derde worden overheidsobligaties aan de analyse toegevoegd. 
De toevoeging van overheidsobligaties is alleen mogelijk in dit stadium omdat de analyse zich nu op het 
niveau van portefeuilles begeeft. De toevoeging van (individuele) overheidsobligaties zou door hun omvang 
de uitkomst van de decompositie analyse te zeer hebben beïnvloed. De toevoeging van overheidsobligaties 
is echter van belang omdat eerder is ondervonden dat beleggingsportefeuilles vooral in dit segment 
geïnvesteerd waren voor EMU. Voor de portefeuillerendementen van overheidsobligaties worden de 
indexen van EFFAS gebruikt. Deze zijn beschikbaar vanaf december 1991.  202 
 
 
  Spannings- en efficiëntietoetsen worden verricht op de drie types van landen- en 
industrieportefeuilles, eerst voor de gehele periode en vervolgens weer voor de twee deelperiodes rondom 
het begin van EMU. Resultaten zijn opmerkelijk omdat in een aantal gevallen landen- en 
industrieportefeuilles van Europese obligaties van elkaar zijn te onderscheiden. De eerste set van 
conclusies betreft alleen bedrijfsobligaties. Hier blijkt dat spanning minder vaak wordt verworpen in het 
geval portefeuilles voortkomen uit de decompositie dan uit hun directe allocatie. In de gevallen dat 
spanning wordt verworpen komt het vaker voor dat industrieportefeuilles verbeterd kunnen worden met 
delen van de landenportefeuilles dan andersom. De efficiëntietoetsen vinden dat beide portefeuilles niet 
zijn te onderscheiden in hun maximale Sharpe ratio, maar wel dat deze consistent hoger is voor de 
landenportefeuilles dan voor de industrieportefeuilles. Deze eerste set van conclusies bevestigd in zekere 
zin de behaalde resultaten van Hoofdstuk 4, waar werd geobserveerd dat landeneffecten belangrijker zijn 
dan industrie-effecten voor de rendementen van Europese bedrijfsobligaties. De tweede set van conclusies 
komt voort uit de toevoeging van overheidsobligaties in de analyse. Deze worden nu ingezet als 
landenportefeuilles en vergeleken met industrieportefeuilles die geheel uit bedrijfsobligaties bestaan. De 
uitkomst van de spanningstoetsen laat zien dat een landenallocatie van overheidsobligaties een 
suboptimale strategie is geweest. In een groot aantal gevallen kan de voor risico gecorrigeerde opbrengst 
van een dergelijke portefeuille verbeterd worden door het toevoegen van bedrijfsobligaties. 
Efficiëntietoetsen vinden echter dat de maximale Sharpe ratio van deze landenportefeuilles statistisch 
significant hoger is dan voor industrieportefeuilles.  
  Wat hebben deze resultaten uiteindelijk te betekenen? In praktische zin, voor het nut van fonds 
beleggers in Europese obligatiemarkten kunnen een aantal opmerkingen worden gemaakt. Fondsen die 
vooral de risicokenmerken van hun portefeuilles beogen, zijn gebaat bij een landenallocatie. Fondsen die 
de meest optimale voor risico gecorrigeerde opbrengst beogen zijn gelijk gebaat bij een landen- en een 
industrieallocatie. Dit echter met de gewaarwording dat landenportefeuilles waarschijnlijk een hogere 
dergelijke opbrengst leveren op de lange termijn. Fondsen die nog vanuit een tijdperk van voor EMU zijn 
blijven hangen in overheidsobligaties behoren hun strategie te veranderen door meer bedrijfsobligaties op 
te nemen. In elke samenstelling van portefeuilles is de beslissing van koersdenominatie belangrijk.  
In politiek-economische zin, wat betreft de verdienste van EMU, kunnen tevens opmerkingen 
worden geplaatst. Door het speciale prisma van de obligatiemarkten bezien is de opgemerkte nationaal-
economische divergentie tussen de kern- en periferielanden wel heel opmerkelijk. Deze tweedeling in de 
monetaire unie wordt in de huidige fase van de recente financiële crisis, die in de subprime markt begon, 
hoog opgespeeld. Obligatiemarkten spelen hierin duidelijk een centrale rol. Deze recente gebeurtenissen 
tonen aan dat doorlopend onderzoek naar het functioneren van deze markten van belang is.  
 